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ABSTRACT AND KEY WORDS
This thesis explores, in the context of pharmaceutical clinical trials, Canadian
federal, provincial and territorial personal data protection laws (which are consistent with
Canada’s membership in the international Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development). This thesis establishes that, despite scholarly concerns over deidentifiability of data, these laws govern collection, use, dissemination, and disposal of
data about individuals in clinical trials right through and including applications made by
innovator pharmaceutical companies to the federal government for approval to market
new drugs. At this latter point, federal data exclusivity regulations also apply (as required
by international trade agreements). This thesis establishes that both personal data
protection and data exclusivity apply to clinical trials only for defined periods. Finally,
this research demonstrates that, unlike protection of confidential information which
remains secret and does not contribute to the public good of access to information, data
exclusivity displays characteristics of classic intellectual property.

Key words: data exclusivity, personal information, personal data protection, personal
health information, clinical trials, data identifiability, confidential information,
intellectual property
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Introduction
Modern intellectual property law seeks to maintain a balance between the rights
of individual innovators, the private interests of corporations that dominate intellectual
property ownership in many contexts, and the public good in accessing knowledge that
will further human progress and development.1 The development of new pharmaceutical
products is an essential endeavor that improves and saves human lives. Pharmaceutical
companies invest significant resources into the research and development of new drugs,
and the effects of these drugs on human health are evaluated in research studies called
clinical trials. The information that is obtained during the course of these clinical trials is
valuable to both pharmaceutical companies and the public alike, albeit in different ways.
On one hand, pharmaceutical companies consider clinical trial data to be valuable
confidential business information, which is subject to intellectual property protections. In
contrast, the public interest lies in accessing this information in order to increase the
availability of affordable medicines and to advance scientific understanding of the effects
of certain drugs on human health. The tension that arises between the interests of
pharmaceutical companies and those of the public at large illustrates the reality that there
can be different, yet compelling, claims to control over the same set of information.
The need for balance among multiple, potentially divergent interests raises
important questions with respect to access and control over confidential information, and
specifically over clinical trial data. Since international trade agreements confer

1

For example, Wilkinson observes that modern copyright law seeks a balance between the interests of the
following groups: a) the individuals whose cognitive activity produces innovation; b) the corporations that
currently dominate ownership of technologies and influence upon economies; and c) the public. See
Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “International Copyright: Marrakesh and the Future of Users’ Rights
Exceptions” in Mark Perry, ed, Global Governance of Intellectual Property in the 21st Century
(Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016) 107 at 114-115 [Wilkinson, “Marrakesh”].
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temporary, exclusive rights upon pharmaceutical companies to the test data involved in
their pharmaceutical products, how do these rights affect public health? In particular, do
these rights, known as “data exclusivity” protection, either promote or hinder positive
public health outcomes? Moreover, members of the public are entitled to protection of
their personal information in both the public and private sectors, in accordance with
Canadian personal data protection statutes. These personal data protection rights also
extend to the health context, where clinical trials comprise part of the treatment options
that are sometimes made available to individual patients. Individual patients access
clinical trials under the care of a medical professional and have personal data protection
rights in their information under personal health information protection statutes.
The work presented in this thesis arose out of a program of research, which was
foreshadowed by my supervisor, Professor Margaret Ann Wilkinson in 2014.2 In 2016,
she and Professor Mistrale Goudreau, of the Faculty of Civil Law at the University of
Ottawa, obtained a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada3 for research on “Le prisme de la culture d’enterprise et la protection des
inventions et donneés” (“The Prism of Corporate Culture and the Protection of Inventions
and Data”). My work on this thesis was supported by the grant, as I assisted Professor

2

See Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “What is the Role of New Technology in Tensions in IP?,” (Presentation
delivered at the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and research in Intellectual
Property [ATRIP], Montpellier, Monday July 7, 2014), online:
<http://law.uwo.ca/about_us/our_people/PDFs/Wilkinson_ATRIP_Montpellier_2014.pdf>. See also:
Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “What is the role of new technologies in tensions in Intellectual Property?,”
in Tana Pistorius (ed) Intellectual Property Perspectives on the Regulation of Technologies [ATRIP
Intellectual Property Law Series] (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar) (in press).
My thesis also builds upon my work on personal data protection in 2015, which culminated in my paper
entitled “Balancing Individual and Collective Interests: Disclosure of Personal Health Information in Public
Health Emergencies,” for which I was awarded the J.S.D. Tory Writing Prize.
3
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council [SSHRC] Insight Grant 435-2016-1638, funded
through the Faculty of Law at Western University under Professor Wilkinson’s supervision. I was the first
“graduate research assistant” to be supported under this grant.
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Wilkinson with research4 under this grant: this thesis forms part of the initial output from
the four-year research program that is being supported by the grant.
The reality of an individual’s right to control his or her personal data raises an
important question in the context of clinical trials over the control and access to clinical
data. Specifically, does the data exclusivity right of pharmaceutical companies either
operate consistently with or abrogate an individual’s right to personal data
protection in the clinical trial context? To answer this question, this thesis will examine
three constructs: 1) the legislative regulation of clinical trials; 2) the data exclusivity right
of pharmaceutical companies; and 3) the individual’s right to personal data protection.
This thesis will accordingly explore the tension between the interests of pharmaceutical
companies in maintaining confidentiality of data produced in clinical trials and the
interests of the public in accessing this data to promote and protect public health.
Chapter One of this thesis offers an introductory discussion with respect to the
legal regulation of pharmaceutical innovation, data exclusivity, and personal data
protection. In particular, this chapter will briefly introduce and discuss the following
matters: the history of Canadian regulatory requirements for the sale of new drugs; the
movement of intellectual property rights into the international trade environment and the
protection of confidential information therein; the notion of data exclusivity as a
limitation on the permanent secrecy of confidential information; the need for personal

4

Together with JD student Colin Hyslop, I supported Professor Wilkinson in the preparation of her paper
entitled “The Subject of Data and Intellectual Property in It: Do They Compete for Legal Priority?”
(Presentation delivered at the 2017 Canadian IP Scholars’ Workshop, Ottawa, 10 May 2017) [unpublished].
I was also a Discussant for the session in which the paper was presented. Professor Wilkinson’s work on
this paper (and her chapter forthcoming in the monograph that will flow from it) was directly supported by
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Insight Grant 435-2016-1638 and the entire workshop,
organized by Professors Goudreau and Wilkinson, was supported through a 2017-2018 SSHRC
Connections Grant for “Nouveaus paradigmes en propriété industrielle (New Paradigms in Industrial
Property).”

4

data protection laws to safeguard the confidentiality of personal information in the face of
increased computerization; and how modern information technology facilitates
techniques that enable previously “anonymized” data to be re-identified.
Chapter Two provides the theoretical and historical background to the main
constructs that are addressed in this thesis and provides a review and discussion of the
literature and Canadian case law surrounding confidential information, data exclusivity,
and personal data protection. The nature of these constructs will be explored both as
individual concepts and in terms of how they all relate to one another in the context of
Canada’s legislative regime that regulates clinical trials and public health with respect to
new drugs.
Chapter Three consists of a technical discussion of Canada’s legislative regimes
for data exclusivity and personal data protection. First, this discussion will involve a
review of data exclusivity laws in Canada and the flow of information under them.
Second, an analysis of personal health information protection legislation will occur in
order to explore whether there is a conflict between data exclusivity and personal data
protection with respect to patient health information in clinical trial data. The definition
of “personal health information” will be discussed in terms of its meaning under different
personal health information statutes and its relationship to the notion of individual
identifiability. Since current information technology has rendered complete anonymity to
be impossible, this chapter emphasizes the importance of clarifying what it means for
information to be identifiable. Through legislative analyses, this chapter will demonstrate
that data exclusivity and personal data protection operate consistently with each other
under Canadian law and that, despite any anonymization of patient data, personal data

5

protection applies to this data in clinical trials. Because of this latter finding, individual
clinical trial participants retain their rights to control their personal health information. In
this way, this chapter will also demonstrate that there is potential for conflict between the
legislative regimes of data exclusivity and personal data protection.
Chapter Four answers the research question of this thesis and provides a list of
findings in conclusion. These findings are subsequently discussed in the context of
recommendations for future research.

6

Chapter 1 – Historical Background of Constructs
1.1. Historical Overview of Drug Regulation
In Canada, drug manufacturers must satisfy federal legislative requirements that
“prescribe the standards of composition, strength, potency, purity, quality or other
property” of drugs.5 For example, in order to sell or advertise a new drug in Canada, a
drug manufacturer must receive a notice of compliance (NOC) after submission of
evidence to the government which enables the government to assess the safety and
efficacy of the drug.6 Clinical trials play a key role in the evidentiary record for efficacy
and safety: these investigations are conducted to discover or verify clinical,
pharmacological, or pharmacodynamics effects of drugs and identify possible adverse
effects.7 Clinical trials generate unique information about a new drug, and data
exclusivity protection, which constitutes a key focus of this thesis, refers to the
temporary, exclusive rights to the information generated in clinical trials.8
The implementation of national regulatory requirements for drugs, such as those
found in Canada’s Food and Drug Regulations,9 ultimately arose from the need to ensure
the quality and safety of medicines, thereby reflecting a gradual evolution in the
legislative protection of public health. Lembit Rägo and Budiono Santoso note that two
major events catalyzed the development of the regulation of medicines.10 In 1937, over
100 people in the United States died following the use of a sulfanilamide elixir which

5

See Food and Drug Regulations, CRC, c 870, s A.01.002 [Food and Drug Regulations].
See ibid. The regulatory approval process for new drugs will be discussed in Chapter Three.
7
Ibid, s C.05.001.
8
This thesis focuses solely on data exclusivity for pharmaceutical products. Data exclusivity will be
subsequently explored in further detail in Chapters Two and Three.
9
Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5.
10
Lembit Rägo & Budiono Santoso, “Drug Regulation: History, Present and Future,” in Drug Benefits and
Risks: International Textbook of Clinical Pharmacology, revised 2nd ed, CJ van Boxtel, B Santoso & IR
Edwards, eds, (IOS Press and Uppsala Monitoring Centre, 2008), 65-77 [Rägo & Santoso].
6
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used diethylene glycol without any safety testing, thereby instigating the introduction of
premarket notification requirements for new drugs.11 The worldwide thalidomide disaster
constituted the second catastrophe that influenced the development of a regulatory system
for medicines: thalidomide, a sedative and hypnotic, was introduced in 46 different
countries worldwide between 1958 and 1960 and resulted in approximately 10,000 babies
being born with various deformities.12 Following this tragedy, the Council of the
European Economic Community approved Directive 65/65, which required that “no
proprietary medicinal product may be placed on the market in a Member State unless an
authorization has been issued by the competent authority of that Member State.”13 The
need for further pharmaceutical regulatory harmonization to facilitate the availability of
safe, effective, and quality drugs ultimately led to the establishment in 1990 of the
International Council on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for the Registration
of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH).14 This collaborative initiative, of which
Canada is currently a “standing regulatory member,” focuses primarily on technical
requirements for new, innovative medicines.15
The Food and Drug Regulations currently provide the only legally binding
environment under which clinical trials are conducted in Canada. Guidance on the
conduct of research, including clinical trials, can be found in the 2014 Tri-Council Policy

11

Ibid at 65.
Ibid.
13
EEC, Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by
law, regulation or administrative action relating to proprietary medicinal products, [1965] OJ 022, P 0369
– 0373 at art 3, available online: <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31965L0065:EN:HTML> (accessed June 24, 2017).
14
Rägo & Santoso, supra note 10 at 66.
15
See ICH, Current and Standing Members (June 2017), online:
<http://www.ich.org/about/membership.html> (accessed June 24, 2017).
12
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Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (“TCPS 2”).16 This policy is
administered through the research ethics boards of institutions that receive funding from
three federal agencies: the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), the Natural
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), and the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). These agencies all require, as a
condition of funding, that researchers and their institutions apply the ethical principles
and articles contained in the TCPS 2.17
Individual consent to participation in research is a key principle of the TCPS 2
and applies generally to any research involving human participants. According to article
3.1 of the TCPS 2, research participants must give their consent voluntarily,18 and this
consent can be withdrawn at any time.19 The data collected about a participant is also
relevant to the principle of informed consent to participation in research. The TCPS 2
states that informed consent involves giving participants an indication about the
information that will be collected about them, the purpose of collection, anticipated uses
of the data, and information about who may have a duty to disclose information and to
whom disclosure can be made.20 For example, according to the TCPS 2, a participant

16

Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada,
and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical
Conduct for Research Involving Humans, December 2014, online: <
http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/pdf/eng/tcps2-2014/TCPS_2_FINAL_Web.pdf> [TCPS 2].
17
Ibid at 3. This policy applies only to investigators who are typically researchers and their institutions:
investigators are distinct from clinical trial sponsors, as can be seen in Table 3 in Chapter Three.
18
Ibid, art 3.1(a):
Consent shall be given voluntarily.
19
Ibid, art 3.1(b):
Consent can be withdrawn at any time.
20
Ibid, art 3.2:
…The information generally required for informed consent includes…(i) an indication of
what information will be collected about participants and for what purposes; an indication
of who will have access to information collected about the identity of participants, a
description of how confidentiality will be protected (see Article 5.2), a description of the

9

who withdraws consent is also able to request the withdrawal of his or her data from the
study.21 However, the TCPS 2 also acknowledges that there may be circumstances which
do not allow withdrawal of participant data: the TCPS 2 specifically cites the
anonymization of personal information and its subsequent addition to a data pool as an
example of situations in which the withdrawal of data may not be possible.22
Nevertheless, since the TCPS 2 is not law,23 legislated requirements will determine
whether or not participant data remains in a clinical trial dataset.24 This thesis thus
focuses exclusively on the legislated aspects of clinical trials.
In light of the principle of informed consent to research, it might be tempting to
conclude that, since the patient is aware of the consequences of participation in research,
a patient loses any individual rights of control that may have been conferred by personal
data protection legislation by virtue of signing a consent form for participation in the
research. However, consent does not reach the binding level of contract, and even in the
case of the stronger legal imperative of contract law, the recent Supreme Court of Canada
decision, Douez v. Facebook (“Douez”),25 establishes that organizations cannot oust

anticipated uses of data; and information indicating who may have a duty to disclose
information collected, and to whom such disclosures could be made.
21
Ibid, art 3.1(c):
If a participant withdraws consent, the participant can also request the withdrawal of their
data or human biological materials.
22
Ibid, art 3.1(c):
…In some research projects, the withdrawal of data or human biological materials may
not be possible (e.g., when personal information has been anonymized and added to a
data pool).
23
Ibid at 16: The TCPS 2 states that researchers are responsible for “ascertaining and complying with all
applicable legal and regulatory requirements with respect to consent and the protection of privacy of
participants.” Where researchers experience a tension between the requirements of the law and the
guidance of the ethical principles in the TCPS 2, “researchers should strive to comply with the law in the
application of ethical principles.”
24
The issue of withdrawal of data by clinical trial participants will be addressed in Chapter Three.
25
2017 SCC 33 [Douez]. The seven-person Court was split 4-3 in this decision. Justice Karakatsanis wrote
for herself and Justices Wagner and Gascon: together with Justice Abella, who wrote for herself, these four
judges constituted the majority and held that the forum selection clause contained in Facebook’s Terms of

10

privacy legislation through contract. In Douez, the appellant was a resident of British
Columbia and claimed that Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”) infringed her privacy rights and
those of other British Columbians in a manner contrary to British Columbia’s Privacy
Act.26 Facebook sought to have the action stayed on the basis of the forum selection
clause contained in its “Terms of Use” (a contract between Facebook and its users).
Karakatsanis J., writing one of the majority judgments in the Supreme Court,
noted that forum selection clauses are regularly enforced since they create certainty and
security in transactions,27 and in commercial contexts, sophisticated parties that agree to
forum selection clauses are deemed to have informed themselves about the risks of
foreign legal systems and are deemed to have accepted those risks.28 However,
Karakatsanis J. also noted that “commercial and consumer relationships are very
different,” since the “unequal bargaining power of the parties and the rights that a
consumer relinquishes under the contract, without any opportunity to negotiate, may
provide compelling reasons for a court to exercise its discretion to deny a stay of
proceedings.”29 Moreover, Karakatsanis J. characterized the issue in Douez in the

Use was unenforceable. Chief Justice McLachlin, with Justice Côté, wrote the dissent, for themselves and
Justice Moldaver.
26
RSBC 1996, c 373. The Privacy Act renders the violation of privacy an actionable tort. It is not a
personal data protection statute, because it does not regulate the collection and handling of personal
information by organizations. Unlike personal data protection statutes, the Privacy Act is not restricted to
information about an identifiable individual: according to section 1(3), the “nature, incidence, and occasion
of the act or conduct” and the relationship between the parties must be considered in order to determine
“whether the act or conduct of a person is a violation of another’s privacy.” Furthermore, since section 1(4)
states that eavesdropping or surveillance may constitute violations of privacy, the Privacy Act encompasses
the individual’s right to refuse to disclose any information that he or she wishes to keep secret, which
includes (but is not limited to) personal information.
27
Douez, supra note 25, per Karakatsanis J. at para 24.
28
Ibid at para 31.
29
Ibid at para 33.
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following language: “At issue in this case is Ms. Douez’s statutory privacy right. Privacy
legislation has been accorded quasi-constitutional status.”30
Through this reasoning and the concurring reasoning of Abella J., the majority of
the Supreme Court judges hearing this case found that, although the Privacy Act does not
specifically override the forum selection clause in a contract, the inequality of bargaining
power between the parties gave Facebook the “unilateral ability to require that any legal
grievances Ms. Douez had could not be vindicated in British Columbia,” which conferred
an unfair procedural benefit upon Facebook.31 Abella J., concurring, noted a gross
imbalance in bargaining power between Facebook, a multi-national corporation, and
Douez, a private citizen, who “had no input into the terms of the contract and, in reality,
no meaningful choice as to whether to accept them given Facebook’s undisputed
indispensability to online conversations.”32 Abella J. found that the facts of the case
satisfied the conditions for application of the doctrine of unconscionability.33 Thus, the
Supreme Court held that the forum selection clause in the contract between Facebook and
Douez was unenforceable and therefore that the law of British Columbia, including its
Privacy Act, would apply.
While Douez occurred in the context of a consumer contract, clinical trial
participants most certainly face unequal bargaining power with respect to the entities that
conduct clinical trials, particularly when these entities are pharmaceutical companies.
Aside from the obvious imbalance in financial resources, the patient’s decision to
30

Ibid at para 59. While the British Columbia Privacy Act is not a personal data protection statute,
Karakatsanis J. cited, in support of her point that “privacy legislation [is] quasi-constitutional,” inter alia, a
Supreme Court decision based upon a personal data protection statute: Dagg v Canada (Minister of
Finance), [1997] 2 SCR 403 at paras 65-66.
31
Douez, supra note 25, per Abella J. at para 116.
32
Ibid at para 111.
33
Ibid at para 115.

12

participate in a clinical trial may be heavily influenced by the need for treatment of a
particular medical condition, such that it may not be a meaningful choice at all. Although
the primary goal of clinical research is to produce generalizable scientific knowledge,
some clinical investigators argue that the purpose of this research also includes ensuring
state-of-the-art therapy for participants.34 In this way, the administration of an
experimental drug can be viewed “both as a means to learn about its safety and efficacy
and as a therapeutic option.”35 This perspective appears to be in accordance with that of
organizations such as the Canadian Cancer Society, which lists the following potential
benefits of participation in a clinical trial: the receipt of “state-of-the-art cancer care;” the
possibility that the participant may be “the first to benefit from a new and effective
treatment;” the possibility that the participant “may undergo an effective new treatment
that has fewer side effects than standard treatment”; and, regardless of the outcome of the
trial, “helping scientists answer important questions about cancer” which “may contribute
new knowledge about cancer and eventually help others with the disease.”36 Therefore,
while certain information must be collected and retained from patients in order to meet
the goals of the clinical trial, the “price” for this treatment would, especially in light of
Douez, be unlikely to be considered to include relinquishing the individual’s statutory
rights to control his or her personal information.

34

Gail E Henderson et al, “Clinical Trials and Medical Care: Defining the Therapeutic Misconception”
(2007) 4 PLoS Medicine 1735 at 1736. Henderson et al note that there is some conceptual disagreement as
to the true purpose of a clinical trial: while some clinical researchers argue that the sole purposes of a
clinical trial are to further the progress of science and help future patients, others argue that helping patients
enrolled in a trial can serve as a legitimate additional purpose of a clinical trial.
35
Ibid at 1737.
36
Canadian Cancer Society, Why Participate? online: < http://www.cancer.ca/en/about-us/ourresearch/clinical-trials-we-are-funding/?region=on> (accessed August 6, 2017).
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Since drug research and development has important consequences for the life
sciences,37 Elina Petrova has observed that the pharmaceutical industry faces enormous
pressure to innovate, because “no other industry is expected to affect how long people
can live or how fast they recover from an illness.”38 On the other hand, “no other industry
can burn through billions of dollars and man-hours only to end up empty-handed, with
not much to show for its vast expenditure, dedication, and effort.”39 Pharmaceutical
innovation has thus influenced intellectual property law-making, particularly at the
international level, owing to a confluence of factors such as the public’s need for
essential medicines and the need to protect the large-scale investments of powerful
pharmaceutical companies in drug development.

1.2. The Movement of Innovation (and Confidential Information) into International
Trade
In 1967, developed countries established the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) in order to promote the harmonization of intellectual property
laws.40 WIPO administers two principal international intellectual property covenants, the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris Convention”)41 and
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne

37

See Elina Petrova, “Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Process of Drug Discovery and
Development,” in M Ding et al, eds, Innovation and Marketing in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Emerging
Practices, Research, and Policies (New York: Springer, 2014), 19-81 at 25 [Petrova]: According to
Petrova, the Second World War instigated a worldwide “extraordinary need” for antibiotics. In response to
market demands, pharmaceutical firms invested in unprecedented research and development programs.
Firms thus acquired technical and managerial experience and the organizational capability to produce
massive volumes of drugs, thereby forever altering the process of drug discovery and development.
38
Ibid at 23.
39
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40
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Monopolies on Medicines – Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement” (2015) 23 J
Intell Prop L 1 at 6 [Baker & Geddes].
41
(1883) 828 UNTS 305, revised, July 14, 1967 [Paris Convention].
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Convention”),42 which were both signed at the end of the nineteenth century and were
updated at various conferences.43 Although the Paris Convention and the Berne
Convention represented the first efforts to set global standards with respect to intellectual
property rights protections,44 these conventions suffer from two major flaws in that they
both lack detailed rules on the enforcement of intellectual property rights before national
judicial and administrative authorities as well as a binding and effective mechanism to
settle disputes between states.45 WIPO thus has limited success in its efforts to create
normative intellectual property rights standards.46
Beginning in the 1970s, developed countries such as the U.S. faced increasing
pressure from domestic intellectual property industries to combat widespread
infringement and raise standards of protection worldwide, thereby improving their ability
to compete in foreign markets.47 In 1986, the contracting parties of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 194748 launched the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations (“Uruguay Round”), which concluded in 1994 with the creation of
the World Trade Organization (WTO).49 At the urging of corporate intellectual property
owners, the U.S. pressed for the inclusion of intellectual property issues in the 1986
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negotiating mandate of the Uruguay Round.50 Corporate intellectual property owners,
including those in the pharmaceutical industry, heavily influenced the shift of innovation
and intellectual property rights away from the public international law environment of
WIPO and into international trade. The connection between intellectual property rights
and trade is subsequently reflected in the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”)51 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(“TRIPS”),52 which was introduced in 1995. TRIPS now includes no fewer than seven
categories of intellectual property rights.53
Linking intellectual property rights protection to trade issues effectively
facilitated a restructuring of dispute settlement rules, creating a system in which decisions
are binding on all states, and the use of retaliatory sanctions is authorized if states do not
offer compensation or alter domestic laws found to be incompatible with the World Trade
Organization Agreement.54 Member states that fail to enforce intellectual property rights
under both TRIPS and NAFTA are subject to potential economic sanctions under each
agreement. TRIPS facilitates a dispute mechanism55 through the General Agreement on
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Tariffs and Trade, 1994 (“GATT 1994”)56 and the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (“DSU”).57 Article XXIII of GATT 1994 provides for certain courses of
action if any contracting party considers that “any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired” through, for example, the
failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations.58 If the circumstances are
“serious enough to justify such action,” contracting parties may authorize the suspension
of “concessions or obligations under this Agreement.”59 Article 22 of the DSU contains
the rules governing the suspension of concessions or obligations, and, within it, Article
22(3) provides a number of principles and procedures that complaining parties must
apply: although complaining parties should first seek to suspend concessions or other
obligations with respect to the same sector in which the nullification or impairment
occurred,60 parties are authorized to seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in
other sectors under the same agreement61 or under another covered agreement.62 In this
way, since TRIPS authorizes sanctions involving sectors other than those for intellectual
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by
the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and the settlement of
disputes under this Agreement except as otherwise specifically provided herein.
56
April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867
UNTS 187, 33 ILM 1153 (1994) [GATT 1994].
57
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [DSU].
58
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59
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60
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panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment.
61
Ibid, art 22(3)(b):
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circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other
obligations under another covered agreement.
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property, failing to carry out intellectual property obligations under TRIPS can result in
far-reaching economic consequences. NAFTA provides for economic sanctions in a
similar manner: Article 2019 of NAFTA directly authorizes the “suspension of benefits”
for “measures” that do not conform to NAFTA.63 In a manner similar to TRIPS,
complainant parties under NAFTA are also authorized to apply sanctions in different
economic sectors.64
In addition to establishing binding dispute settlement mechanisms for intellectual
property rights, the movement of innovation into international trade also created a new
discourse with respect to the protection of confidential information. For instance,
Margaret Ann Wilkinson notes that TRIPS used the texts of public international law
treaties such as the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention as the threshold for
patent protection and copyright protection, respectively, in the new international trade
environment.65 However, international parameters with respect to the protection of
confidential information were introduced for the first time in the context of the
“coercive” conditions of trade negotiations.66 Confidential information is now protected
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as intellectual property under TRIPS and NAFTA,67 thereby reflecting the importance of
confidential information with respect to innovation and, consequently, to national
economic interests.

1.3. Data Exclusivity: Relationship to Intellectual Property and Confidential
Information
Although the protection of confidential information may be advantageous to the
person or business entity that is holding the information,68 the philosophical
underpinnings of the protection remain unclear. Indeed, as an aspect of law, the
normative basis for protecting confidential information has differed.69 At common law,
confidential information can be protected through contract, and in equity, confidentiality
can be buttressed by the concept of fiduciary obligations.70 In Canada, the first clear
recognition of the protection of confidential information occurred in 1989 with respect to
breach of the duty of confidence, but the Supreme Court of Canada has declined to
precisely classify the basis of protection.71
The protection of confidential information is directly relevant to data exclusivity
for pharmaceutical products. Obligations of data exclusivity originate from TRIPS and
NAFTA, under which member states are required to protect “undisclosed”
pharmaceutical test data against disclosure.72 Data exclusivity is thus directly related to
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states’ regulatory regimes for new drugs, and Canada introduced its first data exclusivity
framework in 1995.73
Although pharmaceutical companies typically seek patent protection to protect a
new, innovative drug, the issuance of the patent for the drug does not discharge a
pharmaceutical company’s legal obligation to obtain market approval where required
from a state government. Because of the requirement for market approval, and although a
patent grants an innovator the right to distribute an invention,74 a pharmaceutical
company cannot use this patent-related right of distribution unless it first undertakes the
extra step of receiving regulatory approval from the state government.75 Data exclusivity
can be defined as the temporary protection of clinical test data that is required to be
submitted to a regulatory agency in order to prove the safety and efficacy of a new
drug.76 During the period of data exclusivity, only the innovator is permitted to rely on
this data in an application for regulatory approval.77 While a patent is typically filed
before the start of clinical trials that generate safety and efficacy information,78 the period
of data exclusivity typically extends beyond the life of the patent and allows companies
to recoup the cost of investment in generating the information for regulatory approval. In
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this way, data exclusivity operates independently from patent,79 and one commentator has
noted that both patent protection and data exclusivity create a temporary, monopoly
situation that enables the recovery of costs incurred during drug discovery and
development.80
The data exclusivity framework that originates from TRIPS and NAFTA
essentially placed the data generated in clinical trials into the realm of intellectual
property. Intellectual property rights have been expressed as having a pre-defined scope,
and within this scope, they negatively exclude the world and positively grant limited,
exclusive rights to use the subject matter.81 Since intellectual property rights are intended
to both stimulate and reward individual creativity, innovation, and investment,82 the reach
of exclusivity and the requirements of intellectual property protection reflect a balance
with respect to the public interest.83 In light of this balance, temporary exclusive rights
are viewed as the norm for classic intellectual property devices such as patent, copyright,
and trademark.84
However, whereas traditional intellectual property frameworks specifically
encourage the dissemination of information in society, the protection of confidential
information “does the opposite,”85 because confidential information has the potential to
remain secret forever.86 Since confidential information does not have a public access

79

See Petrova, supra note 37 at 31: For example, patent and data exclusivity may or may not run
concurrently and they may not necessarily encompass the same claims.
80
Ibid at 32.
81
Alexander Peukert, “Individual, multiple and collective ownership of intellectual property rights – which
impact on exclusivity?” in The Structure of Intellectual Property Law: Can One Size Fit All?, Annette Kur
& Vytautas Mizaras, eds, (Cheltenham, UK & Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011).
82
Ibid at 197-198.
83
Ibid at 199-200.
84
Ibid at 200.
85
Hagen et al, supra note 68 at 573.
86
A more detailed discussion of confidential information will occur in Chapter Two.

21

aspect at all, it does not appear to lie within the classic definition of intellectual property
that includes a “bargain” between an intellectual property rights holder and the public
interest.87As this thesis will demonstrate, however, data exclusivity places a limitation on
the secrecy of clinical trial data. In doing so, data exclusivity functions in a manner
similar to classic intellectual property devices. It grants a limited-term monopoly over the
data from clinical trials: the flow of information is interrupted during the period of
protection. With respect to the testing of new pharmaceutical products, data exclusivity
ensures that innovators who invest money and effort into conducting clinical trials will
have an initial opportunity to maintain the secrecy of valuable data, and competitors of
these innovators will not be able to use the information for a given number of years in an
application for regulatory drug approval, giving the innovators a competitive market
advantage. The information subsequently becomes accessible to other drug manufacturers
following the expiration of the data exclusivity period, thereby ending the innovator’s
ability to control the free flow of information. Data exclusivity thus requires an end to the
confidentiality of information that would otherwise remain secret forever.88

1.4. Personal Data Protection: Historical Overview
Beginning in the late 1970s with the emergence of global telecommunications and
computerization, countries began to seek domestic legislative implementation of privacy
values in light of the increased memory capacity, processing speed, and ubiquity of
computers.89 Since the portability of data between states was essential for ensuring that
all nations could participate in the anticipated “information economy,” the Organization
87
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for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) first published the OECD
Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data90 (“OECD Privacy Guidelines”) in 1981 in order to both protect personal
information and promote the free flow of data between countries.91 Member countries of
the OECD, including Canada, are required to implement the OECD Privacy Guidelines,
including the Basic Principles of National Application92 and are advised to adopt laws
protecting privacy and to coordinate various government bodies through the development
of national privacy strategies.93 Importantly, according to the Individual Participation
Principle under the OECD Privacy Guidelines, individuals have express rights to access
their personal information and to “have the data erased, rectified, completed, or
amended” in the event of a successful challenge to the collection of this data.94
Canada accordingly enacted the Privacy Act,95 which aims to provide individuals
with a right of access to their personal information held by a federal government
institution and to protect the privacy of individuals with respect to that information.96 At
the same time, however, Canada acknowledged the need for democratic openness with
respect to the public accessibility of government documents and enacted the Access to
Information Act97 (“Access Act”). The Privacy Act and the Access Act together create a
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balance between access to information generally and the confidentiality of certain
information held by federal institutions in the public sector.
The provinces followed suit generally by creating “omnibus” statutes that
combined access and personal data protection regimes in single statutes.98 Both
provincial and federal legislators also perceived a need to address questions of an
individual’s control over his or her personal information held by private sector
organizations and a need to ensure that this information was adequately protected.99
Quebec was the first Canadian jurisdiction to adopt personal data protection legislation
for the private sector,100 which has been in force since 1994. More recently, the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act101 (“PIPEDA”) was passed by the
federal government in 2000 and protects personal information with respect to federally
regulated private sector organizations and organizations that engage in “commercial
activities.”102 The need for comprehensive regulation of the collection, use, and
disclosure of personal information in the hands of both public and private sector
organizations has ultimately led to a proliferation of personal data protection statutes
across Canada. All Canadian jurisdictions have now legislated in the area of public sector
personal data protection.103 In addition to Quebec and the federal government, Alberta104
and British Columbia105 have their own private sector personal data protection laws.
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Personal data protection specifically designed for the health context has also now been
enacted by nearly all Canadian jurisdictions.106

1.5. Personal Data Protection: Questions of Identifiability and Relationship to Data
Exclusivity
The immense computing and processing power of modern information technology
in 2017 raises personal data protection issues that did not exist when Canada’s data
exclusivity framework was first introduced in 1995. For instance, privacy issues in
clinical research were, in 1995, typically addressed through the protection of the
identities of the research participants because patient data underwent anonymization (or
de-identification) using techniques to aggregate the data into large sets which meant the
removal of identifiers, such as individual names, not necessary for statistical analyses.107
However, advances in information technology and storage have now resulted in the
ability to perform large-scale analyses of vast data sets, which in turn decreases the need
to “strip” data of identifiers in the first place and, if stripped, increases the likelihood for
re-identification of data that has been rendered anonymous: identifying information can
now be produced from non-identifying information because of the potential to link
multiple data sets together.108
The risk of re-identification through modern information technology such as data
linkage calls into question the meaning of individual identifiability with respect to the
106
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application of personal data protection laws in the context of clinical trials. As will be
discussed in section 3.3 in Chapter Three of this thesis, large amounts of personal health
information, including an individual’s weight, blood pressure, and medical history, are
collected from individual participants in the course of a clinical trial, and clinical trial
practices mandate the retention of records that would identify each individual participant
in the case of adverse events.109 The ability to identify clinical trial participants in this
manner raises the question of whether personal data protection actually still applies to
“de-identified” clinical trial data, since this data is simply assumed to be truly anonymous
but may in fact not be so in light of current technological realities.
However, if individuals retain rights of control to their data in clinical trials in
accordance with personal data protection principles, each individual’s rights of control
could conflict with the rights of drug manufacturers with respect to data exclusivity.
Furthermore, if the result of this conflict is such that personal data protection prevails
over data exclusivity, this situation would challenge Canada’s international obligations
under TRIPS and NAFTA and would place Canada in a difficult position in terms of its
simultaneous attempts at enforcing rights under the legislative regimes of both personal
data protection and data exclusivity. Owing to the potential struggle for control over
information in clinical trials, this thesis seeks to determine whether data exclusivity
operates consistently with personal data protection in Canadian law.

1.6. Conclusion
The research question of this thesis arises in the context of Canada’s obligations
to implement two potentially conflicting legislative regimes in the context of the public
109
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health regulation of drugs. On one hand, data exclusivity originates from the international
trade environment in a “top-down” manner, under which member states are required to
enforce intellectual property rights through their domestic laws. A member state’s failure
to adequately implement these rights can result in negative economic consequences at the
national level. On the other hand, while personal data protection originates from an
international instrument and gives an individual the right to control his or her personal
data, personal data protection has arisen across Canada in a largely “bottom-up” manner
with the implementation of legislative personal data protection regimes occurring at both
the provincial and national levels.
The protection of confidential information serves as common ground with respect
to both data exclusivity and personal data protection. Confidentiality of information
creates a potentially permanent barrier to the free flow of information, and an important
goal of both data exclusivity and personal data protection concerns the secrecy of
information. Nevertheless, both these regimes of data exclusivity and personal data
protection transcend confidential information protection since they each only maintain
secrecy of information to a certain extent. Data exclusivity functions in a manner akin to
intellectual property protection and provides a limited-term monopoly on secrecy.
Legislated personal data protection controls are imposed on organizations for the benefit
of individuals, which, unlike the law of confidential information, apply whether or not the
information was confidential in the first place and regardless of an individual’s awareness
of the collection of the information.110
Modern information technology has also called into question the understanding of
identifiability. Anonymization is closely related to the question of whether the
110
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confidentiality of personal information can be ensured: if de-identified information can
be re-identified and so constitutes identifiable information in a factual sense, such a
finding has implications for an individual’s right to control his or her personal
information under personal data protection laws. This thesis thus examines whether data
exclusivity operates consistently with personal data protection or instead abrogates an
individual’s right to personal data protection in the clinical trial context.
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Chapter Two – Theoretical Background of Constructs
2.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the theoretical backgrounds of confidential information,
data exclusivity, and personal data protection. Examination of the first construct,
confidential information, will involve an exploration of the nature of confidential
information by reviewing case law and academic scholarship, particularly with respect to
the duty of confidence. The regulation of the sale of drugs will also be explored to
illustrate that clinical trials are heavily regulated in order to protect public health. Within
this context, a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v.
Canada (Minister of Health),111 will be used to demonstrate the tension between the
access and secrecy of confidential information in the pharmaceutical context. To explore
the second construct, data exclusivity protection, the discussion will consist of a brief
description of the origins of data exclusivity in international trade agreements to provide
a contextual framework. In this context, the nature and purpose of data exclusivity will be
examined from the perspectives of supporters and opponents of data exclusivity. Finally,
examination of the third construct, personal data protection, will involve a discussion of
how personal data protection is related to, but distinct, from privacy law with respect to
regulating the flow of information between individuals and organizations. The chapter
ultimately concludes that, although personal data protection is relevant to data
exclusivity, personal data protection has largely been excluded from the data exclusivity
discourse.
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2.1.1. The Nature of Confidential Information: Excluding Others - The Importance of
Confidential Information to Private Businesses
Exclusive rights to information ultimately result in a monopoly over use of the
knowledge. In order to justify this exclusion, knowledge must be novel, unique,
identifiable, or secret: mere ideas will not suffice to receive legal protection.112 In
particular, a company’s ability to maintain secrecy over information pertaining to its
technology may successfully delay a competitor from copying the technology, thereby
giving the company a competitive market advantage.113 Intellectual property rights,
which provide exclusive rights to activities including the manufacture, use, and sale of
particular goods, are thus crucial business assets.114 For modern business organizations,
the slightest advances in technology can give companies an enormous competitive
advantage over their market rivals, and maintaining exclusive possession of valuable
technical and commercial information can sometimes mean the difference between
cornering a particular market and fighting for financial survival.115
Despite the present characterization of confidential information as intellectual
property in the international trade environment,116 the type of intellectual property
protection available for a particular thing is arguably determined by “the nature of the
thing.”117 Wilkinson has noted that the inclusion of confidential information under TRIPS
and NAFTA marked the first time that confidential information has been classified as
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intellectual property.118 There has been much uncertainty in legal scholarship with respect
to the nature of confidential information and its proper characterization. Indeed, the
philosophical base for its protection has remained unclear owing to the absence of
legislative enactment and the lack of consistent judicial guidance.

2.1.2. The Nature of Confidential Information: A Question of Duty
According to Arnold Weinrib, writing in 1988,119 there is a prima facie case for
recognizing confidential information as property.120 However, at the very least, a dispute
about the protection of confidential information will be based on the express or implied
contractual obligation to maintain confidentiality of the information.121 In the absence of
a contract, the relationship between the parties may give rise to a fiduciary obligation,122
in which misuse of information would constitute a breach of this obligation.123
The existence of certain duties between parties has thus featured prominently in
the discourse regarding the protection of confidential information. Duties may arise
because of the exchange of valuable information between parties in a context in which
the need for confidentiality has been made clear to the confidante.124 The exchange of
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valuable information causes the confiding party to be vulnerable if the information is
divulged by the confidante, such that this exposure to risk leads to duties being imposed
on the confidante.125 It follows that the legal duty imposed based on the exchange of
information is restricted both in terms of scope and duration, in which the duty endures
only as long as the secret remains a secret and also pertains only to maintaining the secret
and not to a wider, fiduciary relationship.126
In this way, English and Canadian courts have observed a duty of confidence with
respect to the protection of confidential information. The relevant English and Canadian
case law will be explored in the sections below, in which this thesis will show that the
law still remains uncertain as to the proper characterization of confidential information.

2.1.3. The Nature of Confidential Information: The Duty of Confidence in English
Case Law
A leading authority for breach of confidence is the English case, Saltman
Engineering Co. v. Campbell Engineering Co.,127 in which Lord Greene uttered a classic
articulation of the key characteristics of confidential information:
….The information, to be confidential, must, I apprehend, apart from contract,
have the necessary quality of confidence about it, namely, it must not be
something which is public property and public knowledge. On the other hand, it
is perfectly possible to have a confidential document, be it a formula, a plan, a
sketch, or something of that kind, which is the result of work done by the maker
upon materials which may be available for the use of anybody; but what makes it
confidential is the fact that the maker of the document has used his brain and thus
produced a result which can only be produced by somebody who goes through
128
the same process.

According to Lord Greene’s statement, confidential information is knowledge that
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is not public and can also constitute information which has resulted from an individual’s
unique mental labour. Confidentiality of information also persists independently from
contract. If a contract is silent on the matter of confidence, there is an implied obligation
to treat the confidential matter “in a confidential way,” such that the obligation to respect
confidence is not limited to cases where the parties are in a contractual relationship.129 If
a defendant uses confidential information, either directly or indirectly obtained from a
plaintiff without the plaintiff’s express or implied consent, the defendant will be guilty of
an infringement of the plaintiff’s rights.130
Based on this reasoning, Lord Greene observed that, “contract or no contract,” the
defendants came into possession of the plaintiffs’ drawings in light of the knowledge that
this material belonged to the plaintiffs and was “obviously confidential matter.”131
Moreover, by using the confidential drawings, the defendants managed to “dispense in
certain material respects with the necessity of going through the process which had been
gone through in compiling these drawings,” thereby saving the defendants “a great deal
of labour and calculation and careful draughtsmanship.”132 The circumvention of the
labour and production process that arose from the use of the confidential information thus
constituted a breach of the duty of confidence, which was owed by the defendants to the
plaintiffs, who were the “owners of the confidential matter.”133
Lord Greene in Saltman Engineering identified some important characteristics of
confidential information. However, he did not expressly classify confidential information
as property. Despite Lord Greene’s use of proprietary language in referring to the
129
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plaintiffs as “owners” of the confidential material, this term may simply have referred to
the physical documents that happened to contain the confidential information at issue.134
Since Saltman Engineering concerned the duty of confidence and the relationship
between the parties to the dispute, it is unclear as to whether a duty of confidence arises
from an interest in the information itself or from other factors such as the relationship
between the parties or the circumstances of the case.
The classic articulation of the duty of confidence can be found in the English
case, Coco v. AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd.135 Megarry J. agreed with Lord Greene’s
comments in Saltman Engineering, in that the duty of confidence may exist where there
is no contractual relationship between the parties. Accordingly, he observed that, where
there is no contract, “the question must be one of what it is that suffices to bring the
obligation into being.”136 Megarry J. subsequently identified three essential elements of a
breach of the duty of confidence: 1) the information must be of a confidential nature; 2)
the information must have been communicated in circumstances importing an obligation
of confidence; and 3) there must be unauthorized use of the information to the detriment
of the party that communicated it.137 With respect to the concept of confidentiality,
Megarry J. echoed the views of Lord Greene in Saltman Engineering, in that a person’s
ingenuity and innovative skill may impart a quality of confidentiality to an invention
constructed from publicly available materials.138 Megarry J. further concluded that “there
must be some product of the human brain which suffices to confer a confidential nature
134
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upon the information.”139 It is through the exertion of mental effort and the creative
thought process by which “something new and confidential may have been brought into
being.”140
In this way, one commentator has noted that the action for breach of confidence
essentially protects original thought processes and creative efforts.141 In accordance with
the reasoning in Coco, as well as Saltman Engineering, breach of confidence will occur
when the defendant takes unfair advantage of information that has been disclosed to him
or her, thereby saving the “time, trouble, and expense of going through the same
process.”142 However, although the three-step test enunciated by Megarry J. in Coco is
certainly informative with respect to the factors that amount to breach of confidence,
Megarry J. was concerned mostly with concept of confidentiality alone, rather than the
nature of confidential information. Accordingly, he did not attempt to classify
confidential information into a specific category and so did not provide further guidance
as to the proper characterization of confidential information.

2.1.4. The Nature of Confidential Information: The Protection of Confidential
Information in Canadian Case Law
In Canada, the nature of confidential information has been raised in case law in
both the criminal and civil contexts. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Stewart143 examined the question of whether confidential information can be the subject
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of theft under the Criminal Code and ultimately held that confidential information does
not qualify as property for the purposes of the law of theft. However, Lamer J., writing
for the Court, also commented on the nature of confidential information in the context of
civil law with respect to this information’s potential characterization as property:
It can be argued…that confidential information is property for the purposes of
civil law. Indeed, it possesses many of the characteristics of other forms of
property: for example, a trade secret, which is a particular kind of confidential
information, can be sold, licensed or bequeathed, it can be the subject of a trust or
passed to a trustee in bankruptcy. In the commercial field, there are reasons to
grant some form of protection to the possessor of confidential information: it is
the product of labour, skill and expenditure, and its unauthorized use would
undermine productive efforts which ought to be encouraged. As the term
“property” is simply a reference to the cluster of rights assigned to the owner,
this protection could be given in the form of proprietary rights.144

The above statement echoes the perspective of Weinrib, mentioned previously,
who asserted that confidential information is property. However, this statement
nevertheless fell far short of clarifying the nature of confidential information in any
definitive manner. Lamer J. merely declared that “it can be argued” that confidential
information can be classified as property, which certainly does not translate into an
assertion that “confidential information should be classified as property.” Rather than
settling the law, Lamer J. simply described the inconsistencies in judicial decisionmaking with respect to the treatment of confidential information as property. In the civil
context, Lamer J. noted that Canadian law145 does protect confidential information, but
the legal basis for doing so has not been clearly established by the courts: while some
cases treat confidential information as property that entitles an owner to exclude others
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from use,146 the courts have also recognized certain rights to confidential information that
arise from the equitable obligation of good faith.147 Furthermore, Lamer J. noted that the
protection afforded to confidential information in most civil cases arises “more from an
obligation of good faith or a fiduciary relationship than from a proprietary interest,”148
concluding that “no Canadian court has so far conclusively decided that confidential
information is property, with all the civil consequences that such a finding would
entail.149 Lamer J. thus raised, but ultimately did not answer, the question as to whether
confidential information constitutes property.
Wilkinson has noted that the Supreme Court of Canada has ultimately declined to
specifically characterize confidential information.150 International Corona Resources Ltd
v. LAC Minerals Ltd.151 is a leading case152 on breach of confidence and fiduciary duty in
the commercial context and the appropriate remedies that arise from such breaches. The
appellant, LAC Minerals Ltd. (“LAC”), had expressed interest in joining the respondent,
International Corona Resources Ltd. (“Corona”), in exploring a property that Corona
suspected had gold. Information that was not available to the public was revealed to LAC
during meetings to discuss the venture. Subsequently, LAC used this information to make
an offer for the property and then acquired and mined it. Although the ultimate finding of

146

Stewart SCC, supra note 143 at para 23, referring to Aas v Benham, [1891] 2 Ch 244 (Eng CA);
Exchange Telegraph Co v Gregory & Co., [1896] 1 QB 147.
147
Ibid at para 23, referring to Saltman Engineering, supra note 127; Seager v Copydex , [1967] 2 All ER
415 (Eng CA); Phipps v Boardman, [1967] 2 AC 46 (UK HL).
148
Ibid at para 24.
149
Ibid.
150
Wilkinson, “Confidential Information,” supra note 49 at 282.
151
LAC Minerals, supra note 71.
152
Ibid. This case was heard by only five of the nine judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, and the only
issue on which all the judges agreed was that the appellant, LAC, was liable for breach of confidence, and
that the traditional test in Coco applied.

37

a fiduciary relationship between the parties divided the court,153 all five judges agreed
that a breach of confidence had occurred. However, despite the fact that Lamer J. was
also one of the deciding judges in this case, neither he nor any of the other judges
addressed the nature of confidential information in their reasoning.
For example, La Forest J. concluded that unjust enrichment had occurred and that
a constructive trust was an appropriate remedy. However, he added that since “it is not
the recognition of a right of property that leads to a constructive trust, it is not necessary,
therefore, to determine whether confidential information is property.”154 Sopinka J., on
the other hand, arrived at the opposite conclusion of La Forest J. and opposed the remedy
of a constructive trust on the basis that this remedy is usually reserved for situations
where a right of property is recognized. Most important, he noted that “although
confidential information has some of the characteristics of property, its foothold as such
is tenuous,”155 since the originator of an idea does not receive proprietary rights
equivalent to those of a patentee.156 Furthermore, acquisition of the land at issue resulted
from the use of information that was both public and private. Since it would be
153
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impossible to assess the role of either type of information, Sopinka J. argued that there
was no factual basis for assuming that, but for the confidential information LAC received
from Corona, LAC would not likely have acquired the land. Sopinka J. concluded that an
award of damages was appropriate.
The LAC Minerals case demonstrates that, in an action for breach of confidence,
the subject of judicial focus is the relationship of confidence, in which confidential
information is merely viewed as a “medium” that creates the relationship.157 Since the
characterization of this medium is evidently considered to be of secondary importance,
LAC Minerals thus offers limited judicial guidance on the nature of confidential
information. La Forest J. expressly declined to determine whether confidential
information constitutes property. Sopinka J. also refuted the notion of confidential
information as property in order to support his assertion that a constructive trust was not
an appropriate remedy, but he did not undertake a comprehensive exploration of the
nature of confidential information. Instead, he merely voiced his doubts on the
characterization of property rights in confidential information in the context of his choice
of remedy. Therefore, based solely on Sopinka J.’s statements in LAC Minerals, one
might conclude that confidential information likely does not constitute property.
In any event, it is clear that Canadian judges disagree on the proper
characterization of confidential information. Prior to the decision in LAC Minerals, Cory
J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal once offered the following justification for
157
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maintaining confidentiality of information pertaining to commercial enterprises:
Information and its collection, collation and interpretation are vital to most
modern commercial enterprises. Compilations of information are often of such
importance to the business community that they are securely kept to ensure their
confidentiality. The collated, confidential information may be found in many
forms covering a wide variety of topics. It may include: painstakingly-prepared
computer programs pertaining to all aspects of the firm’s business; meticulouslyindexed lists of suppliers, with comments as to their efficiency, reliability and
time required for delivery; laboriously-compiled lists of customers and their
needs; instructions as to manufacturing processes learned from months of
experimentation and trial; or lists of employees, including reference to their
physical well-being and disciplinary history, that may be required to be kept
confidential in compliance with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
For many businessmen their confidential lists may well be the most valuable
asset of their company. Their security will be of utmost importance to the firm.158

Cory J.A.’s comments emphasize the value of certain business information and
the subsequent importance of maintaining the secrecy of business information. In
addition to its direct influence on the performance and effective management of a firm,
confidential information is often gathered through labour-intensive activities. Because of
the effort required to obtain these informational “assets,” Cory J.A. advocated for the
recognition of confidential business information as property and its subsequent protection
as such. He asserted:
If questioned, a businessman would unhesitatingly state that the confidential lists
were the “property” of his firm. If they were surreptitiously copied by a
competitor or outsider, he would consider his confidential data to have been
stolen. The importance of confidential information will increase with the growth
of high technology industry. Its protection will be of paramount concern to
members of industry and the public as a whole.159

While Cory J.A. acknowledged that mere information may not constitute
property, he maintained that there is a right of property in confidential information.160
Moreover, by asserting that confidential business lists can constitute literary works,
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which are subject to copyright161 that is a “form of property analogous to personal
property,”162 Cory J.A. thereby introduced the possibility that intellectual property
protection could encompass confidential business information.
However, although Cory J.A. offered a decisive articulation regarding the nature
of confidential information, his statements do not represent the final word on this matter
because the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in this case was subsequently
overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada.163 Furthermore, while the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in LAC Minerals establishes that the protection of confidential
information in Canadian law is based upon the duty of confidence, appellate-level
judicial guidance on the proper classification of confidential information remains elusive.
Nevertheless, Cory J.A.’s comments are noteworthy because they reflect a common
philosophical justification for intellectual property protection: based on the notion that
“every man is entitled to the fruits of his own labour,” patent and copyright provide
safeguards against piracy for the “fruits of labour” of inventors and authors.164 This
perspective also happens to be in accordance with Lord Greene’s reasoning in Saltman
Engineering, in which a person’s labour with respect to information justified the
maintenance of its confidentiality.
Perhaps the notion that people are entitled to the fruits of their labour provides a
compelling justification for the right to exclude others from the access and use of
information for which one has undertaken painstaking efforts to compile. In other words,
161
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perhaps it is justified for a commercial entity to maintain control over information that it
has generated and which is also directly tied to the success of the business. Nevertheless,
if such a monopoly over the control of information is warranted, should the right to
control information in this manner necessarily endure indefinitely in order to satisfy a
person’s entitlement to the fruits of his or her labour? In other words, does the right to
control information come with a “price” or “trade-off”? These questions will be explored
in the following section.

2.1.5. The Nature of Confidential Information: Questions of Balance - The “Bargain”
in Intellectual Property Rights Protection
The concept of “entitlement to the fruits of one’s labour” is reflected in
intellectual property law, but this entitlement does not continue indefinitely. For example,
patent165 and copyright166 confer monopolies, but the inventions and works to which they
pertain face competition in the marketplace following the expiration of the term of
protection. There is also a clear public interest aspect to copyright and patent with respect
to the dissemination of knowledge. For example, the information contained in a
copyrighted work freely circulates among the public even though the author retains
exclusive rights to produce, reproduce, or perform the work.167 Likewise, information

165

Patent Act, supra note 74:
Subject to section 46, where an application for a patent is filed under this Act on or after
October 1, 1989, the term limited for the duration of the patent is twenty years from the
filing date.
166
Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42, s 6:
The term for which copyright shall subsist shall, except as otherwise expressly provided
by this Act, be the life of the author, the remainder of the calendar year in which the
author dies, and a period of fifty years following the end of that calendar year.
167
See ibid, s 3(1) for authors’ rights with respect to copyrighted works.

42

about a patent is made publicly available168 despite the inventor’s monopoly on the right
to manufacture, sell, and distribute the invention. Figure 1 thus demonstrates the flow of
information with respect to the patent process, in which the public is eventually capable
of accessing the knowledge associated with a patent. When a patent application is filed
with the government, the information is removed from the realm of secrecy and placed
within the knowledge of the government. The government maintains the secrecy of patent
applications for 18 months and then publicly discloses the information contained
therein.169

Figure 1 - Flow of Information in the Patent Process

Binnie J. has noted in Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents):
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…The grant of a patent simply reflects the public interest in promoting disclosure
of advancements in learning by rewarding human ingenuity. Innovation is said to
be the lifeblood of a modern economy. We neglect rewarding it at our peril.
Having disclosed to the public the secrets of how to make or use the invention,
the inventor can prevent unauthorized people for a limited time from taking a
“free ride” in exploiting the information thus disclosed. At the same time,
persons skilled in the art of the patent are helped to further advance the frontiers
of knowledge by standing on the shoulders of those who have gone before.170

Binnie J.’s comments with respect to the purpose of patent protection reflect the balance
that intellectual property law seeks to achieve between the private interests of innovators
and the public interest of society at large. An innovator must be rewarded for the fruits of
his or her labour in order to continue to engage in innovation that will ultimately benefit
the national economy. Intellectual property protections such as copyright and patent
allow the innovator, for a defined period of time, to maintain exclusive rights to the
exploitation of creative works or inventions. Public disclosure of information with respect
to an invention or creative work, thereby allowing society to benefit from new knowledge
contained therein, is accordingly the “price” for a limited-term monopoly.
Ten years after the decision in LAC Minerals, the Supreme Court of Canada again
had the opportunity to address the nature of confidential information in Cadbury
Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd.,171 a case concerning the protection of trade secrets.
The respondents, Cadbury Schweppes Inc. (“Cadbury Schweppes”) alleged that
confidential information regarding their product, Clamato juice, had been used to develop
a competing product. Cadbury Schweppes asserted that, where trade secrets constitute the
subject matter of wrongful use or disclosure, the policy objectives underlying patent
protection are applicable to breaches of confidence in the commercial context.
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Binnie J., writing for the Court, referred to the comments of Lamer J. in Stewart
in acknowledging that confidential information possesses many characteristics of other
forms of property.172 Nevertheless, he observed that the respondents’ characterization of
confidential information as property was “controversial,” given that an action for breach
of breach of confidence has traditionally been “rooted in the relationship of confidence
rather than the legal characteristics of the information confided.”173
Most important, Binnie J. refuted the respondents’ arguments that breach of
confidence is akin to patent infringement. Binnie J. concluded that the respondents’
reliance on intellectual property law ignored the “bargain” that constitutes the heart of
patent protection:
A patent is a statutory monopoly which is given in exchange for a full and
complete disclosure by the patentee of his or her invention. The disclosure is the
essence of the bargain between the patentee, who obtained at the time a 17-year
monopoly on exploiting the invention, and the public, which obtains open access
to all of the information necessary to practise the invention. Accordingly, at least
one of the policy objectives underlying the statutory remedies available to a
patent owner is to make disclosure more attractive, and thus hasten the
availability of useful knowledge in the public sphere in the public interest...
Entrepreneurs in the food industry frequently eschew patent protection in order to
avoid disclosure, and thus perhaps perpetuate their competitive advantage beyond
the 17-year life span of a patent.174 We are told that the secrecy of the Coca-Cola
recipe has apparently endured for decades. If a court were to award compensation
to the respondents on principles analogous to those applicable in a case of patent
infringement, the respondents would be obtaining the benefit of patent remedies
without establishing that their invention meets the statutory criteria for the
issuance of a patent, or paying the price of public disclosure of their secret.175

Binnie J.’s comments regarding the purpose of patent protection emphasize the
key trade-off in intellectual property law, in that the law will provide an innovator with a
temporary right to exclude others from exploiting his or her invention or work, so long as
172
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the rights holder makes the secret therein publicly available. It would appear, then, that
contribution to the public interest is a key requisite in the conferral of intellectual
property rights.

2.1.6. The Nature of Confidential Information: Confidential Information as
(Intellectual) Property - Is the Bargain Present?
In Cadbury Schweppes, Binnie J.’s insight into the relevance of intellectual
property law with respect to breach of confidence may explain why the respondents were
not entitled to receive compensation equivalent to “patent remedies.” Nevertheless, these
statements focus on the maintenance of secrecy of the information and the subsequent
lack of a public interest component, rather than the nature of the confidential information
at issue. Despite the fact that Binnie J. earlier stated that “the nature of the information
may influence the appropriate remedy,”176 he only acknowledged the controversy
surrounding the characterization of confidential information and did not elucidate his
own thoughts on the matter.
Similar to the situation in LAC Minerals, judicial determination of the nature of
confidential information did not occur in Cadbury Schweppes, because this appeal
focused on the determination of the appropriate remedy. In this context, Binnie J. asserted
that a proprietary remedy should not automatically follow for breach of confidence, and
that determination of the remedy should depend on a “case-by-case balancing of the
equities.”177 The remedy awarded in LAC Minerals was driven by “the course of events
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that would have likely occurred “but for” the breach,” rather than the “property status” of
the confidence.178 The decision in Cadbury Schweppes thus did not settle the law
regarding the nature of confidential information.
Nevertheless, Cadbury Schweppes does raise an important question with respect
to the intellectual property protection of confidential information. As noted by Binnie J.
in his observations about the bargain in intellectual property law, innovators in the food
industry often avoid patent protection, presumably to maintain secrecy of information
that in turn facilitates a competitive edge beyond the life of a patent. Figure 2 illustrates
the fact that there is no flow of information with respect to confidential information and
the public, such that confidential information has the potential to remain forever excluded
from public knowledge (thus the two separate circles in the diagram). The entity in
possession of confidential information would thus have a monopoly in the market for the
product or service to which the information pertains.
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Figure 2 - Relationship between Confidential Information and Public Knowledge Two Solitudes

Wilkinson notes that, in the context of the current Canadian law, there are three
factors that set the protection of confidential information apart from traditional
intellectual property devices. Unlike patent or copyright, the protection of confidential
information: a) is a product of judicial decision rather than statute; b) is an “unbounded
monopoly” that can persist forever, provided that the conditions of confidentiality are
maintained; and c) lacks an apparent element of direct public interest, other than the
public’s general interest in the success of the national economy.179 If disclosure of
information to benefit the public is the “price” for a limited-term monopoly in exploiting
an invention or work, then this bargain appears to be absent in the context of the
intellectual property protection of confidential information.
One could argue that subjecting confidential information to intellectual property
protection is philosophically justified on the basis that the information is a product of
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human ingenuity and labour,180 and lack of protection in this manner would allow others
to unjustly avoid the effort and expense of undertaking the same process. Classifying
confidential information as “a product of the mind” that warrants the appropriate
intellectual property protection would appear to be consistent with the judicial reasoning
in the Coco and Saltman Engineering cases, as well as the underlying rationale of
intellectual property law in providing incentives for innovation.
The shift of confidential information protection into the realm of intellectual
property law has also brought confidential information into that of international trade. For
example, TRIPS articulates the obligations of member states to protect confidential
information as follows:
Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information
lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by
others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices
so long as such information:
(a) is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration
and assembly of its components, generally known among or readily accessible to
persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in
question;
(b) has commercial value because it is secret; and
(c) has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person
lawfully in control of the information, to keep it secret.181

NAFTA also mandates the protection of confidential information but, unlike
TRIPS, expressly refers to “trade secrets”:
1. Each Party shall provide the legal means for any person to prevent trade
secrets from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without the
consent of the person lawfully in control of the information in a manner contrary
to honest commercial practices, in so far as:
180
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(a) the information is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the
precise configuration and assembly of its components, generally known
among or readily accessible to persons that normally deal with the kind of
information in question;
(b) the information has actual or potential commercial value because it is
secret; and
(c) the person lawfully in control of the information has taken reasonable steps
under the circumstances to keep it secret.
2. A Party may require that to qualify for protection a trade secret must be
evidenced in documents, electronic or magnetic means, optical discs, microfilms,
films or other similar instruments.
3. No Party may limit the duration of protection for trade secrets, so long as the
conditions in paragraph 1 exist.
4. No Party may discourage or impede the voluntary licensing of trade secrets by
imposing excessive or discriminatory conditions on such licenses or conditions
that dilute the value of the trade secrets.182

Based on the language in the above provisions of TRIPS and NAFTA, one can
observe that confidential information derives its value from the very fact that it is secret.
Making the information publicly available in accordance with the principles of the
traditional “bargain” in intellectual property law would thus destroy this value.
Nevertheless, if a purpose of intellectual property protection is to maintain a balance
between private and public interests, there should arguably be an exchange between the
innovator and the public in accordance with this principle. The act of sequestering
knowledge from public scrutiny, particularly when this information could promote
scientific or social progress, leads to philosophical difficulties in justifying a monopoly
on control over information that will contribute to a perpetual competitive advantage for
the entity that controls the information.
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2.1.7. The Nature of Confidential Information: Controlling Confidential Information The Tension between Access and Secrecy
Although the value of confidential information and intellectual property rights lies
in the rights holder’s ability to exclude others from exploiting them, private rights
regarding information may conflict with the federal Access Act.183 The Access Act is
based on the principles that government information should be available to the public,
exceptions to the right of access should be limited and specific, and decisions regarding
disclosure of government information should be reviewed independently of the
government.184 Under the Access Act, Canadian citizens and permanent residents of
Canada are entitled, in accordance with section 4(1), to access any records under the
control of a government institution.185
Despite this entitlement to information in the hands of the government, there are
some notable exceptions to disclosure under the Access Act.186 The head of a government
institution must refuse to disclose any record that contains information that falls within
the scope of the exemptions.187 For example, personal information constitutes one
exception to disclosure188 unless the individual has consented to disclosure, the
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information is publicly available, or if disclosure is authorized under the Privacy Act.189
Third party information, which encompasses confidential information when placed in the
hands of a government organization, constitutes another exception to disclosure and is
protected under section 20(1) of the Access Act. The provision reads:
Subject to this section, the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose
any record requested under this Act that contains
(a) trade secrets of a third party;
(b) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information that is confidential
information supplied to a government institution by a third party and is treated
consistently in a confidential manner by the third party;
(b.1) information that is supplied in confidence to a government institution by a third
party for the preparation, maintenance, testing or implementation by the government
institution of emergency management plans within the meaning of section 2 of
the Emergency Management Act and that concerns the vulnerability of the third
party’s buildings or other structures, its networks or systems, including its computer
or communications networks or systems, or the methods used to protect any of those
buildings, structures, networks or systems;
(c) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in
material financial loss or gain to, or could reasonably be expected to prejudice the
competitive position of, a third party; or
(d) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to interfere
with contractual or other negotiations of a third party.190

The Access Act thus attempts to strike a balance between the need to maintain
confidentiality of valuable business information and the public interest in the free flow of
information. In this context, Figure 3 illustrates the effect of an access request on the flow
of information, in which third party information is exempted from disclosure in this
manner and thus remains inaccessible by the requester.
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Figure 3 - Flow of Information when Access Request is made

The exceptions to disclosure under the Access Act reflect the importance of
considering the different and potentially conflicting interests with respect to a particular
set of information. In Stewart, Lamer J. advocated for a balanced approach with respect
to access to information:
Indeed, the realm of information must be approached in a comprehensive way,
taking into account the competing interests in the free flow of information and in
one’s right to confidentiality or again, one’s economic interests in certain kinds
of information.191

Public access to information can “increase transparency in government, contribute
to an informed public, and enhance an open and democratic society.”192 In this way,
certain types of information are entitled to confidentiality in order to avoid undermining
the very principles of access and promote good governance.193 In addition to the
exception to the general disclosure requirement, the Access Act also provides for
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procedural protections for third parties where a head of a government institution intends
to disclose a record but has reason to believe that the record contains trade secrets or
other forms of confidential business information. In this case, the head of an institution is
required to give written notice to the third party regarding the access request and the
head’s intention to disclose the information,194 thereby allowing the third party to
subsequently make representations as to why the record should not be disclosed.195 It is
thus a matter of balancing the tension between the access and secrecy of information in
order to satisfy the needs and interests of all the stakeholders involved.

2.1.8 The Nature of Confidential Information: Confidential Information is a Wider
Class of Information than Trade Secrets
In the 2012 case, Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Health)
(“Merck Frosst”)196 Cromwell J., writing for the majority, observed that there are
different types of confidential information. Cromwell J. first noted the deliberate
separation of trade secrets and confidential commercial information under the Access Act
into exemptions under sections 20(1)(a) and 20(1)(b), respectively. According to
Cromwell J., this distinction suggests that the information covered under section 20(1)(b)
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constitutes a “more general class of confidential, commercial, scientific, and technical
information” than the “narrower concept” of “trade secrets” in section 20(1)(a).197
Cromwell J. further noted that the section 20(1)(a) exemption under the Access Act is not
subject to disclosure in the public interest, whereas the section 20(1)(b) exemption for
confidential information is subject to this type of disclosure.198
It therefore follows that trade secrets constitute a smaller subset of confidential
information. One academic has noted that although all trade secrets are confidential
information, not all confidential information constitutes a trade secret.199 Whether or not
a particular set of information constitutes a trade secret will be a question of fact, in
which the plaintiff must demonstrate the confidential nature of the information.200
Cromwell J. noted that information does not require an “inherent value” in order to
constitute financial, commercial, scientific, or technical information.201 Unlike a trade
secret, the value of confidential information may fluctuate over time, since it will
ultimately depend upon “the use that may be made of it” and “who may want it, and for
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what purposes.”202 Cromwell J. concluded that a trade secret must be given its
“traditional legal meaning,” and that information must satisfy the following criteria to
constitute a trade secret:
a) The information must be secret in an absolute or relative sense (it is known by
one or a relatively small number of persons;
b) The possessor of the information must demonstrate that he has acted with the
intention to treat the information as secret;
c) The information must be capable of industrial or commercial application; and
d) The possessor must have an interest (e.g. an economic interest) worthy of legal
protection.203

The above criteria emphasize the importance of secrecy with respect to the value
of a trade secret. One commentator, Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, has observed that a trade
secret’s claim to protection rests upon its possessor’s reasonable efforts to keep it secret
by refusing to divulge the secret to any party who does not owe an obligation of
confidentiality to the owner.204 Fellmeth further notes that the law of trade secrets
protects information that is valuable by virtue of being publicly unknown, such that
public knowledge of a trade secret would diminish or destroy whatever monopoly the
trade secret confers upon its owner.205
In addition, Cromwell J.’s articulation of a trade secret considers the inherent
value of the information and the specificity of its application. Gregory Hagen et al also
agree that trade secrets are a subset of the more “inclusive” category of confidential
information and tend to be more specific than confidential information: for example,
“trade secrets” are typically secret plans, processes or formulae, and compounds, recipes,
202
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or tools, whereas confidential information can include customer lists, knowledge or
opportunities, “and just about any information that is of value when confidential to the
holder.”206
The characterization of trade secrets as a narrower class of confidential
information is further supported by section 20(6) of the Access Act, which authorizes
disclosure in the public interest. While all confidential information constitutes an
exception to the general requirements of disclosure under section 4(1) of the Access Act,
there is an “exception to the exception,” in which some types of confidential information
can be subject to disclosure:
The head of a government institution may disclose all or part of a record
requested under this Act that contains information described in any of
paragraphs (1)(b) to (d) if
(a) the disclosure would be in the public interest as it relates to public health,
public safety or protection of the environment; and
(b) the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs in importance any
financial loss or gain to a third party, any prejudice to the security of its
structures, networks or systems, any prejudice to its competitive position or
any interference with its contractual or other negotiations [emphases
added].207

Provisions authorizing the disclosure of confidential information for the purposes
of protecting public health or the public interest can also be found in other Canadian
legislation. For instance, where there is a “serious risk of injury to human health,”
section 21.1 of the federal Food and Drugs Act states that the Minister of Health “may
disclose confidential business information about a therapeutic product” without the
consent of the person to whose business the information relates.208 Similarly, the
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Minister of Health may disclose confidential business information about a therapeutic
product to the government, an advisor to the Minister, or someone who carries out
functions that are related to the “protection or promotion of human health or the safety
of the public.” 209 The Food and Drugs Act defines “confidential business information”
as business information that has “actual or potential economic value” and that is not
publicly available, in which measures have been taken to ensure that the information
remains not publicly available.210 A “therapeutic product” is defined as “a drug or device
or any combination of drugs and devices.”211 Thus, the Food and Drugs Act indicates
that the confidential information generated for drugs in clinical trials does not constitute
a trade secret.
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has ultimately declined to comment on
the nature of confidential information, the tension between protecting confidential
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information and sharing it for the greater public good is reflected in the comments made
by Lamer J. in Stewart:
From a social point of view, whether confidential information should be
protected requires a weighing of interests much broader than those of the parties
involved. As opposed to the alleged owner of the information, society’s best
advantage may well be to favour the free flow of information and greater
accessibility by all. Would society be willing to prosecute the person who
discloses to the public a cure for cancer, although its discoverer wanted to keep it
confidential?212

Lamer J. thus seems to suggest that in some contexts, it may not be clear as to
who should hold the right to control a particular set of information. In creating valuable
information, it follows that the generating entity should be granted the right to control
this information. However, if that entity’s rights of control unduly restrict the free flow of
information, especially when disclosure of this information can save human lives,
perhaps these rights should be limited for the benefit of the public at large. The need to
acknowledge other legitimate claims to the same set of information accordingly calls into
question the theoretical validity of the permanent secrecy of confidential information.
Nevertheless, despite providing for disclosure of confidential information in the
public interest, section 21.1 of the Food and Drugs Act and section 20(6) of the Access
Act do not mandate disclosure, but instead leave the decision of disclosure to the
discretion of the institutional head.213 Most important, Hagen et al further note that in
Canada, there is currently no difference in juridical treatment as between trade secrets
and confidential information.214 Therefore, there is no time limit on the protection of
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secrets, and obligations of confidence may be claimed and enforced as long as the
information is kept secret.215 The strategy of keeping information a secret is an effective
and flexible way to maintain a competitive advantage in light of changing business
practices and technology: legal protection of secrets allows an idea, information, process,
or technology to be tested without fear of appropriation, thereby encouraging
investment.216 Moreover, Hagen et al assert that the legal protection of confidential
information also fosters ethical behaviour in fair competition by “promoting, protecting,
and enforcing relationships founded on trust and confidence.”217

2.1.9. Conclusion on the Nature of Confidential Information
While legal scholars such as Weinrib and Cory J.A. have explored the notion of
confidential information as property, the law of confidential information in Canada does
not characterize confidential as property. As demonstrated in cases such as LAC Minerals
and Cadbury Schweppes, the protection of confidential information in Canada is based
upon the duty of confidence, in which a breach of confidence will give rise to a cause of
action. Although confidential information may continue to be discussed in terms of
property because of its classification as intellectual property under international trade
agreements, confidential information differs from traditional intellectual property devices
such as copyright and patent because it lacks a public interest component that would
justify its continued secrecy and a subsequent limitless monopoly.
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Therefore, it is perhaps more useful to frame a discussion of the protection of
confidential information in terms of a party’s rights of control over information, as this
framework also considers the possibility that there may be multiple, yet also compelling
claims to the same set of confidential information. As this thesis will show, the existence
of potentially conflicting rights to information is particularly salient in the pharmaceutical
context.

2.2. Regulation of the Drug Approval Process: Protecting Public Health
The ultimate goal of national regulatory authorities, such as Health Canada, is to
protect and promote public health.218 Governments have a responsibility to protect their
citizens, especially in areas where citizens are not able to protect themselves.219
Government regulation and oversight is particularly necessary with respect to the
manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products. Drugs are not ordinary consumer
goods, since most consumers do not possess the requisite knowledge to make informed
decisions “about when to use drugs, which drugs to use, how to use them, and to weigh
potential benefits against risks.”220 Although medical doctors are presumably competent
to diagnose a patient’s disease and select the appropriate course of treatment, a
comprehensive understanding of the complex scientific issues that are associated with
medicines often requires highly specialized training in the field of clinical
pharmacology.221 It is thus in the public interest to have a strong, centralized regulator
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that has both the knowledge and authority to make definitive judgments on the safety,
efficacy, and labelling of medicines.222
Another important purpose of a national regulatory agency is to provide a check
on powerful pharmaceutical companies that might allow commercial interests to prevail
over public safety. A regulator’s failure to uphold its responsibility regarding adequate
oversight within its authority can lead to disastrous consequences for public health. For
example, in 1999, the pharmaceutical company Merck & Co., Inc. (“Merck”) was granted
approval for the drug rofecoxib (also known as Vioxx) by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the national health regulator in the U.S.223 On September 30,
2004, after more than 80 million patients had taken rofecoxib and annual sales had
reached $2.5 billion, Merck withdrew rofecoxib from the market owing to increased risks
for myocardial infarctions and stroke. One commentator, Eric Topol, has noted that
Merck could have conducted a specific trial to ascertain cardiovascular risks and benefits,
but such a trial was never conducted even though the FDA possessed the authority to
mandate one.224 Merck instead issued a “relentless series of publications” that asserted
the safety of rofecoxib, which were subsequently complemented by papers in peerreviewed medical literature by Merck employees and consultants.225 Merck also spent
over $100 million per year in direct-to-consumer advertising, another activity regulated
by the FDA, which was essential in generating its massive annual sales for rofecoxib.226
Despite the efforts of many investigators in conducting and publishing independent
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research on the cardiovascular toxicity of rofecoxib, only the FDA was authorized to take
action regarding the findings.227 In estimating that there may be “tens of thousands of
patients who have had major adverse events attributable to rofecoxib,” Topol thus asserts
that the FDA failed to fulfil its responsibilities to the public by passively waiting for data
to accrue and in failing to exercise its regulatory power.228
Effective regulatory systems clearly require appropriate action on the part of the
people who run them, particularly when these individuals are the only ones authorized to
act. Since the efficacy of regulatory systems depends on the actual enforcement of the
laws therein by individuals, the system may not always ensure perfect safeguards against
cases such as the rofecoxib incident. However, this reality does not detract from the
necessity of legislative requirements that mandate standards for rigorous scientific testing
of new compounds in preparation for their subsequent use by humans. This process
involves the balancing of the benefits, risks, and the availability of other drugs for a
particular disease.229 In this way, when Health Canada decides that a drug is safe and
effective, this approval means that the drug’s benefits outweigh the risks, which reflects a
policy choice based in part on society’s collective level of risk tolerance.230
As mentioned in Chapter One of this thesis, the manufacturer of a new drug must
submit evidence to the government regarding the drug’s safety and efficacy before the
drug can be marketed and sold in Canada. In order to receive the NOC that indicates
proof of the government’s approval, the manufacturer must first file a New Drug
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Submission (NDS) with the Minister of Health.231 The NDS must contain “sufficient
information and material to enable the Minister to assess the safety and effectiveness of
the new drug,” including the following: detailed reports of tests made to establish the
drug’s safety under the recommended purpose and conditions of use; “substantial
evidence” of the new drug’s clinical effectiveness for the recommended purpose and
conditions of use; and details of the tests to control the drug’s potency, purity, safety, and
stability.232
An NDS consists of a vast amount of information, much of which is generated by
clinical trials which are heavily regulated in Canada by the Food and Drug
Regulations.233 Clinical trials typically consist of four phases. During Phase I, an
experimental drug is tested on a small group of people for the first time in order to assess
the drug’s safety or toxicity, identify side effects, and determine a safe dosage range.234
In Phase II, the drug is administered to a larger group of 100 or more individuals to
further assess the drug’s safety and obtain preliminary data on the drug’s effectiveness
for a particular disease or condition.235 In Phase III, the drug is administered to a group of
1000 or more people to confirm the drug’s effectiveness, monitor side effects, compare
the drug to commonly used treatments, and collect information that will allow the drug to
231
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be used safely.236 Finally, Phase IV occurs once the drug is approved and is available on
the market, and researchers gather information on the drug’s optimal use and its longterm benefits and risks.237 The entities that conduct clinical trials (“clinical trial
sponsors”)238 are required to maintain “complete and accurate records” with respect to the
use of a drug in a clinical trial and are obligated to identify and subsequently contact
clinical trial participants if the sale of the drug may endanger their health or that of other
people.239
The regulatory process for new drugs is particularly relevant to the protection of
confidential information in the pharmaceutical context. As will be discussed in the next
section of this thesis, information in an NDS is disclosed to the government in the course
of the market approval process, but the information constitutes third party information
that is generally exempt from disclosure under section 20 of the Access Act. Moreover,
the pharmaceutical context offers a clear illustration of the struggle between the
competing interests of the parties that wish to gain access to confidential information and
those that seek to maintain its secrecy.
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2.3. Access and Control over Confidential Information in the Pharmaceutical
Context
In section 2.1.8, the 2012 Supreme Court of Canada decision, Merck Frosst,240
was discussed as supporting the characterization of trade secrets as a subset of the
broader category of confidential information. However, the key role of this decision in
the analysis in this thesis concerns the aspect of the case revolving around the protection
of confidential information in the pharmaceutical context with respect to exceptions to
disclosure under the Access Act. The decision demonstrates the tension between access
and secrecy: in the Merck Frosst case, the access was sought by someone who was not a
subject of the data. In this thesis, the access that is of concern is access to the data of a
person who is a subject of the data.
Cromwell J., writing for the majority in Merck Frosst,241 first acknowledged that
broad rights of access to government information serve an important public purpose by
ensuring accountability, thereby strengthening democracy.242 On the other hand,
Cromwell J. noted that providing access to government information also engages the
interests of third parties that provide information to the government for regulatory
purposes, since the information in question may include trade secrets and “other
confidential commercial matters” which may be valuable to competitors of the third
party.243 Since disclosing valuable confidential information may result in financial harm
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to a third party, the routine disclosure of this information may “ultimately discourage
research and innovation.”244
The Merck Frosst decision thus illustrates the tension between the public’s right
to access government information and the need to preserve the private interests of third
parties. This decision is the final result of lengthy and complex litigation, in which five
decisions led to the appeals before the Supreme Court of Canada. At issue was the
information contained in an NDS and Supplementary New Drug Submission (SNDS),245
which had been submitted to the respondent Health Canada by the appellant, Merck
Frosst Canada Ltd. (“Merck”), in the course of obtaining regulatory market approval for
an asthma medication, Singulair®. The initial judicial review was heard by Harrington J.
of the Federal Court in 2004,246 whose decision was subsequently overturned by the
Federal Court of Appeal in 2005.247 The matter was returned to the Federal Court, which
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A supplement to an NDS is submitted to request authorization to market a drug that has already been
approved and for which certain changes have been made. See Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s
C.08.003 (1):
Despite section C.08.002, no person shall sell a new drug in respect of which a notice of
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suspended under section C.08.006, if any of the matters specified in subsection (2) are
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heard the applications for judicial review related to the NDS248 and SNDS.249 For both of
the NDS and SNDS judgments, Health Canada appealed and Merck cross-appealed: the
Federal Court of Appeal heard the appeals and cross-appeals concurrently and delivered
one judgment.250
In accordance with the approval process, Merck had made comprehensive
disclosure to Health Canada of all its information on Singulair®, including raw data from
pre-clinical and clinical studies.251 Figure 4 illustrates the flow of information with
respect to the data submitted by Merck. Information in an NDS, such as clinical trial data,
is disclosed to the government, and information contained in government records is
subject to access requests through the Access Act.
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Figure 4 - Flow of Information with respect to Data Submitted by Merck

Health Canada subsequently received access to information requests under the
Access Act with respect to information contained in Merck’s NDS and SNDS. The
specific documents to which the requester252 sought access were the NOC, the
Comprehensive Summary,253 the Health Canada reviewers’ notes,254 and the
correspondence255 between Health Canada and Merck. In accordance with procedural
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255
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additional information from the manufacturer. These requests and other communications between Health
Canada and the manufacturer thereby constitute “correspondence.”
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requirements under the Access Act, Health Canada was required to give notice to Merck
of the request for access and of Health Canada’s intent to disclose part of the NDS
record.
While Health Canada found that 30 of the 550 pages identified under the access
request contained confidential information and could not be disclosed, Health Canada
also concluded that the NDS record contained 15 pages that did not constitute
confidential information. Health Canada subsequently disclosed these pages without
notifying Merck. In contrast, Merck claimed that all of the information covered by the
access request, including the disclosed pages, was exempt from disclosure. The same
events unfolded with respect to the SNDS, in which Health Canada disclosed eight pages
of the SNDS after concluding that they contained no confidential information, while
Merck insisted that none of the 300 pages of the SNDS could be disclosed. Thus, Merck
complained that Health Canada failed to give Merck notice and an opportunity to make
objections before disclosing some of its confidential information and that Health Canada
did not conduct a sufficiently detailed review of the documents before deciding the
information was subject to disclosure. In addition, Merck claimed that certain categories
of records, of which an NDS and a SNDS are part, should “automatically” trigger a right
to notice because of the confidentiality and competitive value of the information
contained therein.256
Cromwell J. rejected Merck’s assertion that the proposed disclosure of any part
of an NDS or SNDS automatically triggers a duty to give notice.257 Cromwell J. noted
that the ordinary meaning of the notice provision did not support Merck’s position of a
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right to notice regarding particular categories of records.258 In addition, Merck’s position
was not consistent with an important principle of the Access Act, in that exceptions to the
right of access should be “limited and specific.”259 The creation of classes of documents
that would “presumptively trigger the notice requirement and be presumptively exempt
from disclosure” would thus be inconsistent with this principle.260
Nevertheless, Cromwell J. acknowledged that observing a low threshold for
triggering the notice requirement would ensure procedural fairness and reduce the risk of
the mistaken disclosure of exempted information.261 Deschamps J. also raised the
question of whether a government entity is capable of determining whether all
confidential information has been redacted from a record intended for disclosure.
According to Deschamps J.:
Health Canada’s statement that all confidential information has been redacted is
just an argument. It is not proof that all such information has in fact redacted.
Indeed, at the beginning of the proceedings, Health Canada took the position that
none of the information was confidential. The number of documents that either
were subsequently found to be exempt in their entirety or were redacted
extensively is a clear indication that Health Canada’s word cannot be taken as
proof.262
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Because an institutional head has equally important duties “to disclose and not to
disclose,” the institutional head must thus give third parties notice if they are in doubt
about whether the information is exempt.263 In particular, a third party will be in a better
position than a head of a government institution to identify information that falls within
the exemptions to disclosure under the Access Act. A third party will have knowledge and
understanding about the industry in which it participates, as well as “intimate knowledge”
of the information at issue and the possible harm that could result from its disclosure.264
Therefore, a third party’s assistance will be required “to know how, or if, the third party
treated the information as confidential,” such that “whether the information is
confidential cannot be determined without representations from the third party.”265
It is important to note that Cromwell J. did not dispute the potential value of
Merck’s confidential information. He acknowledged that “disclosure of information that
is not already in the public domain and that could give competitors a head start in product
development, or which they could use to their competitive advantage, may be shown to
give rise to a reasonable expectation of probable harm or prejudice to the third party’s
competitive position.”266 Instead, Merck’s claims were dismissed owing to its failure to
present sufficient evidence to support its claims under the various exemptions under
section 20 of the Access Act.
With respect to the section 20(1)(a) exemption for trade secrets, Cromwell J.
noted that Merck’s evidence was not capable of establishing that the documents in the
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NDS record either contained trade secrets or revealed trade secrets.267 Moreover, to the
extent that portions of the records revealed trade secrets, this information had been
redacted.268 Merck failed to demonstrate how the remaining information constituted trade
secrets within the meaning of the exemption, since “the conclusion that virtually blank
pages constituted trade secrets is a palpable and overriding error” on the part of the
reviewing judge.269
Merck encountered similar evidentiary problems with respect to the section
20(1)(b) exemption: Merck could not explain why the remaining information on heavily
redacted pages constituted confidential information. Merck argued that its assembled list
of studies and articles was not public knowledge, and that releasing the articles in
response to the access request would link them to Singulair® and the NDS or the SNDS.
Cromwell J. concluded that Merck’s evidence failed to support the claim that Merck’s
listing of the studies was confidential information, although he did not “foreclose the
possibility of a claim of this nature being established in some cases in which the evidence
supported it.”270
Finally, Merck argued that the compilation of publicly available studies is a
separate work from the studies themselves, a separate work which had been created by
Merck’s employees using substantial time and resources. The studies themselves may
have been publicly available, but “what was not publicly available…is the way a group of
publicly available studies was compiled for a particular purpose.”271 In determining

267

Ibid at para 120.
Ibid at para 121.
269
Ibid at para 124.
270
Ibid at para 182.
271
Ibid at para 147. Although Merck did not purport to assert a proprietary interest in the information, it is
interesting to note that Merck’s arguments nonetheless reflect the notion that people are entitled to the
268

73

whether this information could trigger an exemption under section 20(1)(c) with respect
to the reasonable expectation of harm to Merck, Cromwell J. agreed that “it may be
possible in some cases to show that the way in which publicly available information has
been assembled in a particular situation is not, itself, publicly known.”272 Nevertheless,
Cromwell J. again noted that Merck failed to show evidence about how disclosure of the
redacted form of the information, as presented by Health Canada, would reasonably be
expected to give rise to the harm and prejudice claimed by Merck. Furthermore, in light
of these redactions, Cromwell J. asserted that the public interest favoured disclosure of
the redacted records, noting that “it is particularly important to allow broad access to this
sort of information in the context of the pharmaceutical industry…Health Canada
systematically posts on its website about undesirable effects of all drugs sold in
Canada.”273
The Merck Frosst case illustrates the battle for control over confidential
information in the pharmaceutical context. Moreover, since the Food and Drug
Regulations require drug manufacturers to disclose all information about a new drug to
the government, the protection of confidential information in Merck Frosst occurred in a
statutory context rather than at common law, a statutory context in which the Access Act
protects third party information through exemptions to disclosure. The Merck Frosst case
is thus informative with respect to a discussion about data exclusivity, which is also
based on a statutory regime.274 Harrington J. of the Federal Court specifically noted that,
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to recoup their investment in the costly development of new medicines, innovator
pharmaceutical companies “are dependent upon patent protection and protection of data
submitted to government authorities.”275
However, it is important to note that the Merck Frosst decision did not concern
data exclusivity at all. The Federal Court of Appeal noted that Merck cited, but ultimately
did not argue at trial, Canada’s obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA in support of its
position against disclosure under the Access Act.276 Although it is not expressly
mentioned in any of the judgments, the fact that Merck did not rely on data exclusivity
protection in its arguments likely occurred because the term of data exclusivity would
have expired by the time the initial judicial review was heard by the Federal Court in
2004. Prior to 2006, the duration of data exclusivity in Canada was five years, and Merck
obtained market approval for Singulair® in 1998.277 Nevertheless, the protection of
confidential information in the course of the market approval process for new drugs, as
seen in the Merck Frosst decision, provides the contextual foundation for a discussion
about data exclusivity.
In exploring the research question for this thesis, recall that the following three
constructs must be addressed: 1) the regulation of clinical trials; 2) the data exclusivity
right of pharmaceutical companies; and 3) the individual’s right to personal data
protection. This thesis has completed the initial explanation of the first construct, the
regulation of clinical trials. Confidential information was also discussed to illustrate the
tension between access to information and the maintenance of its secrecy, in which this
tension is evident in the pharmaceutical context. The discussion of confidential
275
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information has now laid the groundwork for the second construct, data exclusivity,
which will be explored in the following section.

2.4. Data Exclusivity and Control over Confidential Information
Data exclusivity is related to the law of confidential information and thus relates
to the free flow of information (or lack thereof). By affecting access to information about
new drugs, data exclusivity also has an impact on public health. The present discussion
will focus on the nature of data exclusivity and will discuss intellectual property in
pharmaceutical research and development as well as the different perspectives regarding
the impact of data exclusivity on public health outcomes and innovation.

2.4.1. Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection: Safeguarding
Investment
A new drug that contains a medicinal ingredient that has not been previously
approved by the Minister of Health is defined as an “innovative drug.”278 Accordingly,
drug manufacturers that conduct clinical trials for innovative drugs are known as
“innovative manufacturers” or “brand name drug manufacturers.” Once the Minister of
Health approves the innovative drug and issues an NOC to the manufacturer, the drug
becomes listed as a Canadian Reference Product.279
278

Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.08.004.1(1):
innovative drug means a drug that contains a medicinal ingredient not previously
approved in a drug by the Minister and that is not a variation of a previously approved
medicinal ingredient such as a salt, ester, enantiomer, solvate or polymorph [emphasis in
original].
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purpose of demonstrating bioequivalence on the basis of pharmaceutical and, where
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However, the road to approval of an innovative drug involves significant financial
costs. A U.S. study from 2003 collected data from ten multinational pharmaceutical firms
and estimated that the research and development cost per new drug was $802 million, and
that this cost increased to nearly $900 million for research conducted after the drug was
approved.280 These results were independently verified by another study from 2006 which
used a publicly available data set.281 Furthermore, the authors of the 2006 study estimated
the costs per approved drug to be $836 million before approval, and that the expected
cost to large pharmaceutical firms for developing a drug ranged from $521 million to
$2.1 billion.282
While no published estimate of the costs of developing a new drug can be
considered a gold standard since clinical trials vary in their methods, data sources,
samples,283 and the health conditions under investigation,284 it is nonetheless clear that
pharmaceutical companies must invest vast amounts of capital into the research and
development process, which can easily span a decade or more.285 The process also
involves a high risk of failure, since it is estimated that fewer than 1% of compounds

applicable, bioavailability characteristics, where a drug in respect of which a notice of
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a drug referred to in paragraph (a) [emphasis in original].
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examined during pre-clinical testing ultimately advance to the clinical trial stage,286 and
drugs may also fail in late-stage clinical trials owing to their inability to outperform a
placebo.287
Therefore, the expense and effort involved in pharmaceutical innovation
ultimately gives rise to the perceived need for intellectual property protection. An
innovative manufacturer will typically seek and obtain a patent for an innovative drug
which will confer a monopoly of twenty years288 regarding the drug’s manufacture, sale,
and use.289 According to the Patent Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations,290 the
first person who files an NDS may submit a patent list to the Minister of Health for
addition to the patent register.291 Among other criteria, a patent list must identify the NDS
to which the list relates; identify the medicinal ingredient, brand name, dosage form,
strength, route of administration, and use set out in the NDS; and, for each patent on the
list, contain a statement that the first person who filed the NDS to which the list relates is

286

Shamnad Basheer, “The Invention of an Investment Incentive for Pharmaceutical Innovation” (2012) 15
J World Intellectual Prop 305 at 309.
287
Ibid at 310.
288
See TRIPS, supra note 52, art 33:
The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty
years counted from the filing date.
See also, Patent Act, supra note 74, s 44:
Subject to section 46, where an application for a patent is filed under this Act on or after
October 1, 1989, the term limited for the duration of the patent is twenty years from the
filing date.
289
Patent Act, ibid, s 42:
Every patent granted under this Act shall contain the title or name of the invention, with a
reference to the specification, and shall, subject to this Act, grant to the patentee and the
patentee’s legal representatives for the term of the patent, from the granting of the patent,
the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing and using the invention
and selling it to others to be used, subject to adjudication in respect thereof before any
court of competent jurisdiction.
290
Patent Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133.
291
Ibid, s 4(1):
A first person who files or who has filed a new drug submission or a supplement to a new
drug submission may submit to the Minister a patent list in relation to the submission or
supplement for addition to the register.

78

the owner of the patent or has an exclusive license.292 With respect to a patent on a patent
list in relation to a NDS, the patent is eligible for addition to the patent register if it
satisfies the criteria regarding the medicinal ingredient, formulation, dosage form, or use
of the medicinal ingredient.293
The expiration of a patent on an innovative drug results in the loss of the
manufacturer’s monopoly over the drug’s manufacture, sale, and use. Other drug
manufacturers are subsequently free to engage in these activities regarding that drug.
However, any new entrant to the Canadian market for the drug will also require an NOC
from the Minister of Health. These later entrants are commonly known as “generic drug
manufacturers,” which simply means that these manufacturers are not innovators but
produce drugs that are pharmaceutically equivalent and bioequivalent to the original
innovative drugs. Instead of conducting their own clinical trials,294 a generic drug
manufacturer can file an Abbreviated New Drug Submission (ANDS) to demonstrate that
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their drug is equivalent to a Canadian Reference Product in terms of pharmaceutical
equivalence, bioequivalence, route of administration, and conditions of use.295 Section
C.08.002.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations outlines the criteria for the content of an
ANDS, which must consist of the identification of the Canadian Reference Product used
in any comparative studies and evidence from comparative studies that demonstrates that
the new drug is equivalent to the Canadian Reference Product.296
In this way, generic drug manufacturers do not have to incur the costs associated
with conducting clinical trials. Competition in the marketplace also increases with the
expiration of the patent on an innovative drug, which generally results in drug price
reductions.297 Thus, generic drugs are also typically sold at cheaper prices than those
charged by innovative drug companies. A report published by the Patented Medicine
Prices Review Board found that, of a sample of 284 drugs, the price of a typical Canadian
generic drug in 2013 was 39% of the corresponding price of the innovative drug, and in
Ontario, the generic price was 31% of that for the innovative drug.298 The cheaper generic
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versions of drugs accordingly result in considerable cost savings to the consumer and
ultimately promote access to affordable, essential medicines.
The enormous financial costs and labour associated with clinical trials and the
ability to circumvent these efforts by generic manufacturers provide the initial context in
which data exclusivity arises. As once observed by Binnie J., if innovation is the
lifeblood of a modern economy, human ingenuity must be rewarded in order to further
advance the frontiers of knowledge.299 Intellectual property protection thereby satisfies a
person’s entitlement to the “fruits of their labour” by allowing the innovator to exploit the
subject matter of the protection for a defined period of time. Patent protection and data
exclusivity arguably provide the means for exploitation. This perspective of data
exclusivity’s purpose, however, has created considerable controversy with respect to the
impact on public health. This controversy largely has to do with arguments over the
nature of data exclusivity and the extent of the protection it confers under the trade
agreements, specifically TRIPS, from which it originates.

2.4.2. Nature of Data Exclusivity: Interpretative Context and International Trade
The term “data exclusivity” is not a legally defined term. It is nonetheless an apt
description of the protection’s effects on intellectual property rights holders. Recall that
TRIPS and NAFTA both mandate the protection of confidential information.300 For
example, under Article 39 of TRIPS, member states are required to protect “undisclosed
information.”301 Article 39(3) contains the data exclusivity rules under TRIPS and
299
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mandates protection for “undisclosed” data, “the origination of which involves a
considerable effort”302 against “unfair commercial use” and “disclosure”:
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical
entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of
which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair
commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against
disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are
taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.303

NAFTA contains similar language to Article 39(3) of TRIPS with respect to the
obligation to protect test data against unfair commercial use and disclosure. Article
1711(5) states:
If a Party requires, as a condition for approving the marketing of pharmaceutical
or agricultural chemical products that utilize new chemical entities, the
submission of undisclosed test or other data necessary to determine whether the
use of such products is safe and effective, the Party shall protect against
disclosure of the data of persons making such submissions, where the
origination of such data involves considerable effort, except where the
disclosure is necessary to protect the public or unless steps are taken to ensure
that the data is protected against unfair commercial use.304

Despite the aforementioned similarities between TRIPS and NAFTA, there is an
important distinction between the two agreements regarding the duration of data
exclusivity. Whereas TRIPS does not specify a minimum term of protection, Article
1711(6) of NAFTA mandates a “reasonable period” of protection of “not less than five
years”:
Each Party shall provide that for data subject to paragraph 5 that are
submitted to the Party after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, no
person other than the person that submitted them may, without the latter's
undisclosed information, but rather, “information disclosed selectively and under precise conditions”: See
Gervais, supra note 43 at 541.
302
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permission, rely on such data in support of an application for product
approval during a reasonable period of time after their submission. For this
purpose, a reasonable period shall normally mean not less than five years
from the date on which the Party granted approval to the person that
produced the data for approval to market its product, taking account of the
nature of the data and the person's efforts and expenditures in producing
them. Subject to this provision, there shall be no limitation on any Party to
implement abbreviated approval procedures for such products on the basis of
bioequivalence and bioavailability studies [emphasis added].305

Data exclusivity therefore originates from TRIPS and NAFTA. These agreements
mandate that, where drug manufacturers are required to submit test data to a regulatory
agency in the course of a market approval process for new drugs, this data is confidential
and must be protected as such. Members of the WTO, including Canada, that are
signatories to TRIPS and NAFTA are accordingly required to implement data exclusivity
obligations into their domestic legislation.306 Owing to the possibilities for economic
sanctions for failure to comply with obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA, it is essential
to determine the nature and scope of the rights that data exclusivity provides to the
entities that generate confidential clinical trial information. The following two sections of
this thesis will discuss the academic literature with respect to the purpose of data
exclusivity.
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2.4.3. Nature of Data Exclusivity: Perspective of Proponents – Protecting Public
Health and Preventing Free-Riding
Proponents of data exclusivity typically characterize its purpose as a means to
encourage drug research and development. For example, Erika Lietzan observes that, to
ensure that “pioneers” do the necessary research for the benefit of subsequent applicants
and patients alike, “some delay is necessary before that research may be used by
others.”307 This delay will satisfy the needs of future generations of patients for as-yet
undiscovered and undeveloped drugs by ensuring that innovative manufacturers do not
face immediate competition from companies who circumvent research and pay “a
fraction of the same price for market entry.”308 Public health concerns thus justify data
exclusivity.309
In their analysis of the language used in Article 39(3) of TRIPS, G. Lee
Skillington and Eric Solovy focus on the intentions of the TRIPS negotiators and also
note that WTO panels and the WTO Appellate Body are “very reluctant to interpret
provisions in a manner that leaves them without meaning and that makes them
redundant.”310 In addition, Skillington and Solovy assert that a “fundamental” purpose of
data exclusivity protection is to provide incentives to bring new drugs to market, such
that prohibiting reliance on an innovator’s data would be consistent with this purpose.311
Reliance on an innovative manufacturer’s data before the innovator has had the chance to
recoup the costs of the efforts to generate the data would be unjust, since the competitor
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would not only receive a “free ride” on the innovator’s investment but would be in a
better market position than the innovator, owing to the substantial economic savings from
circumventing the clinical trial process.312 Skillington and Solovy thus conclude that the
term “unfair” would also be interpreted in light of commercial consequences, and would
be interpreted as prohibiting any reliance on an innovator’s data.313 Logically, the TRIPS
negotiators likely intended “unfair commercial use” of data to mean that the data will not
be used to support or review submissions of second applicants, since to conclude
otherwise would effectively give second applicants a commercial advantage because they
did not have to generate their own data, unlike innovative manufacturers.314
Daniel Gervais has similarly noted that uses of an innovator’s data by a
competitor could be deemed unfair if they give the competitor a “springboard” to
“shortcut” research and development efforts,315 such that generic manufacturers who
demonstrate bioequivalence to an innovative drug would be encompassed by this
interpretation of the expression. Daria Kim has also observed that, according to WIPO’s
Model Provisions on Protection Against Unfair Competition, disclosure of test or other
data constitutes an act of unfair competition, since this disclosure may have similar
detrimental effects on an enterprise in the same manner as unauthorized use of the
information.316
The prevention of “free-riding” upon an innovator’s work is also central to
Lietzan’s argument that data exclusivity does not constitute a reward conferred on
312
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innovative manufacturers by the government, which creates the perception that data
exclusivity is “artificial and provided, as a benefit, to pioneers.”317 Instead, Lietzan
argues that data exclusivity is “not a grant of anything to anyone” but is “the absence of
an abbreviated pathway,” since it does not prevent subsequent market entrants from
“doing exactly what the first entrant did.”318 Owing to reliance on an innovative
manufacturer’s research, subsequent market entrants such as generic manufacturers face a
reduced regulatory burden because approval of an innovative drug will eliminate “much
of the trial and error” experienced by the innovative manufacturer.319 Lietzan accordingly
claims that reliance-based generic drug submissions should not be controversial with
respect to proving use of the innovative manufacturer’s data, since a subsequent applicant
“uses” an innovator’s research when it refers to the innovative drug by using the “fact” of
the innovator’s approval to obtain its own approval.320

2.4.4. Nature of Data Exclusivity: Perspective of Opponents – Impeding Public Health
while Providing “Double Protection”
Owing to the expense and effort involved in pharmaceutical innovation,
incentives to innovate, through intellectual property protection, are arguably warranted.
However, in the pharmaceutical context, the requirements to uphold intellectual property
standards in TRIPS have inspired a continuous debate over effects on public health
outcomes, since the higher costs of patented drugs erect financial barriers for access to
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essential medicines in developing countries.321 At the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial
Conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001, the WTO members affirmed that TRIPS
“can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
members’ right to protect public health, and in particular, to promote access to medicines
for all.”322 In particular, owing to the inadequacy or outright lack of manufacturing
capabilities in the pharmaceutical sector in developing countries, the members called for
an “expeditious” solution to the difficulties faced by developing countries with respect to
compulsory licensing under TRIPS.323 A compulsory license provides for flexibility in
patent protection: it allows for “other use” of the subject matter of a patent without the
authorization of the rights holder, thereby enabling a generic version of a patented
medicine to be exported to developing countries that lack their own pharmaceutical
manufacturing capacities.324 The 2003 decision of the WTO General Council thus
addressed public health concerns of developing countries by waiving the domestic market
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requirement under Article 31(f) of TRIPS,325 thereby enabling any country to receive
imported medicines through compulsory licensing.326
Arguably, the above measures prevent patent holders from unduly emphasizing
commercial interests at the expense of public health. However, it is important to note that
Article 31 of TRIPS applies exclusively to the subject matter of patent protection and not
that of data exclusivity. While Article 30 authorizes the provision of limited exceptions to
the exclusive rights conferred by patent,327 there are no corresponding provisions under
TRIPS or any WTO decisions that provide exceptions to data exclusivity protection. In
this way, although data exclusivity functions in a manner akin to patent protection by
providing a temporary monopoly on information generated in clinical trials and thus
contributes to the delay of the market entry of cheaper drugs, there is a lack of formal
mechanisms to address the potential impact of data exclusivity on public health
outcomes.
Much of the opposition to data exclusivity occurs because of the uncertainty of
interpretation of Article 39(3) of TRIPS regarding the rights conferred to confidential
clinical trial data. For one thing, TRIPS does not mandate a uniform period of data
exclusivity, unlike that seen for patent protection.328 Despite the fact that members are
required to protect test data against “unfair commercial use,” TRIPS also does not
325
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provide a clear definition of this expression.329 Antony Taubman thus proposes three
possible forms of protection that can potentially arise in accordance with three
corresponding interpretations of the Article 39(3) standard: 1) proprietary rights in the
form of data exclusivity, in which protection against unfair commercial use would involve
a fixed period of exclusive rights to data, such that any use of the data during this time
would be deemed unfair; 2) a compensatory regime, in which the innovator cannot
prevent others from using or referring to the data but is entitled to equitable financial
compensation in order to remedy the “unfairness” of a competitor’s use of the data; and
3) direct data protection, in which there is no obligation to provide for exclusivity or
compensation and where, although undisclosed data must be protected from unauthorized
disclosure, “unfairness” is limited to data that is acquired by “dishonest means.”330 In any
event, the arguably broad wording of Article 39(3) has led to controversy regarding its
interpretation and, subsequently, the nature and extent of the protection conferred by the
provision.
For example, owing to the fluidity in interpretation of “unfair commercial use,”
some academics have concluded that the expression is not synonymous with exclusive
proprietary rights. Peter Yu concludes that the scope of Article 39(3) is limited, in that it
does not offer broad protection of test data but includes the following narrow conditions:
1) protection against unfair competition, which does not create exclusive rights in data;
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and 2) protection for products that utilize new chemical entities, such that the provision
should exclude entities that have been reformulated or sold for a new indication.331
Similarly, in observing that Article 39(3) merely requires countries to protect data
against “unfair commercial use,” Carlos Correa asserts that countries are not granted
exclusive rights but instead have only the right to bring legal action against whoever has
obtained commercial advantage through dishonest practices.332 If the underlying rationale
of data exclusivity is indeed to allow innovative manufacturers to recover their costs of
research and development, this purpose protects investment rather than a creative or
inventive outcome, which would be contrary to the very purpose of intellectual property
rights.333 Unlike the TRIPS provisions related to trademark and patent, Correa observes
that Article 39 of TRIPS does not use language that confers ownership rights, thereby
supporting the notion that innovative manufacturers do not have exclusivity rights to
trade secrets and test data.334 In addition, Correa asserts that the interpretation of “unfair
commercial use” must be based on the ordinary meaning of the words therein.335 Correa
observes that there is no universal rule to determine whether certain practices should be
deemed unfair, since different countries will likely judge certain situations differently in
accordance with their values and competitive advantage.336 Thus, Article 39(3) only
applies when a competitor obtains a benefit or advantage as a result from unfair
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commercial practices, in which it is the qualification of the practice that is relevant rather
than the mere existence of an advantage or benefit.337
In addition to interpretative issues surrounding Article 39(3) of TRIPS, another
common concern among academics is the effects of the dual application of patent
protection and data exclusivity. For example, Trudo Lemmens and Candice Telfer assert
that data exclusivity confers a de facto extension of patent protection, which should
already have been fair compensation for the investment in drug development.338 This
patent-style protection on pharmaceutical products forces generic manufacturers to: a)
either wait until the period of data exclusivity has passed; or b) invest in clinical test data
without receiving the same financial reward that innovators receive from patent.339
Jerome Reichman similarly contends that longer terms of data exclusivity do not actually
create greater incentives for conducting clinical trials, since they essentially allow
innovative manufacturers to “have it both ways,” without accounting for the excess
profits yielded, in many cases, by the overlapping patent and data exclusivity regimes.340
Yu thus asserts that, while the costs of clinical trials remain high and consist of a major
portion of research and development costs for new drugs, innovative manufacturers have
considerable incentives under the patent system, thereby rendering the need for data
exclusivity laws to be “economically dubious.”341
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There is merit in the concerns regarding the legitimacy of data exclusivity with
respect to the “bargain” at the heart of intellectual property law. Data exclusivity laws
confer exclusive rights in a manner akin to patent protection despite the differences
between these regimes with respect to the public knowledge contributed by an innovator
in exchange for a market monopoly. In Canada, for example, notwithstanding a
confidentiality period of eighteen months that begins on the date of filing,342 all patents,
patent applications, and documents that are filed in connection with patents or
applications are subject to public access and scrutiny.343 Patent is thus not a restraint on
free competition. By contributing a new and useful technical achievement that others in
the relevant field could not themselves have developed, disclosing the invention to the
public in exchange for a legal monopoly actually helps to elevate the existing state of
competition to the next highest level.344 In this way, public disclosure of an invention not
only encourages people with the appropriate skills to innovate but also contributes to the
education of the public at large. Owing to the requirement for direct public disclosure, it
is therefore arguable that patent protection does promote creative outcomes in accordance
with the purpose of intellectual property law.
However, it is more difficult to justify data exclusivity on the same grounds.
Since innovative drug manufacturers are not required to publicly disclose their clinical
342
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trial data, the characterization of clinical trial data as a proprietary asset to which
innovative manufacturers maintain exclusive rights seems to lack social utility that is
readily apparent. Pamela Andanda also observes that data exclusivity may impede efforts
by clinical researchers and regulatory authorities to share information that may
potentially benefit clinical research participants, which constitutes a public health
concern that has been “overshadowed” by the innovative industry’s preoccupation with
preventing competition from generic manufacturers.345
In addition, the notion that generic manufacturers are free to conduct their own
clinical trials may be illusory owing to both financial and ethical concerns. Generic
manufacturers, by definition, do not have a patent which allows them to monopolize the
market and so would not be able to charge consumers sufficient amounts of money to
recoup the huge costs of clinical trials.346 Moreover, having a generic manufacturer repeat
a pre-existing trial simply for the sake of conducting its own trial would ultimately deny
some patients access to medicines347 and would submit research participants to
unnecessary duplicate testing, which would be ethically problematic for patients who are
asked to participate in placebo-controlled trials.348 Yu therefore declares that there are
serious moral implications for introducing data exclusivity laws that would delay the
entry of pharmaceuticals that would otherwise become readily available at the end of a
patent term.349
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2.4.5. Nature of Data Exclusivity: Conclusion
Based on the above review of the literature on data exclusivity, one can conclude
that the nature of data exclusivity remains unclear, in a manner similar to the uncertainty
surrounding the nature of confidential information. What is clear, however, is that the
characterization of data exclusivity depends on the perspective of the particular advocate,
since persuasive arguments have been made by both proponents and opponents of the
protection. Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next chapter, data exclusivity has
been implemented in a way such that the generating entities of clinical trial data maintain
exclusive rights of control for the term of protection.
Data exclusivity and patent protection function in similar ways through the grant
of limited term monopolies. Some academics view data exclusivity as necessary to
reward innovation and thus protect public health through the development of new
medicines, while other commentators criticize data exclusivity as a detriment to public
health by hindering access to medicines. Despite this debate over the purpose and impact
of data exclusivity, however, this thesis established in the previous discussion of the
nature of confidential information that the secrecy of confidential information has the
potential to continue indefinitely. In contrast, since data exclusivity protection endures
for a limited time, it can be considered as a limitation on secrecy for information that
would otherwise remain forever secret. Classifying clinical trial data, such that it fits
within the scope of data exclusivity protection and not that of trade secrets,350 leads to the
situation where the initial restriction on access to information ultimately results in a
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greater benefit – access to otherwise permanently secret information – than would be
obtained had the protection not existed in the first place.

2.5. Uniting the Constructs: Confidential Information, Data Exclusivity, and
Personal Data Protection in the Context of Clinical Trials
The law of confidential information and data exclusivity protection concern the
secrecy and maintenance of control over information, which often can be in direct
opposition with public interest outcomes. By delaying the entry of cheaper drugs into the
market, data exclusivity can contribute to financial barriers in accessing affordable
medicines. Deschamps J., writing for the minority in the Merck Frosst case, observed that
“access to information may be becoming the favourite battleground of innovative and
generic drug manufacturers.”351 The struggle between innovative and generic
manufacturers over the issue of confidential information generated in clinical trials for
new drugs constitutes one illustrative example of the different, yet compelling, interests
of the multiple stakeholders that compete for control over the same information.
However, the discourse regarding data exclusivity is so focused on the struggle
between the interests of innovative and generic manufacturers, access to medicines, and
public health outcomes that it has neglected to consider the interest of another key
stakeholder: that of the individual clinical trial participants with respect to their personal
information. The failure to account for personal data protection is evident since no
authors, whether or not they support or oppose data exclusivity protection, have
addressed the reality that patient health information is collected in clinical trials and
necessarily constitutes part of the same set of test data. Thus, it is also necessary to
351
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clarify the individual patient’s rights of control with respect to this data. The lack of
guidance on this issue accordingly forms the basis of the research question of this thesis:
whether the regimes of data exclusivity and personal data protection operate consistently
with each other in terms of the rights that they protect.

2.5.1. Personal Data Protection and the Individual’s Right to Control Information
Wilkinson, who has written extensively in the area of personal data protection,352
argues that the role of personal data protection has been largely misunderstood by both
the public and courts alike, owing to its overlapping vocabulary with privacy law.353
While privacy has been commonly understood as “the right to be let alone,”354 this classic
understanding of privacy does not clarify the nature of privacy but makes a claim to legal
or normative status.355 Instead, Wilkinson asserts that privacy may be better understood
as a “state of being let alone” and further notes that there are important differences
between privacy and personal data protection.356 Personal data protection is restricted to
issues related to data, whereas privacy encompasses interests beyond informational
privacy.357 Moreover, whereas personal data protection is confined by statute to
352
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information about an identifiable individual,358 privacy encompasses rights to refuse to
divulge any information held by an individual that the individual wishes to keep secret,
including information about the individual.359
Wilkinson thus argues that personal data protection legislation is designed to
regulate organizations that obtain information about individuals from various sources.360
Rather than regulating the flow of information between individuals in society,361 personal
data protection laws maintain a balance between individual privacy interests and the
access of personal information by organizations once an individual “has had information
about herself or himself come into the hands of an organization governed by [personal
data protection] legislation.”362 This interpretation of the goal of personal data protection
is supported by the language used to articulate the purpose of Canada’s federal private
sector personal data protection statute, PIPEDA:
The purpose of this Part is to establish, in an era in which technology
increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of information, rules to
govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a manner that
recognizes the right of privacy of individuals with respect to their personal
information and the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose personal
information for purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in
the circumstances [emphases added].363

The above provision of PIPEDA reflects the reality that personal information does
not always remain exclusively in the hands of the individual. Furthermore, personal data
protection acknowledges that there can be legitimate interests, other than that of the
individual, involved with respect to access, use, and dissemination of this information.
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Both Wilkinson and Mark Perry have thus noted that, while personal data protection is
closely related to privacy law, there is also a distinction between these two constructs
with respect to the flow of information.364 Whereas privacy law focuses on reinforcing a
person’s desire for informational seclusion,365 personal data protection laws assume that
the individual’s personal information is not being held privately by the individual but has
already made its way into the possession of an organization.366 Thus, personal data
protection is concerned with the flow of information between individuals and
organizations: instead of regulating whether information can be gathered from individuals
or about individuals, personal data protection regulates how information is to be gathered
about individuals.367
Since personal data protection statutes also restrict the scope of organizations’
abilities to use and disseminate the collected information, Wilkinson argues that these
statutes are an extension of the law of confidence, in which personal data protection laws
mandate a relationship of confidence “between individuals providing information about
themselves to organizations and the affected organizations.”368 Indeed, the “essence” of
the protection of confidential information, privacy, and personal data protection is to
“exclude others completely from access.”369 However, the individual’s entitlement to
confidentiality in information that is supplied to organizations is limited, under personal
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data protection legislation, to confidences that involve information that is identified with
that individual.370 Wilkinson observes that this narrow scope of legal protection for
confidentiality likely constitutes the source of conceptual confusion between personal
data protection and privacy.371
James Moor has noted that there are situations in which people may not have
direct control over the exchange of their personal information but there is no loss of
privacy.372 For example, personal information that is confided to a doctor may be shared
with other medical professionals in the course of normal medical practice, and
individuals also have little control over the way their personal information is stored on
computer databases.373 Moor’s observations are consistent with personal data protection
laws, in that these laws do not promote the absolute secrecy of information but instead
preserve an individual’s right to confidentiality of personal information by providing
controls over the ways in which organizations can collect, use, and disclose the
individual’s personal information. Furthermore, the ability of, say, the health care system
to function effectively depends on the accuracy, completeness, and availability of health
data: all participants in the health care system, including regulators and health care
providers require high-quality information for informed decision-making.374 Personal
data protection is accordingly concerned with both access and secrecy of personal
information.
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2.5.2. The Right to Control One’s Personal Information: The Importance of Consent
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that an individual has an interest in
the control of his or her personal information, which persists despite the fact that the
information may be in the possession of another person or entity. The 1992 case
McInerney v. MacDonald (“McInerney”)375 concerned a patient’s right of access to
information in his or her medical records. The Supreme Court of Canada held that in the
absence of regulatory legislation,376 patients are entitled, upon request, to inspect and
copy all the information in their medical files which was considered in the administration
of medical advice or treatment.377 According to LaForest J., the physician, institution, or
clinic that compiles the medical records owns the physical records.378 However, LaForest
J. also acknowledged that patients disclose sensitive information about the personal
aspects of their lives when they approach a physician for health care. This information is
“highly private and personal to the individual” and “goes to the personal integrity and
autonomy of the patient.”379 Since information in a person’s medical records is
essentially information about that person’s body, such information “remains in a
fundamental sense one’s own, for the individual to communicate or retain as he or she
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sees fit.”380 While an individual may decide to make personal information available to
others to obtain benefits such as medical advice and treatment, the person has a “basic
and continuing interest in what happens to this information, and in controlling access to
it.”381 LaForest J. observed:
The fiduciary duty to provide access to medical records is ultimately grounded in
the nature of the patient's interest in his or her records…information about
oneself revealed to a doctor acting in a professional capacity remains, in a
fundamental sense, one’s own. The doctor’s position is one of trust and
confidence. The information conveyed is held in a fashion somewhat akin to a
trust. While the physician is the owner of the actual record, the information is to
be used by the physician for the benefit of the patient. The confiding of the
information to the physician gives rise to an expectation that the patient’s interest
in and control of the information will continue.382

LaForest J.’s statements emphasize the fundamental importance of the ability to
control the information about oneself. This control is reflected in current personal data
protection legislation in the health context.383 Personal health information protection
statutes generally require individual consent for the collection, use, and disclosure of an
individual’s personal health information,384 and the individual is also entitled to access a
record of his or her personal health information.385
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2.5.3. Personal Information Protection: A Matter of Control and Not Ownership
The concept of a fundamental interest in and right to control one’s personal health
information, as conceived by LaForest J. in McInerney and addressed in personal data
protection statutes, raises the question of the definition of “control” itself. Solove
observes that control over information is sometimes viewed as synonymous to ownership
of the information, in which property in personal information is justified on the basis that
personal information is an extension of one’s personality or “selfhood.”386 Advocates for
the recognition of property rights in health data have asserted that private ownership
would increase patients’ power to block the unwanted use of their data and facilitate the
wider availability of data for clinical and research uses.387
It is not clear what patient ownership of personal health information would entail
in practice. Barbara Evans notes that, with respect to the issue of consensual access, use,
and disclosure of personal data, the concept of property ownership in personal
information fails to account for the reality that having a property right does not
necessarily ensure its indefinite protection.388 Although personal data protection laws are
intended to give individuals a right to control and access their personal information, they
clearly do not confer an absolute right of control upon the individual with respect to his
or her personal data. For example, an individual’s right to access a personal health
information record is subject to certain limitations, including situations where the record
is subject to a legal privilege or where other legislation or a court order prohibits
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disclosure to the individual.389 In addition, despite the general requirement for individual
consent to disclosure of personal health information, there are some circumstances in
which this information may be disclosed without the individual’s consent, particularly
when this disclosure would protect the public. For example, Ontario’s Personal Health
Information Protection Act (“PHIPA”) authorizes the disclosure of personal health
information where such disclosure is necessary to eliminate or minimize the risk of harm
to “a person or group of persons.”390 The limits on the extent to which one can control
one’s information under personal data protection legislation recognizes that there can be
at least two, potentially competing interests with compelling claims to information.
In accordance with the traditional conception of privacy which emphasizes the
ability to control information about oneself,391 personal data protection ensures that
organizations maintain the confidentiality of personal health information. On the other
hand, exceptions to the confidentiality of personal health information acknowledge that
an organization is sometimes justified to access, use, and disclose the information in
fulfilment of another legitimate purpose. Regardless of whether one believes that
personal information should be classified as property “owned” by the individual, the
reality is that no personal data protection legislation has endorsed the notion that there is
ownership in personal information. Instead, an individual has a “right” to control his or
her personal information, which can be limited in certain circumstances. The question of
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who owns the data is thus less important than the question of the rights and
responsibilities of those who hold the data.392
The ability to control one’s personal information is especially relevant in a digital
world, where information can be shared instantaneously across multiple jurisdictions.
Protecting the confidentiality of medical records is essential since health information “is
perhaps the most intimate, personal, and sensitive of any information maintained about an
individual.”393 Lawrence Gostin, writing in 1995, observed that most individual health
records were kept manually in “voluminous paper files”394 but asserted that “future health
care information infrastructure will not merely contain automated records within each
relevant institution” but would “electronically connect each of the vital components of
the health care system, permitting the rapid exchange of health information.”395
Patricia Goodman, writing in 2012, observed that Canadian jurisdictions were in
the process of creating pan-provincial and territorial electronic health record networks, in
respect of which the provinces and territories were at various stages of converting records
containing personal health information into electronic form.396 Goodman found that
individual consent to the collection of personal health information into electronic health
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records from non-electronic records was not required by any Canadian jurisdiction.397
Moreover, Michelle Gordon, writing in 2010, identified three potential privacy concerns
associated with electronic health records – surveillance,398 aggregation,399 and secondary
use400 – that, if not adequately addressed in legislation and policy, could cause
individuals to lose control over their personal information in a digital environment.401
Current technological realities with respect to the ways that personal health information is
stored, handled, and processed by organizations thus support the notion that, instead of
relying on ownership of personal health information to preserve an individual’s right to
control this information, it is far more important to clarify the duties of organizations that
have custody of personal health information with respect to the circumstances in which
the information can be used and shared.
A clinical trial participant is wronged when there is improper disclosure of his or
her data. For example, the inappropriate disclosure of patient health information can lead
to negative social consequences, such as stigma or discrimination directed toward
individuals who are identified as having mental illness or HIV infection or who engage in
397
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activities such as sex work or substance abuse.402 Moreover, with respect to the risks and
benefits of disclosing information, some researchers observe that decisions by policy
makers and committees do not usually consider subjective personal distinctions but
instead instigate sweeping actions that apply to everyone in the same manner.403 While
sharing information about sexual abuse, abortion, or depression medication may be
liberating for one person, it may be harmful to another.404 It is important to expressly
define the criteria for identifiability, since data such as the sex, age, and geographic
location of research participants can reveal participants’ identities if they are triangulated
with other databases.405 Eloise Gratton has accordingly noted that it is not always clear at
what point a particular piece of data can be said to “identify” an individual.406

2.6. Conclusion
Ultimately, the goal of this chapter was to illustrate the tension between access
and secrecy of information. To achieve this purpose, this chapter explored the law of
confidential information and the protection afforded to different types of confidential
information. The theoretical background regarding the nature of the various concepts
discussed in this chapter (confidential information, the regulation of medicines, data
exclusivity, and personal data protection) demonstrates the reality that multiple
stakeholders can have different but persuasive claims to access and control the same set
402
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of information. With respect to confidential information, these claims are best understood
in terms of rights of control rather than ownership. Indeed, the law of confidential
information in Canada is such that the protection of confidential information is based on
the duty of confidence. Data exclusivity provisions in trade agreements do not mention
ownership of data, and Canadian personal data protection legislation, such as PIPEDA,
does not protect personal information based on ownership but instead recognizes the
“right of privacy of individuals.”407
However, despite the essential role of individual clinical trial participants in
pharmaceutical innovation, the importance of personal data protection and the rights of
the individual to control personal information have been completely forgotten in the
theoretical discourse on data exclusivity. This situation accordingly raises questions
about whether the individual’s right to control personal data, though subject to certain
limitations, is also abrogated by the operation of data exclusivity laws. Chapter Three
will focus on the implementation of data exclusivity and personal data protection in
Canada. In particular, the chapter will consist of an analysis of the legislative provisions
of data exclusivity followed by their interpretation in recent Canadian case law.
Subsequently, the chapter will offer an analysis and discussion of Canadian public and
private sector personal data protection legislation and health-specific personal data
protection statutes in order to determine whether the legislative regimes of data
exclusivity and personal data protection operate consistently with each other in Canadian
law.
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Chapter 3 – Data Exclusivity and Personal Data Protection in Canada
3.1. Data Exclusivity in Canadian Legislation
Just as “data exclusivity” is not legally defined in international instruments, it is
also not a defined term in Canadian law. As this chapter will demonstrate, the term “data
exclusivity” has largely been used in relation to the practical effects of the protection on
the flow of the information generated in clinical trials.
Canada’s data exclusivity laws arise from the authority granted by Parliament to
the Governor in Council under the Food and Drugs Act, in which section 30(3) confers
power upon the Governor in Council to enact regulations that expressly implement
Canada’s data exclusivity obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA:
Without limiting the power conferred by any other subsection of this section, the
Governor in Council may make any regulations that the Governor in Council
considers necessary for the purpose of implementing, in relation to drugs,
Article 1711 of the North American Free Trade Agreement and paragraph 3
of Article 39 of the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights set out in Annex 1C to the WTO Agreement [emphases
added].408

Thus, it is clear that data exclusivity is not a Canadian conception but was instead forced
upon Canada in the course of trade negotiations. The Food and Drugs Act is the enabling
statute of the Food and Drug Regulations, which contain Canada’s data exclusivity
provisions. There have been two different versions of this framework since Canada’s data
exclusivity obligations first arose under TRIPS and NAFTA in the 1990s. The following
section will describe the former version of these provisions and how judicial
interpretation of the language therein ultimately led to amendments which resulted in
Canada’s current regulatory scheme.
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3.1.1. Implementing Data Exclusivity into Canadian Legislation: Judicial
Interpretation of the First Regulation
Canada introduced its first data exclusivity framework in 1995.409 Under this
framework, section C.08.004.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations mandated a
minimum period of five years with respect to reliance on an innovative manufacturer’s
data:
Where a manufacturer files a new drug submission, an abbreviated new drug
submission, a supplement to a new drug submission or a supplement to an
abbreviated new drug submission for the purpose of establishing the safety and
effectiveness of the new drug for which the submission or supplement is filed, and
the Minister examines any information or material filed with the Minister, in a new
drug submission, by the innovator of a drug that contains a chemical or biological
substance not previously approved for sale in Canada as a drug, and the Minister,
in support of the manufacturer’s submission or supplement, relies on data
contained in the information or material filed by the innovator, the Minister
shall not issue a notice of compliance in respect of that submission or
supplement earlier than five years after the date of issuance to the innovator
of the notice of compliance or approval to market that drug, as the case may
be, issued on the basis of the information or material filed by the innovator for that
drug [emphases added].410

At first glance, this first version of section C.08.004.1 appears to be consistent with
Canada’s obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA, particularly with respect to the specified
minimum period of protection mandated by Article 1711(6) of NAFTA. However,
judicial interpretation of this provision considerably weakened data exclusivity protection
for innovative manufacturers.
For example, the applicability of section C.08.004.1 concerning the Minister’s
reliance upon an innovative manufacture’s data was debated in Bayer Inc. v. Minister of
Health.411 Specifically, the issue was whether the Minister would need to rely on data
contained in an innovative manufacturer’s NDS to establish the safety and efficacy of a
409
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second manufacturer’s drug, thereby triggering the application of section C.08.004.1 and
thus imposing a delay of five years upon the second manufacturer. Bayer Inc. (“Bayer”)
argued that, if a second manufacturer filed an ANDS naming Bayer’s drug as the
Canadian Reference Product, the Minister would, inevitably, nearly always rely on the
data contained in Bayer’s NDS because an NOC would only have been issued to Bayer
based on the safety and efficacy information in the NDS. Conversely, counsel for the
Minister of Health argued that the Minister relies on the information contained in the
ANDS itself without referring to materials previously filed by the innovative
manufacturer.
Evans J. ultimately agreed with the Minister of Health. With respect to the scope
of section C.08.004.1, he concluded:
“…this provision was not intended to create a protection analogous to a patent for
the benefit of nearly all the innovators of new drugs who have obtained a NOC. I do
not accept the submission that the Minister “relies” on the innovator’s information
for the purposes of C.08.004.1 when considering an ANDS or a NOC, where the
Minister issues the NOC solely on the basis of the information contained in the
ANDS…the word adverb “indirectly” should not be read into C.08.004.1(1) so
as to broaden the scope of the verb “relies” [emphasis added].412

The Federal Court of Appeal subsequently upheld the decision of Evans J. and also
rejected the notion that the Minister could not issue an NOC to a second manufacturer
earlier than five years after the issuance of an NOC to an innovative manufacturer.413 The
Court observed that the minimum five year protection under section C.08.004.1(1) would
not apply if the second manufacturer could demonstrate in an ANDS that its drug was the
pharmaceutical and bioequivalent of the innovator manufacturer’s drug. The protection
would thus apply only if the Minister “examines and relies upon information filed by the
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innovator in its NDS,” since the safety and efficacy of the drug would only be established
by reference to confidential information provided by the innovative manufacturer.414 The
Court accordingly rejected Bayer’s argument that the Minister implicitly examined and
relied on confidential information in a NDS whenever an ANDS is filed by a second
manufacturer. Instead, the Court concluded that the regulation merely contemplated that
the Minister “may or may not examine and rely upon confidential information filed by
the innovator,” since to read the provision otherwise would effectively grant a minimum
five-year market protection to an innovative manufacturer when an ANDS was filed by a
second manufacturer.415
The Bayer decision thus authorized the issuance of an NOC to a generic drug
manufacturer as soon as the manufacturer was able to establish, on the basis of an ANDS,
that its product was equivalent to an innovative manufacturer’s drug. Since this narrow
interpretation of the data exclusivity regulation would essentially result in the nonapplication of the minimum five-year term of protection to an innovative manufacturer’s
data in many, if not most, cases,416 the Bayer case significantly weakened data exclusivity
protection in Canada and, arguably, favoured generic manufacturers at the expense of
innovative manufacturers.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Bayer decision led to tension between the U.S. and
Canada with respect to Canada’s data exclusivity obligations. In 2003, the U.S. included
414
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Canada on the Watch List in its Special 301 Report.417 The report claimed that Canada
“does not provide effective data exclusivity protections, and systematic inadequacies in
Canadian administrative and judicial procedures allow entry of infringing generic
versions of patented medicines into the marketplace.”418 This view of Canadian data
exclusivity law was also consistent with that of some legal commentators, who called the
judicial reasoning in Bayer “flawed in several ways”: aside from the fact that the meaning
of the word “rely” in the English language does not mean “review” or “examine,” the
right to exclusive use of data is consistent with one of the key purposes of the data
exclusivity regulation, which is to encourage the testing and entry of new drugs into the
marketplace.419
In response to these criticisms, Canada’s federal government announced proposed
amendments to the data exclusivity framework in December 2004, and acknowledged
that Canada had not implemented its data exclusivity obligations in a manner that
“automatically” prohibited reliance on an innovative manufacturer’s data for a minimum
period of time.420 The new data exclusivity regulation, which came into force on October
5, 2006,421 constitutes the current state of data exclusivity protection in Canada.
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3.1.2. Strengthening Data Exclusivity in Canada: The Data Protection Regulation
The amended section C.08.004.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations, now known
as the “Data Protection Regulation” (“DPR”), has expanded the scope of data exclusivity
protection. For instance, section C.08.004.1(3) reads:
If a manufacturer seeks a notice of compliance for a new drug on the basis of a
direct or indirect comparison between the new drug and an innovative drug,
(a) the manufacturer may not file a new drug submission, a supplement to a new
drug submission, an abbreviated new drug submission or a supplement to an
abbreviated new drug submission in respect of the new drug before the end of a
period of six years after the day on which the first notice of compliance was issued
to the innovator in respect of the innovative drug; and
(b) the Minister shall not approve that submission or supplement and shall not
issue a notice of compliance in respect of the new drug before the end of a period
of eight years after the day on which the first notice of compliance was issued to the
innovator in respect of the innovative drug [emphases added].422

The amendments strengthen data exclusivity in a number of ways. First, under
section C.08.004.1(3), it is now the manufacturer’s reliance that is relevant rather than
that of the Minister. This provision essentially incorporates the appellant’s position in
Bayer with respect to reliance of a generic manufacturer on an innovative manufacturer’s
NDS materials, in that an ANDS “will merely purport to establish that [the generic
manufacturer’s] drug is the pharmaceutical equivalent and bioequivalent” of the
innovative drug, and “will not contain any independent evidence of the safety and
effectiveness” of the generic product.423 Furthermore, section C.08.004.1(3) expressly
includes the notion of “indirect” reliance on an innovative manufacturer’s data, thereby
clarifying interpretive difficulties regarding actual or “implied” reliance. Perhaps most
striking, the amended section now confers a total protection period of eight years,
compared to the five years under the previous regulation, with mandatory delays on the
422
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filing of submissions and issuance of an NOC. For a six-year period, a generic
manufacturer cannot file any submission to seek regulatory approval, and the provision
also prohibits the Minister of Health from issuing an NOC to a generic manufacturer for
an additional two years after the six-year period elapses.
As mentioned in Chapter Two, there are differences between TRIPS and NAFTA
with respect to the mandated length of data exclusivity protection. While NAFTA
requires member states to grant a five-year minimum term of protection, TRIPS does not
mandate a minimum term of data exclusivity protection and instead leaves member states
free to address the issue according to their own preferences. However, there is
nonetheless an important similarity between both agreements regarding the permitted
scope of intellectual property protection, since both TRIPS and NAFTA authorize their
member states to enact more extensive protection than that required therein.424 Where
there is a mandatory minimum period of protection and if the phrase “more extensive”
protection also encompasses the length of protection, member states are within their legal
rights to select and implement a term that exceeds the minimum requirement into their
domestic legislation. However, if the purpose of a regulatory regime in the
pharmaceutical context is to protect public health, the state government has a duty to
consider the potential impact of any proposed legislation on the citizens of the state. Such
policy issues are also an essential factor in the determination of the appropriate length of
data exclusivity protection in Canadian legislation.
424
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Before passage of the new data exclusivity regime, Health Canada accepted
submissions from various interested parties to ascertain the regulatory impact of the
proposed amendments to the DPR. Health Canada received representations from 43
stakeholders, including innovative and generic manufacturers and their trade associations,
members of parliament, law firms, provincial and territorial Ministers of Health, and
consumer groups.425 These submissions reflected a clear difference in perspectives
between the innovative and generic pharmaceutical industries with respect to the
appropriate duration of data exclusivity protection. The generic drug industry objected to
the proposed eight-year term, observing that this term would impose a delay on generic
approval for a period that was three years longer than that mandated by NAFTA and in
other jurisdictions such as the U.S.426 In contrast, the innovative drug industry supported
the eight-year term of protection but encouraged the government to adopt a period of
protection consistent with that of the European Union,427 which had, since November 30,
2005, begun to offer a ten-year term of protection with the possibility of an extension to
eleven years for new therapeutic indications.428 Therefore, although Pei-Kan Yang
suggests that Canada may have “overreacted” in its attempt to improve compliance with
TRIPS and NAFTA,429 Canada’s eight-year term of protection actually constitutes a
midpoint between five years and eleven years, thus reflecting an apparent effort to strike
a balance between the two divergent terms of protection recommended by the innovative
and generic drug industries.
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3.1.3. Judicial Interpretation of the Data Protection Regulation in Canadian Case Law
In Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Canada (Minister of Health),430
Canada’s new 2006 DPR was challenged on the basis that the protection was ultra vires
the federal legislative authority. Mandamin J. of the Federal Court addressed the
following substantive issues: a) whether the DPR was intra vires the federal legislative
powers pursuant to subsection 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867; b) whether the DPR
and subsection 30(3) of the Food and Drugs Act were intra vires the federal legislative
powers (as matters of national concern or the general regulation of trade and commerce);
and c) whether the DPR was invalid owing to lack of rational connection to authority
granted under section 30(3) of the Food and Drugs Act or because section 30(3) was an
impermissible sub-delegation by Parliament.431
Notably, this case illustrates the tension between the innovative and generic drug
industries with respect to the nature and scope of data exclusivity protection. The first
applicant, the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association (CGPA),432 emphasized the
importance of low-cost generic drugs.433 The ability of generic manufacturers to receive
market approval for their drugs plays an essential role in controlling drug prices in
Canada, since upon market entry, the price of a generic drug is typically 30-50% below
that of an innovative drug. The CGPA accordingly estimates that the monopoly imposed
by the DPR cost the healthcare system $500 million in lost savings. Secondly, the CGPA
asserted that, where the generic manufacturer submits an ANDS, the Minister does not
actually rely on an innovative manufacturer’s clinical and pre-clinical studies in assessing
430
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the safety and efficacy of a generic drug.434 Instead, both the generic manufacturer and
the Minister rely on: a) the fact that an NOC has previously been issued for a Canadian
Reference Product; b) the fact that the Canadian Reference Product is being marketed in
Canada; and c) the information and material in the ANDS. With respect to the validity of
the DPR, Mandamin J. noted the CGPA’s claims that the DPR was beyond the scope of
subsection 30(3):
Permitted regulations must not restrict the authority conferred elsewhere in the
Act, they must only apply to trade secrets or undisclosed data, and must affect
only the person who “relies on” such data, and only for a “reasonable period”,
normally five years. The Data Protection Regulation exceeds these limitations; it
creates a new intellectual property regime without statutory authority.435

On the other hand, Canada argued that the DPR was intra vires the federal
legislative powers under section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In particular,
Canada asserted that the protection of public health and safety is a valid exercise of the
federal government’s criminal law power, and that the DPR contributes to the protection
of public health and safety. By prohibiting all drugs except those that have been proven to
be safe and effective, the DPR constitutes an integral part of the overall scheme
concerning the marketing of drugs in Canada. In its submission, Canada emphasized the
public safety elements of the Food and Drug Regulations, including the goal of
“minimizing the potential for marketing unsafe drugs while maximizing the potential for
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safe drugs to be readily accessible in the market”436 and the requirement for exhaustive,
complete, and accurate information on the safety and effectiveness of a new drug.”437
Moreover, Canada acknowledged the issue of balance between the interests of
generic and innovative manufacturers. In providing for an abbreviated process to prove
the safety and efficacy of a new drug, the regulatory scheme also provides for
competition in the marketplace by lowering the cost of drugs for the public and reducing
the testing required for human subjects. Nevertheless, the abbreviated process must be
subject to constraints (through data exclusivity) in order to avoid reducing the number of
submissions for approval for innovative drugs. While these constraints may appear to
relate to unfair commercial practices that would fall within the scope of provincial
legislative powers, they are an essential component of the overall scheme of criminal law
and are implemented to protect public safety.
In the end, contrary to the perspective of the CGPA, Mandamin J. observed that
making a generic version of an approved drug circumvents the need to generate the
requisite research and clinical data. Proof of safety and efficacy of a generic drug by
comparing it to a Canadian Reference Product thus “necessarily relies on the earlier NDS
information” submitted by an innovative manufacturer.438 In reaching this conclusion,
Mandamin J. noted the perspective of Binnie J. of the Supreme Court of Canada with
respect to reliance on an innovator’s submission:
Generally speaking, the “second person” intends to manufacture and distribute a
“copy-cat” version of the active medicinal ingredient. If it copies the approved
product, it can rely on the safety and efficacy data and the clinical studies
436
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submitted by the “innovator” first person. Such reliance reduces the amount of
required supporting data and the approval time, and the shortened submission is
therefore known as an Abbreviated NDS (ANDS).439

Mandamin J.’s conclusion with respect to reliance makes logical sense. Although
the Minister may review the ANDS material without having to refer to the original NDS
submission, the reality is such that the evidence in the ANDS would not exist but for the
Canadian Reference Product with which to compare the generic drug. This interpretation
is accordingly consistent with the perspective of Lietzan, mentioned in Chapter Two, who
asserted that there should be no question of reliance where an abbreviated submission
uses the “fact” of the innovator’s approval as a comparison.440
As mentioned earlier in Chapter Two, the protection of confidential information
appears to lack a public interest441 component. Although this thesis has proposed that data
exclusivity actually provides a limitation on the potentially perpetual secrecy of
confidential information, this approach to the purpose of data exclusivity may provide
little consolation in practice since longer periods of data exclusivity protection do
contribute to delays in the market entry of cheaper, generic drugs. These delays result in
the monopoly of more expensive medications, which affects access to affordable
medicines and thus constitutes a public health issue. Perhaps owing to this reality,
Mandamin J. made the following observation:
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The Data Protection Regulation does not directly add to public safety since it
postpones the introduction of lower cost generic drugs. The [Regulatory Impact
Analysis Statement] states that the Data Protection Regulation is to encourage
innovator drug manufacturers, or at least allow them to recover their investment,
and thereby foster innovators to develop new drugs. However, the evidence on
this point is more of a logical assertion than a clear demonstration that innovators
are not or will not bring forward new drugs for approval without the provision
[emphasis added].442

The connection between data exclusivity and protection of the public health may
be only theoretical. Nevertheless, perhaps there is merit in the argument that intellectual
property rights enforcement is highly influential, if not outright determinative, in
choosing the appropriate location for pharmaceutical research and development. For
example, Michael Ravvin has noted that of the 1,556 new drugs that received market
approval during the period from 1975 to 2004, only 21 drugs (barely greater than 1% of
the total), targeted “neglected” tropical diseases.443 Ravvin has also observed that
pharmaceutical research and development is devoted almost exclusively to diseases
prevalent in affluent countries, because innovative companies have no incentive to invest
in research and development in poor countries that cannot support monopoly drug
prices.444
Mandamin J. observed that protecting public health and safety is a valid exercise
of the federal government’s criminal law power, and that the regulatory drug scheme in
the Food and Drug Regulations was “unquestionably valid criminal law legislation.” The
contravention of either the Food and Drugs Act or the Food and Drug Regulations can
result in liability for penalties including fines and imprisonment:
Subject to sections 31.1, 31.2 and 31.4, every person who contravenes any of the
provisions of this Act or of the regulations, or fails to do anything the person was
442
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ordered to do by an inspector under section 25 or 27.2, is guilty of an offence and
liable
(a) on summary conviction for a first offence to a fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or to both and,
for a subsequent offence, to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both; and
(b) on conviction on indictment to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both.445

However, notwithstanding that the overall regulatory scheme of drugs falls
within federal authority, Mandamin J. concluded that the DPR was not a public safety
provision and was thus not intra vires the federal law criminal powers. In particular,
Mandamin J. observed that the regulation of drug marketing has a “very significant
impact in the area of commerce.”446 Thus, according to Mandamin J., the dominant
feature of the DPR was the balancing of commercial considerations between the
protection of an innovative manufacturer’s investment in preparing an NDS and the
approval of a generic manufacturer’s ANDS for a lower cost generic copy of the same
drug.447 The public health and safety aspect of the DPR therefore constituted an “adjunct
rather than integral” part of the overall regulatory scheme.448
Nevertheless, Mandamin J. upheld the DPR as a valid exercise of the section
91(2) regulation of trade and commerce.449 He noted that the DPR addresses a “genuine,
national economic concern” because Canada’s implementation or failure to implement
international trade agreements has a “national dimension that relates to Canada’s ability
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to participate in world trade.”450 Furthermore, Mandamin J. stated that provincial
legislatures cannot enact legislation that delays the approval of generic drugs for the
market place. Provincial government approval for drugs for the marketplace would
seriously encroach on federal criminal law powers to prohibit the marketing of drugs
unless they have proven to be safe and effective. Finally, Mandamin J. held that the
Governor in Council was properly delegated the authority to enact regulations and did not
have indeterminate regulatory power to do so. Rather, Parliament has restricted the scope
of the Governor in Council’s authority to a narrow area, since section 30(3) of the Food
and Drugs Act expressly refers only to Article 1711 of NAFTA and paragraph 3 of
Article 39 under TRIPS. The pith and substance of the DPR thus constitutes the balance
regarding the commercial considerations between innovative and generic manufacturers
that arise from the implementation of TRIPS and NAFTA.
At the appellate level, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision of
Mandamin J.451 However, Nadon J.A. disagreed with Mandamin J.’s characterization of
the pith and substance of the DPR. Whereas Mandamin J. had previously concluded that
the protection of public safety was ancillary to the regulatory scheme, Nadon J.A. arrived
at the opposite conclusion and asserted that the DPR must be interpreted in the context of
the Food and Drug Regulations and its enabling statute.452 By granting innovative
manufacturers an eight-year period of market protection, the DPR encourages research
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and development for new drugs, which thereby constitutes a valid health and safety
purpose. Nadon J.A. stated:
The true purpose of the DPR is not to balance the commercial interests of
innovators and generic drug manufacturers, but rather to ensure that Canadians
have reasonable access, at reasonable prices, to new, safe and effective drugs…the
Regulations as a whole encourage the research and development of new medicines
that save lives, prevent diseases, heal and cure and improve the health of
Canadians, who can only benefit from the discovery and development of new
medicines after the information and data generated in extensive pre-clinical and
clinical trials demonstrate the “innovative drug’s” safety and efficacy to the
satisfaction of the Minister. The DPR plays an important part in this regulatory
scheme.453

This interpretation of the DPR’s purpose was directly referenced by Stratas J.A. in
Takeda Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health) (“Takeda”).454 Though the dispute in
Takeda concerned the interpretation of the term “innovative drug” rather than the DPR at
large, and Stratas J.A. also delivered the dissenting judgment, it is nevertheless important
to note his judicial interpretation of the DPR’s purpose, particularly since he linked data
exclusivity protection of an innovator’s investment to the public interest. In doing so, he
observed that many new, safe, and efficacious drugs are now readily available to the
public. However, “invisible” to the public are the “years of financial investment, effort,
research, and testing, all undertaken with no assurance of success,” in which the entire
process is filled with economic, scientific, and regulatory risk.455 Since drug
manufacturers wish to maximize profits, greater risks and smaller potential rewards
decrease the likelihood that drug manufacturers will invest in research and
development.456 Accordingly, one area of risk concerns the “valuable” data generated by
innovative manufacturers: if data that is submitted for regulatory approval can
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immediately be used by competitors in order to obtain their own market approval, “what
is the incentive for the innovator to innovate, submit data, and bring new drugs to
market?”457 Stratas J.A. concluded that data exclusivity promotes innovation by altering
the “risk-reward equation” for the innovator, who is then encouraged to research,
discover, and develop new drugs.
Since the public benefits from new ideas and inventions, Stratas J.A. observed
that data exclusivity obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA ensure that the protection is
only conferred upon “new” chemical entities.458 This perspective of Stratas J.A. appears
to reflect the balance sought by intellectual property law: since data exclusivity protects
confidential information, a limited term monopoly is given to an innovator or “first
mover” in exchange for a temporary interruption in the flow of valuable information.
Data exclusivity accordingly brings back the “bargain” into the protection of confidential
information, since it represents a break in the permanence of the secrecy therein.
The decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canadian Generic and the
dissenting opinion of Stratas J.A. in Takeda459 reiterate a common perspective of data
exclusivity, in that data exclusivity protects investment and subsequently leads to
economic reward, which in turn fosters the development and availability of life-saving
drugs, thereby resulting in positive public health outcomes. Because data exclusivity
protects confidential information, these views reflect the theoretical connection between
data exclusivity and public welfare, in that the public’s initial exclusion from knowledge
will ultimately result in a greater benefit than would have been obtained had the
information been immediately available.
457
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Having now completed a discussion of both the legislative regulation of clinical
trials and data exclusivity, this thesis will next consider personal data protection
governing the health sector in Canada.

3.2. Personal Health Information Legislation: Controlling Information in the Health
Context
Prior to the enactment of health-specific personal data protection legislation, it
was possible for personal health information to be governed by two different regulatory
standards, depending on whether the data was held by public or private sector
organizations. In Ontario, for example, two public sector statutes, such as the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act460 and the Municipal Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act,461 have governed access and privacy of personal
information held by public sector organizations since 1988 and 1992, respectively.462
However, because of their “piecemeal approach,” these statutes did not offer clear,
statutory rules with respect to the consistent treatment of health records that were held by
health care institutions in Ontario.463
With respect to the private sector, the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act464 (“PIPEDA”) was passed in April 2000 by the federal
government.465 Before January 2004, PIPEDA was limited in scope to organizations
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under federal jurisdiction, such as banks and airlines.466 As of January 1, 2004, PIPEDA
began to apply to all organizations within the country that collected, used, or disclosed
personal information, including personal health information, in the course of commercial
activities.467 PIPEDA would apply to these organizations unless a province had enacted
“substantially similar” legislation that was applicable to these organizations, and the
federal government had ordered an exemption from PIPEDA.468
Uncertainty regarding the application of PIPEDA, based on the term “commercial
activities,” created a lack of consistency in the framework of privacy standards across the
health sector.469 Also, since PIPEDA had been originally enacted to address the needs of
electronic commerce, stakeholders in the health sector were concerned about whether
PIPEDA was sufficiently adequate to address the complexities of the health system.470
The rationale amongst various provinces for health-specific personal data
protection arose out of the need to create a framework that facilitated consistent provision
of health care. The federal government has noted that enacting “substantially similar”
legislation to PIPEDA would “enable provinces [and] territories to regulate the personal
information management practices of organizations operating within their borders and to
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minimize the imposition of a dual regulatory regime on these organizations.”471 Where a
province enacted private sector (including health-related) personal data protection
legislation that the federal government does not deem “substantially similar” to PIPEDA,
affected organizations must comply with both statutes: PIPEDA and the provincial
enactment.
Ontario’s PHIPA was thus designed to address this duality of regulatory regimes:
the federal government duly designated PHIPA as “substantially similar” to PIPEDA, and
health information custodians472 under PHIPA are expressly exempt from the application
of Part 1 of PIPEDA.473 The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act and
the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act do not apply to
personal health information in the custody or control of a health information custodian.474
Table 1 contains the Canadian jurisdictions that have enacted health-specific
personal data protection and addresses whether these statutes have been deemed to be
substantially similar to PIPEDA. In addition to Ontario’s PHIPA, health-specific personal
data protection statutes from New Brunswick,475 Newfoundland and Labrador,476 and
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Nova Scotia477 have been deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA. As shown in Table 1,
there are six provinces with health-specific personal data protection legislation that have
not been deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA.

Table 1 - Jurisdictions with Health-Specific Personal Information Protection
Legislation

Jurisdiction

Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
New Brunswick
Newfoundland &
Labrador
Nova Scotia
Prince Edward
Island
Yukon
Northwest
Territories

477

Statute

Health Information Act, RSA 2000, c H-5.
Health Information Protection Act, SS 1999 c
H-0.021.
Personal Health Information Act, CCSM 2005,
c P33.5.
Personal Health Information Protection Act,
RSO 2004, c 3.
Personal Health Information Privacy and
Access Act, SNB 2009, c P-7.05.
Personal Health Information Act, SNL 2008, c
P-7.01.
Personal Health Information Act, SNS 2010, c
41.
Health Information Act, RSPEI 1988, c H1.41.479
Health Information Privacy and Management
Act, SY 2013, c 16.
Health Information Act, SNWT 2014, c 2.

Deemed
Substantially
Similar to
PIPEDA?478
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

Personal Health Information Custodians in Nova Scotia Exemption Order SOR/2016-62.
Where a statute has not been deemed substantially similar to PIPEDA, PIPEDA will continue to apply to
organizations in that province with respect to personal health information. The organization in question
must then comply with both PIPEDA and the personal health information statute.
479
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There remain three Canadian jurisdictions that have not enacted health-sector
specific personal data protection legislation. Table 2 identifies these jurisdictions and the
personal data protection statutes that apply to organizations in the public and private
sectors with respect to the handling of personal health information. The private sector
statutes from British Columbia480 and Quebec481 have been deemed to be substantially
similar to PIPEDA and organizations in these provinces are thereby exempt from the
application of PIPEDA. As Table 2 shows, PIPEDA still applies to private sector
organizations in Nunavut.
Table 2 - Personal Data Protection Law Applicable Where Jurisdiction Has No
Health-Specific Statute

Jurisdiction
British Columbia482
Quebec483

Nunavut

480

Private Sector Statute
Personal Information Protection
Act, SBC 2003, c 63.

Public Sector Statute
Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy
Act, RSBC 1996, c 165.
An Act Respecting the Protection of An Act Respecting Access
Personal Information in the
to Documents Held by
Private Sector, RSQ 2005, c P-39. Public Bodies and the
Protection of Personal
Information, RSQ 2005, c
A-2.1.
Personal Information Protection
Access to Information and
and Electronic Documents Act, SC Protection of Privacy Act,
2000, c 5.
SNWT 1994, c 20.
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The following sections of this chapter will explore the link between personal data
protection and data exclusivity through an analysis of the legislatively mandated practices
for clinical trials and through the determination of the personal data protection laws that
apply to the relevant parties that are required to maintain records regarding clinical trial
participants.

3.3. Linking Data Exclusivity to Personal Data Protection
Clinical trial data originates from patients and healthy volunteers who participate
in clinical trials, in which raw data is collected during the following periods: a) first
enrollment; b) the trial itself; and c) completion of the study.484 Raw data consists of
observations about individual participants, which are collected for the study protocol or
as part of routine care.485 These data may be in the form of measurements of participant
characteristics including weight, blood pressure, or heart rate and they can also include a
baseline description of the participant’s medical history including: physical exam
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information; clinical laboratory results; genome sequences; procedure results; and selfreported data such as a person’s quality of life.486 During the course of the trial, the raw
data is “abstracted, coded, and transcribed” into an analyzable set,487 which is eventually
“locked” into a final data set in which no further changes may be made.488
Both the raw data and analyzable data sets ultimately constitute individual
participant data.489 Some observations, such as imaging results from X-rays or magnetic
resonance imaging, must be interpreted (or “abstracted”) by study investigators and
entered into case report forms as transcribed narrative data or as coded data according to
the requisite coding procedures – for example, men may be coded as “0” and women as
“1.”490 In addition to physiological and clinical measures, it is also becoming increasingly
common to collect other types of health information in clinical trials, such as sensor data
from smartphone applications, consumer genomics data, and participant-reported
outcomes.491
The need for documentation of the vast amount of patient information collected in
a clinical trial requires clinical trial sponsors to maintain detailed records with respect to a
drug used in a clinical trial. According to section C.05.012(3)(d) of the Food and Drug
Regulations:
The sponsor shall maintain complete and accurate records in respect of the use of
a drug in a clinical trial, including…records respecting the enrolment of clinical
trial subjects, including information sufficient to enable all clinical trial
subjects to be identified and contacted in the event that the sale of the drug may
486
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endanger the health of the clinical trial subjects or other persons [emphasis
added].492

The connection between the legislative regimes of data exclusivity and personal
data protection, at least with respect to the Food and Drug Regulations, largely depends
on the phrase “information sufficient to enable all clinical trial subjects to be identified.”
If patients can be re-identified from de-identified clinical trial data, this would suggest
that personal health information protection laws would apply to the data. At first glance,
one might think that section C.05.012(3)(d) merely mandates that a master list of all
contact information for registered clinical trial participants must be retained, such that
there is no need for examination of the clinical trial data itself. However, there is a
problem with this interpretation, since the provision mandates that clinical trial
participants must first be identified and then contacted. Furthermore, because the
provision expressly mentions that identification and contact are to occur in the event that
the drug would endanger participants’ health or that of others, it would make little sense
from a public health standpoint to contact individuals in a blind, wholesale manner,
particularly since participants might have been randomized into multiple groups under
different trial conditions and may require further medical intervention from having taken
the experimental drug in the first place.
In mandating that individual clinical trial subjects be identifiable, section
C.05.012 of the Food and Drug Regulations provides the strongest potential link between
the legislative regimes of data exclusivity and personal data protection. Clinical trial data
consists of an individual’s health information, and individuals have a right to control their
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Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.012(3)(d).
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personal information according to personal data protection laws.493 However, clinical trial
sponsors maintain temporary, exclusive rights to clinical trial data because of federal data
exclusivity legislation. This struggle over access to the same set of confidential
information leads to a potential conflict with respect to Canada’s abilities to comply with
both data exclusivity and personal data protection obligations made internationally. To
determine whether there is a conflict between these two regimes, the following issues will
be addressed in this chapter: a) the definition of “personal health information” under
provincial health information protection legislation; and b) whether clinical trial data
retains the characteristics of information that constitutes “personal health information.” In
addition to clarifying the consistency of operation between data exclusivity and personal
data protection, this analysis will help to determine the extent of rights of individual
clinical trial participants to control their personal health information.

3.3.1. Record-Keeping Requirements: Good Clinical Practices and Identification of
Patients
As mentioned in Chapter One, Canada’s federal health regulatory agency, Health
Canada, is a standing regulatory member of the International Council for Harmonisation
of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (“ICH”).494 The ICH is a
non-profit organization that seeks to achieve greater harmonization in the interpretation
and application of guidelines and requirements for pharmaceutical product registration
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For example, an individual’s consent is generally required for the collection, use, and disclosure of the
individual’s personal health information under Ontario’s PHIPA: see PHIPA, supra note 384, s 29.
494
See Government of Canada, International Council for Harmonisation (ICH), online:
<https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/drug-products/applicationssubmissions/guidance-documents/international-conference-harmonisation.html> [Gov’t of Canada (ICH)].
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and “contribute to the protection of public health.”495 This harmonization is achieved
through the development of ICH Guidelines through a “scientific consensus” with
regulatory and industry experts, in which the ICH asserts that the key to success of this
process is “the commitment of the ICH regulators to implement the final Guidelines.”496
Health Canada accordingly claims to be “committed to the adoption and implementation
of ICH guidance and standards,”497 which includes the ICH’s Guideline for Good
Clinical Practice (“ICH-GCP”).498 Health Canada’s commitment is thus consistent with
Canada’s Food and Drug Regulations, which defines “good clinical practices” as
“generally accepted practices that are designed to ensure the protection of the rights,
safety, and well-being of clinical trial subjects and other persons.”499
Health Canada’s own Guidance for Records Related to Clinical Trials
(“Guidance”) on the interpretation of the record-keeping requirement under section
C.05.012 of the Food and Drug Regulations is directly influenced by the ICH-GCP.500
The ICH-GCP’s guidance contains a “minimum” list of “essential documents,” which
constitutes an Annex to Health Canada’s Guidance. Importantly, some of these records
are capable of identifying clinical trial participants. Table 3 describes these records,
which are required to be kept by clinical trial sponsors and institutional investigators:
495
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the Food and Drug Regulations - Division 5, (May 23, 2006), online: <
https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hc-sc/migration/hc-sc/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/compliconform/gui_68-eng.pdf> (accessed June 14, 2017) [Health Canada].
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Table 3 - Required Records to be kept in the Course of Clinical Trials that can
Identify Clinical Trial Subjects501

Stage of
Trial

Record Title

Record Purpose

During
Clinical
Phase

Source
Documents

Documents the existence
of the subject and
substantiates the integrity
of trial data collected –
should include original
documents related to the
trial, to medical
treatment, and history of
subject
Documents identification
of subjects who entered
pre-trial screening
To document that the
investigator or institution
keeps a confidential list
of names of all subjects
allocated to trial numbers
on enrolling in the trial.
Allows investigator or
institution to reveal the
identity of any subject
Documents chronological
enrollment of subjects by
trial number
Enables identification of
all subjects enrolled in the
trial in case a follow-up is
necessary. List should be
kept confidential and for
an “agreed upon time”
To document results and
interpretation of the trial

Subject
Screening Log
Subject
Identification
Code List

Completion
or
Termination
of Trial

Subject
Enrollment
Log
Completed
Subject
Identification
Code List

Clinical Study
Report

501

Record Location
(Files Of)
Investigator Sponsor

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

The contents of Table 3 have been adapted from “Essential Documents for the Conduct of a Clinical
Trial”: ICH, “Clinical Practice”, supra note 498.
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Based on Table 3, there would be at least the above records extant in every
clinical trial. As will be demonstrated, personal data protection would give rights to
patients in respect of each of these records.
The Food and Drug Regulations define a “sponsor” as an “individual, corporate
body, institution, or organization that conducts a clinical trial,”502 and sponsors are
ultimately responsible for conducting trials in accordance with good clinical practices,
which includes fulfilling the requirements with respect to information and records under
section C.05.012 of the Food and Drug Regulations.503 Health Canada further clarifies
the role of the sponsor as an individual, institution, or organization that is responsible for
the “initiation, management, and/or financing of a clinical trial.”504 Sponsors also
delegate many functions to third parties, including qualified investigators.505
The Food and Drug Regulations define a “qualified investigator” as “a person
responsible to the sponsor for the conduct of the clinical trial at a clinical trial site, who is
entitled to provide health care under the laws of the province where that clinical trial site
is located.”506 Moreover, the person must be “a physician and a member in good standing
of a professional medical or dental association.”507 Under the Health Canada Guidance,
qualified investigators are required to retain clinical trial participants’ medical records as
well as records that identify the participants.508
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Table 3 indicates that some records that facilitate the identification of clinical trial
subjects, such as the “completed subject identification code list,” are to be retained
exclusively by the investigator rather than the sponsor. Based on this delegation of record
retention, it may initially seem that only the qualified investigator is able to identify study
participants. However, section C.05.012 of the Food and Drug Regulations expressly
states that it is the sponsor that is responsible for the maintenance of records that would
enable the identification of clinical trial participants. The Health Canada Guidance
acknowledges that it is ultimately the sponsor’s responsibility to comply with the Food
and Drug Regulations, and that in the event of any inconsistency or conflict with the
Food and Drug Regulations, these regulations take precedence over the Health Canada
Guidance.509 In this way, to comply with the Food and Drug Regulations, it follows that
the sponsor must also retain the information that facilitates the identification of individual
participants.
According to the ICH’s Structure and Content of Clinical Study Reports (“ICHCSR”), a “clinical study report” (CSR) is a comprehensive report that integrates
numerous pieces of information relating to an individual study of a drug or treatment
conducted in patients.510 Although the precise contents of a CSR may depend on the
individual trial,511 the report is generally supposed to include information pertaining to
treatment administered, selection of the study population, statistical analyses regarding
efficacy, and safety evaluation. In particular, the ICH recommends that the CSR should
509

Ibid at 4.
International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human
Use, Structure and Content of Clinical Study Reports (30 November 1995) at 1, online:
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describe demographic and other predictive characteristics of the study population, “and
where the study is large enough to permit this, present data for demographic (e.g. age,
sex, race, weight) and other (e.g. renal or hepatic function) subgroups” in order to
identify possible differences in safety and efficacy.512 For example, the ICH-CSR
recommends that the CSR include a listing of all patients discontinued from the study
after enrolment, “broken down by centre and treatment group, giving a patient identifier,
the specific reason for discontinuation, the treatment (drug and dose), cumulative dose,
(where appropriate), and the duration of treatment before discontinuation.”513 In addition,
the ICH-CSR states that “it may also be useful to include information, such as critical
demographic data (e.g. age, sex, race), concomitant medication, and the major response
variable(s) at termination.”514
The ICH-CSR notes that investigators should present and compare group data for
“critical demographic and baseline characteristics of the patients,” and should also
include a diagram that shows the relationship between the entire sample and any other
groups in the analysis.515 The ICH-CSR notes that the “critical” baseline variables in the
group data will depend on the nature of the disease and protocol but will usually include
demographic variables such as age, sex, race, as well as “disease factors” such as disease
duration, stage, and severity, concomitant illness at trial initiation (e.g. renal disease,
diabetes, heart failure), relevant previous illness, and relevant previous treatment for
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illness treated in the study.516 Other potentially relevant variables include factors such as
smoking, alcohol intake, special diets, and menstrual status.517
It is thus clear that a clinical trial involves the collection and use of a significant
amount of patient health information. Figure 5 illustrates the flow of information with
respect to clinical trial data and the patient data contained therein, thereby representing
the reality that while clinical trial data is part of the realm of confidential information,
this data ultimately originates from patient data.

Figure 5 - Flow of Information with respect to Clinical Trial Data and Patient Data
This patient health information subsequently forms part of a CSR that is prepared
in accordance with the ICH-CSR. Although the term “clinical study report” is not a
defined term under the Food and Drug Regulations, sponsors are nonetheless required to
submit, as part of regulatory market approval, “detailed reports of the tests made to

516
517

Ibid at 14.
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establish the safety” with respect to an innovative drug’s recommended purpose and
conditions of use.518 The record-keeping requirements under section C.05.012 of the
Food and Drug Regulations and the guidance prepared by the ICH and Health Canada
also clearly indicate that patient identity is capable of being revealed at any time by both
the sponsor and investigator alike despite the purported anonymization of patients
through the assignment of code numbers.
There are two aspects of the personal data protection analysis that are important to
determining whether there is a conflict between data exclusivity and personal data
protection. First, in light of record-keeping requirements under the Food and Drug
Regulations and Health Canada’s Guidance, one must determine the proper personal data
protection legislation that applies to qualified investigators and clinical trial sponsors that
possess the health information of clinical trial participants. Second, one must determine
whether patient health information in clinical trial data constitutes personal health
information within the meaning of personal health information protection laws or, where
applicable, personal information within the meaning of public and private sector general
personal data protection laws. As this thesis will show through a legislative analysis,
patient health information that is collected and retained in clinical trials falls within the
definition of identifiability under health-specific personal data protection statutes and also
falls under the aegis, where applicable, of public and private sector general personal data
protection laws. Therefore, personal data protection applies to clinical trial data.
Furthermore, this thesis will also demonstrate that data exclusivity and personal data
protection can operate consistently together in Canadian law.

518

Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.08.002 (2)(g).
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3.3.2. Which Personal Data Protection Laws Apply to Qualified Investigators and
Clinical Trial Sponsors?
The documentation and record-keeping responsibilities of the clinical trial
sponsor and qualified investigator under Health Canada’s Guidance and the Food and
Drug Regulations are directly related to the application of the appropriate personal data
protection laws. For example, in Ontario, section 29(1)(a) of PHIPA states that a “health
information custodian” must not collect, use, or disclose an individual’s personal health
information unless “it has the individual’s consent under this Act.”519 Section 3(1) of
Ontario’s PHIPA defines a “health information custodian” as follows:
“health information custodian”, subject to subsections (3) to (11), means a
person or organization described in one of the following paragraphs who has
custody or control of personal health information as a result of or in connection
with performing the person’s or organization’s powers or duties or the work
described in the paragraph, if any:
1. A health care practitioner or a person who operates a group practice of
health care practitioners.
2. A service provider within the meaning of the Home Care and Community
Services Act, 1994 who provides a community service to which that Act
applies.
3. A community care access corporation within the meaning of
the Community Care Access Corporations Act, 2001.
4. A person who operates one of the following facilities, programs or
services:
i. A hospital within the meaning of the Public Hospitals Act, a private
hospital within the meaning of the Private Hospitals Act, a psychiatric
facility within the meaning of the Mental Health Act or an independent
health facility within the meaning of the Independent Health Facilities
Act.
ii. A long-term care home within the meaning of the Long-Term Care
Homes Act, 2007, a placement co-ordinator described in subsection 40 (1)
of that Act, or a care home within the meaning of the Residential
Tenancies Act, 2006.
519

PHIPA, supra note 384, s 29(1)(a):
A health information custodian shall not collect, use or disclose personal health
information about an individual unless…it has the individual’s consent under this Act and
the collection, use or disclosure, as the case may be, to the best of the custodian’s
knowledge, is necessary for a lawful purpose.
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ii.1 a retirement home within the meaning of the Retirement Homes Act,
2010.
iii. A pharmacy within the meaning of Part VI of the Drug and
Pharmacies Regulation Act.
iv. A laboratory or a specimen collection centre as defined in section 5 of
the Laboratory and Specimen Collection Centre Licensing Act.
v. An ambulance service within the meaning of the Ambulance Act.
vi. A home for special care within the meaning of the Homes for Special
Care Act.
vii. A centre, program or service for community health or mental health
whose primary purpose is the provision of health care.
5. An evaluator within the meaning of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 or
an assessor within the meaning of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.
6. A medical officer of health of a board of health within the meaning of
the Health Protection and Promotion Act.
7. The Minister, together with the Ministry of the Minister if the context so
requires.
8. Any other person prescribed as a health information custodian if the person
has custody or control of personal health information as a result of or in
connection with performing prescribed powers, duties or work or any
prescribed class of such persons.520

Thus, in order for PHIPA to apply to an organization, the organization must be a
“health information custodian” within the meaning of this definition. As mentioned
previously in section 3.3 of this thesis, clinical trials involve the collection of a vast
amount of personal health information from clinical trial participants, so it is important to
clarify the responsibilities of the entities that will have custody and control over this
information.521 The question, then, is whether qualified investigators and clinical trial
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sponsors constitute health information custodians within the meaning of health-sector
specific personal data protection statutes, such as PHIPA, and are thereby subject to the
rules thereunder.
In Ontario, it is evident that qualified investigators constitute health information
custodians under PHIPA. As mentioned previously, section C.05.001 of the Food and
Drug Regulations mandates qualified investigators to be physicians. In Ontario, the
practice of medicine is regulated under the Medicine Act, 1991,522 which requires
physicians to be members of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.523
Under PHIPA, a health information custodian includes “a health care practitioner or a
person who operates a group practice of health care practitioners,”524 in which a “health
care practitioner” is defined as “a person who is a member within the meaning of
the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991525 and who provides health care.”526 The
Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 defines a “member” as a “member of a
College,”527 and includes medicine as a self-governing health profession under the
Medicine Act, 1991.528 Since the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 applies to any
qualified investigator by virtue of his or her status as a physician, qualified investigators
thus qualify as health information custodians within the meaning of PHIPA.

outlines the procedures for compliance with applicable personal data protection legislation and states that
CCTG collects personal health information from participants who have provided written consent to
participation in a clinical trial, including test results, adverse events, and medical history.
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It is also possible for clinical trials sponsors to qualify as health information
custodians under PHIPA. Under Health Canada’s Guidance with respect to recordkeeping requirements, “independent investigators” who initiate a clinical trial under their
own sponsorship become responsible for all aspects of that trial, both as a qualified
investigator and a sponsor.529 In this way, clinical trial sponsors can be health information
custodians under PHIPA if they are also qualified investigators, based on the requirement
that a qualified investigator must be a physician.
However, it is less clear whether clinical trial sponsors that are businesses, such as
pharmaceutical companies, constitute health information custodians within the meaning
of health-sector specific statutes such as PHIPA. A corporate entity such as Merck Frosst,
for example, is not encompassed530 by the above definition of a health information
custodian under PHIPA. This exclusion reflects the fact that, while the research and
development of life-saving drugs is directly relevant to human health outcomes, an entity
such as Merck Frosst does not provide health care but engages in pharmaceutical
innovation for the purpose of selling the products for profit. In other words, the activities
of innovative pharmaceutical companies are better characterized as having a commercial
or business purpose rather than a health care purpose.
Even if PHIPA does not apply to pharmaceutical companies such as Merck
Frosst, these organizations are nonetheless governed by PIPEDA in the course of their
commercial activities. So long as information pertains to an identifiable individual,531 a
529
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pharmaceutical company will be obligated to protect this information with respect to its
collection, use, or disclosure in the course of commercial activities.532 The Federal Court
of Appeal in Wyndowe v. Rousseau533 observed that the definition of personal
information under PIPEDA rendered this statute “very far reaching.”534 This
interpretation is supported by Principle 4.9.1 under PIPEDA, which addresses access to
personal information: since “organizations may choose to make sensitive medical
information available through a practitioner,” Décary J.A. noted that “medical
information”, which is “personal health information”, is “personal information.”535
PIPEDA also provides a definition of personal health information,536 and Décary J.A.
asserted that, despite the fact that these expressions are defined “without reference to one
another, it is clear that “personal health information” is a subset of “personal
information.””537
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As mentioned previously, British Columbia,538 Quebec,539 and Alberta540 have
enacted their own private sector personal data protection statutes which have all been
deemed to be substantially similar to PIPEDA.541 Accordingly, in their respective
provinces, these private sector statutes would govern clinical trial sponsors that are
pharmaceutical companies, replacing PIPEDA.542
Therefore, although personal health information is part of the data that is collected
during clinical trials, the existence of health-specific personal data protection legislation
in a jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that all parties involved in the clinical trial
will be governed by this legislation. As discussed above, a “health information custodian”
is a defined term under Ontario’s PHIPA, and pharmaceutical companies are not
encompassed by this definition and consequently are not subject to the rules under
PHIPA.
To determine the applicable personal data protection laws in other Canadian
jurisdictions with respect to clinical trial sponsors and qualified investigators, this thesis
first focuses on the jurisdictions with health-sector specific personal data protection and
then provides an analysis of the definitions of health information custodians in the health-
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specific personal data protection statutes for the following jurisdictions: Alberta;543
Saskatchewan;544 Manitoba;545 New Brunswick;546 Newfoundland and Labrador;547 Nova
Scotia;548 Prince Edward Island;549 Yukon;550 and the Northwest Territories.551
Despite variations in the legislative definitions of health information custodians
with respect to the institutions and individuals encompassed therein, health care providers
constituted health information custodians in all these jurisdictions. Since health care
providers are health information custodians within the meaning of health-specific
personal data protection statutes, and in light of the requirement under the Food and
Drug Regulations that a qualified investigator must be a physician,552 Table 4
demonstrates that health-specific personal data protection applies to all qualified
investigators in each of these jurisdictions but not to clinical trial sponsors in any of these
jurisdictions. Clinical trial sponsors are instead governed by PIPEDA in each of these
jurisdictions, except in Alberta, where Alberta’s private sector legislation replaces the
application of PIPEDA.553
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Table 4 - Application of Health-Specific Personal Data Protection in Clinical Trials

Jurisdiction

Applies to Qualified
Investigator
(Physician)?

Alberta

Yes

Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
New Brunswick
Newfoundland and
Labrador
Nova Scotia
Prince Edward
Island
Yukon
Northwest
Territories

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Applies to Clinical Trial
Sponsor
(Business – i.e. Pharmaceutical
Company)?
No; the Personal Information
Protection Act applies
No; PIPEDA applies
No; PIPEDA applies
No; PIPEDA applies
No; PIPEDA applies
No; PIPEDA applies

Yes
Yes

No; PIPEDA applies
No; PIPEDA applies

Yes
Yes

No; PIPEDA applies
No; PIPEDA applies

British Columbia, Quebec, and Nunavut have been excluded from Table 4 since
none of these jurisdictions has enacted a health-specific personal data protection statute.
Table 5 identifies the applicable personal data protection laws with respect to qualified
investigators and clinical trial sponsors in these jurisdictions. The public sector personal
data protection statutes in these jurisdictions apply to qualified investigators that are in
possession of health information.554 The private sector statutes in British Columbia555 and

This Act does not apply to…health information as defined in the Health Information
Act to which that Act applies.
However, pharmaceutical companies are excluded from the scope of application of the Health
Information Act, since they do not qualify as “custodians”: see AB HIA, supra note 542, s 1(1)(f) and AB
Reg, supra note 542, s 2(2).
554
The application of public sector legislation to qualified investigators in this context assumes that these
physicians are operating within public organizations, such as hospitals.
555
See BC PIPA, supra note 105, s 3: British Columbia’s private sector statute applies to “every
organization” but does not apply where British Columbia’s public sector statute, the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165, applies to personal information.
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Quebec556 replace the application of PIPEDA in governing clinical trial sponsors in these
provinces, and PIPEDA will continue to apply to clinical trial sponsors in Nunavut.
Table 5 - Application of Personal Data Protection in Clinical Trials for Jurisdictions
without Health-Sector-Specific Statutes

Jurisdiction

British Columbia
Quebec

Nunavut

Qualified Investigator
(Physician)
Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act,
RSBC 1996, c 165.
An Act Respecting Access to
Documents Held by Public
Bodies and the Protection of
Personal Information, RSQ.
2005, c A-2.1.
Access to Information and
Protection of Privacy Act,
SNWT 1994, c 20.

Clinical Trial Sponsor
(Business – i.e. Pharmaceutical
Company)
Personal Information Protection Act,
SBC 2003, c 63.

An Act Respecting the Protection of
Personal Information in the Private
Sector, RSQ, c P-39.

Personal Information Protection
and Electronic Documents Act, SC
2000, c 5.

In determining which personal data protection laws that apply to the relevant
entities holding patient health information, it was necessary to first identify whether these
entities fell within the definition of information “custodian”: if they do, they lie within
the scope of health-specific personal data protection statutes. In all cases, the qualified
investigator under the clinical trials regime falls within this scope where there is
applicable health-sector specific legislation (see Table 4). Where there is no such
legislation, the qualified investigator is governed by the relevant public sector personal
data protection statutes (see Table 5). In the case of clinical trial sponsors, because they

556

See QC Act, supra note 100, s 1: The purpose of this statute is to establish rules concerning the
protection of personal information which a person “collects, holds, uses, or communicates…in the course
of carrying on an enterprise within the meaning of article 1525 of the Civil Code.” See also: Civil Code of
Quebec, CQLR c CCQ-1991, art 1525, which defines an enterprise as “the carrying on by one or more
persons of an organized economic activity, whether or not it is commercial in nature, consisting of
producing, administering or alienating property, or providing a service.”
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are purely businesses, private sector personal data protection legislation (either provincial
or PIPEDA) will apply rather than health-specific or public sector personal data
protection.
The following section of this thesis will explore the definition of “personal health
information” with respect to the concept of identifiability of the individual and how the
application of personal data protection laws affects individuals’ rights to control their
personal health information in the context of data exclusivity.

3.4. What Information Qualifies as “Personal Health Information”557 under
Canadian Legislation?
3.4.1. The Notion of Identifiability
Consider the famous anecdote about the priest who was asked, at a party,
whether he had heard any exceptional stories during confessionals. “In fact," the
priest replied, "my first confessor is a good example, since he confessed to a
murder." A few minutes later, an elegant man joined the group, saw the priest,
and greeted him warmly. When asked how he knew the priest, the man replied:
"Why, I had the honor of being his first confessor.558

This anecdote, offered by Ruth Gavison, illustrates the need to clarify the notion
of “identifiability” as it relates to the definition of personal information within the
meaning of personal data protection laws. As the custodian of the information about the
identity of the murderer, it is clear that the priest felt confident that, in withholding the
confessor’s name, the sensitive information he did reveal was sufficiently anonymous as
to safeguard the confessor’s identity. At the time of the priest’s disclosure, no one present
could have uniquely identified the individual to whom the priest was referring. However,
an additional piece of information that was later made available ultimately removed all
doubts about the individual’s identity. Gratton also notes that, while information may not
557
558

Alberta uses the term “health information” instead of “personal health information.”
Ruth Gavison, “Privacy and the Limits of Law” (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421 at 430-431.
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initially be “identifiable” within the meaning of personal data protection laws, acquiring a
certain volume of information will eventually be sufficient to make that bundle of
information “identifiable.”559
Clarification of the definition of identifiability can involve a factual determination
of what it means to “de-identify” data, and whether such de-identification is sufficient to
render it non-personal information and safeguard the identity of the confidante individual
who confided the data. Data that has been de-identified can lead to later violations of
patient privacy owing to re-identification through the proliferation of large-scale analyses
of vast data sets.560 Solon Barocas and Helen Nissenbaum observe that the promise of
anonymity is impossible to fulfil if individual records contain information that may fall
outside the scope of the commonly defined set of personally identifiable information but
nonetheless distinguish a person sufficiently to associate those records to a specific
individual.561 For example, combining an anonymized data set with a separate data set
that includes identifying information, and subsequently looking for areas of overlap in the
combined data, increases the likelihood of being able to re-identify individuals in the data
set or determine whether they belong to a subgroup with certain attributes.562 The
existence of these techniques raises the issue of whether de-identified data sufficiently
addresses the interests of individual patients in maintaining the confidentiality of their
personal health information.

559

Gratton, supra note 406 at 184.
Institute of Medicine, supra note 392 at 53.
561
Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, “Big Data’s End Run around Anonymity and Consent,” in Julia
Lane et al, Privacy, Big Data, and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement (Cambridge University
Press, 2014), 44-75 at 50, available online: <
https://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/BigDatasEndRun.pdf>.
562
Ibid.
560

151

The issue of identifiability is particularly relevant in the context of clinical trials
with respect to the application of personal data protection laws because the ability to
uniquely identify an individual is essential to the definition of personal information in
both international instruments and Canadian legislation. The international OECD Privacy
Guidelines define “personal data” as “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable individual (data subject).”563 Similarly, Canada’s federal PIPEDA states that
information about an “identifiable” individual constitutes personal information.564
Although neither the OECD Privacy Guidelines nor PIPEDA offer definitions of
“identifiable,” Khaled El Emam et al have observed that information that permits the
direct recognition of an individual, including personal names, social insurance numbers,
and telephone numbers constitutes “direct identifiers.”565 In contrast, “quasi-identifiers”
are characteristics that can indirectly identify individuals and include demographic and
socioeconomic information such as a person’s date of birth, ethnicity, and income
level.566
The identifiability of an individual is also an essential characteristic of personal
information in the health context. For example, section 4 of Ontario’s PHIPA defines
personal health information to mean “identifying information about an individual” with
respect to several features that include the individual’s physical or mental health, family
health history, and health number.567 “Identifying information” is defined under PHIPA

563

OECD Guidelines, supra note 92, s 1(b).
See PIPEDA, supra note 101, s 2(1).
565
Khaled El Emam, Sam Rodgers & Bradley Malin, “Anonymizing and Sharing Individual Patient Data”
(2015) 350 BMJ 1-5 at 2 [El Emam et al].
566
Ibid at 2.
567
PHIPA, supra note 384, s 4(1):
“personal health information”, subject to subsections (3) and (4), means identifying
information about an individual in oral or recorded form, if the information,
564
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as information that identifies an individual or that could be used to identify an
individual.568 Since identifying information includes that which could be used to identify
an individual, Ontario’s PHIPA appears to contemplate situations in which information
could be used in combination with other information to identify an individual.
Recall from section 3.3.2 of this thesis that it was essential to determine the
relevant personal data protection laws applying to the qualified investigators and clinical
trial sponsors that have custody of personal health information in clinical trials in order to
clarify their responsibilities in protecting this information. It is now important to
determine whether the information involved constitutes information about an
“identifiable” individual: since identifiability is a key aspect of the definition of personal
health information, information that does not qualify as identifiable would be excluded
from the scope of the definition, which could subsequently affect the responsibilities of
those who have custody of the information. In this context, understanding of the
“identifiability” of information is a key determinant for whether there is a conflict
between data exclusivity and personal data protection. If personal data protection does
not apply because there is no personal health information in clinical trial data by the time

(a) relates to the physical or mental health of the individual, including information that
consists of the health history of the individual’s family,
(b) relates to the providing of health care to the individual, including the identification of
a person as a provider of health care to the individual,
(c) is a plan of service within the meaning of the Home Care and Community Services
Act, 1994 for the individual,
(d) relates to payments or eligibility for health care, or eligibility for coverage for health
care, in respect of the individual,
(e) relates to the donation by the individual of any body part or bodily substance of the
individual or is derived from the testing or examination of any such body part or bodily
substance,
(f) is the individual’s health number, or
(g) identifies an individual’s substitute decision-maker.
568
Ibid, s 4(2): PHIPA defines ““identifying information” as “information that identifies an individual or
for which it is reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances that it could be utilized, either alone or with
other information, to identify an individual.”
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data exclusivity law applies, then there is no conflict between the legislative regimes of
personal data protection and data exclusivity.

3.4.2. Identifiability of the Individual: Application of Personal Data Protection and
Control over Information
The precise definitions of personal health information differ between jurisdictions.
For example, Manitoba’s personal health information statute has been in force since
1997, and offers the following definition of personal health information:
“personal health information" means recorded information about an identifiable
individual that relates to
a) the individual's health, or health care history, including genetic information
about the individual,
b) the provision of health care to the individual, or
c) payment for health care provided to the individual,
and includes
d) the PHIN and any other identifying number, symbol or particular assigned to
an individual, and
e) any identifying information about the individual that is collected in the
course of, and is incidental to, the provision of health care or payment for
health care.569

Prince Edward Island is the most recent province to have enacted personal health
information protection legislation. The Health Information Act570 received Royal Assent
on May 14, 2014 and was proclaimed in force on July 1, 2017. In contrast with the
legislation of Manitoba, Prince Edward Island’s Health Information Act offers a more
detailed description of the characteristics and activities that contribute to the definition of
personal health information:
“personal health information” means identifying information about an individual
in oral or recorded form that
(i) relates to the individual’s physical or mental health, family health history or
health care history, including genetic information about the individual,

569
570

MB PHIA, supra note 545, s 1(1).
PEI HIA, supra note 549.
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(ii) relates to information about an individual that is collected for the purpose of
registering the individual for the provision of health care, including a health
number, medical record number and any other identifier assigned to an
individual,
(iii) relates to the provision of health care to the individual,
(iv) relates to an individual’s entitlement to benefits under or participation in a
health care program or service,
(v) is collected in the course of, and is incidental to, the provision of a health care
program or service or payment for a health care program or service,
(vi) relates to a drug, a health care aid, device, product, equipment or other item
provided to an individual under a prescription or other authorization issued by a
health care provider,
(vii) relates to information about payments or eligibility for health care in respect
of the individual, or eligibility for coverage for health care in respect of the
individual,
(viii) relates to the donation by the individual of any body part or bodily
substance of the individual or is derived from the testing or examination of any
body part or bodily substance,
(ix) identifies the individual’s substitute decision maker, or
(x) identifies the individual’s health care provider.571

Of the ten Canadian jurisdictions with health-specific personal data protection, eight
jurisdictions expressly include the notion of identifiability in their definition of personal
health information. These include Ontario,572 New Brunswick,573 Nova Scotia,574
Newfoundland and Labrador,575 Manitoba,576 Prince Edward Island,577 the Yukon,578 and
the Northwest Territories.579 Whereas the legislation from Manitoba merely requires
personal health information to relate to an “identifiable” individual,580 the statutes from
Ontario, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward
Island, and the Yukon expressly define “identifying” information, and these definitions
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Ibid, s 1(t).
See PHIPA, supra note 384, s 4(1).
573
See NB PHIPAA, supra note 546, s 1.
574
NS PHIA, supra note 548, s 3(r).
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NL PHIA, supra note 547, s 5(1).
576
MB PHIA, supra note 545, s 1(1).
577
PEI HIA, supra note 549, s 1(t).
578
YK HIPMA, supra note 550, s 2(1).
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NT HIA, supra note 551, s 1(1).
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MB PHIA, supra note 545, s 1(1).
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are essentially identical in each jurisdiction.581 For example, New Brunswick’s Personal
Health Information Privacy and Access Act describes “identifying information” as
follows:
“identifying information” means information that identifies an individual or for
which it is reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances that it could be utilized,
either alone or with other information, to identify an individual.582

One thus observes that, in addition to being able to directly identify an individual,
identifying information also constitutes that for which identification of the individual is
likely to occur. Moreover, the definition of identifying information also contemplates the
possibility of information being combined with other data in order to render the
individual capable of being identified.
The statutory definitions of identifying information in health-specific personal
data protection thus support the proposition that personal data protection applies to
clinical trial data, despite the removal of direct identifiers such as a participant’s name.
To use New Brunswick’s personal health information protection legislation as an
example, “identifying information” includes information “for which it is reasonably
foreseeable in the circumstances that it could be utilized, either alone or with other
information, to identify an individual [emphasis added].”583 Recall that, in accordance
with good clinical practices and the Food and Drug Regulations,584 qualified
investigators and clinical trial sponsors are required to maintain certain records in a
581

See PHIPA, supra note 384, s 4(2); NB PHIPAA, supra note 546, s 1; NL PHIA, supra note 547, s 5(5);
NS PHIA, supra note 548, s 3(l); PEI HIA, supra note 549, s 1(o); YK HIPMA, supra note 550, s 2(1). See
also, NT HIA, supra note 551, s 1(1): the statute from the Northwest Territories does not offer a definition
of “identifying information” but instead directly includes a description of identifiability in its definition of
personal health information: personal health information constitutes information which “identifies an
individual, or in respect of which it is reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances that the information
could be used, either alone or with other information, to identify an individual.”
582
NB PHIPAA, supra note 546, s 1.
583
Ibid.
584
Please refer to the previous discussion in section 3.3.1 of this thesis.
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clinical trial. For example, qualified investigators are required to keep a “Subject
Identification Code List,” that would allow the investigator to reveal the identity of any
subject585 and clinical trial sponsors must maintain “information sufficient to enable all
clinical trial subjects to be identified and contacted in the event that the sale of the drug
may endanger the health of the clinical trial subjects or other persons [emphasis
added].”586 In New Brunswick, although clinical trial data may be transcribed and coded,
such that one may not be able to immediately point to a particular individual, a
participant’s health information in a clinical trial constitutes “identifying information”
within the meaning of New Brunswick’s health information protection statute because it
can be combined with other information, such as a “Subject Identification Code List,” in
order to uniquely identify the individual.
The health-specific personal data protection statutes from Alberta587 and
Saskatchewan588 do not refer to identifiability in their definitions of personal health
information. However, Alberta’s Health Information Act is noteworthy because it
identifies two categories of “health information:”589 “non-identifying” and “individually
585

Please refer to Table 3, above, which includes the Subject Identification Code List as an essential record
that must be retained in a clinical trial, through which the identity of any clinical trial participant can be
revealed.
586
Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.012(3)(d).
587
See AB HIA, supra note 542, s 1(1)(k). Alberta uses the term “health information” instead of “personal
health information.”
588
See SK HIPA, supra note 544, s 2(m).
589
Alberta’s health information protection statute, AB HIA, supra note 542, s 1(i) defines “diagnostic,
treatment, and care information” as: “(i) the physical and mental health of an individual; (ii) a health
service provided to an individual, including the following information respecting a health services provider
who provides a health service to that individual…; (iii) the donation by an individual of a body part or
bodily substance, including information derived from the testing or examination of a body part or bodily
substance; (iv) a drug as defined in the Pharmacy and Drug Act provided to an individual; (v) a health care
aid, device, product, equipment or other item provided to an individual pursuant to a prescription or other
authorization; (vi) the amount of any benefit paid or payable under the Alberta Health Care Insurance
Act or any other amount paid or payable in respect of a health service provided to an individual, and
includes any other information about an individual that is collected when a health service is provided to the
individual, but does not include information that is not written, photographed, recorded or stored in some
manner in a record.” This definition is included as part of “health information,” under Alberta’s Health

157

identifying.” The term “non-identifying” with respect to describing health information
means that “the identity of the individual who is the subject of the information cannot be
readily ascertained from the information.”590 In contrast, ““individually identifying”,
when used to describe health information, means that the identity of the individual who is
the subject of the information can be readily ascertained from the information.”591 In light
of the record-keeping requirements under the Food and Drug Regulations and the
potential identification of an individual clinical trial participant in this manner, Alberta’s
definition of “individually identifying” health information also supports the notion that its
personal data protection applies to clinical trial data.
Recall that the previous analysis in section 3.3.2 found that clinical trial sponsors
which are pharmaceutical companies would not be subject to health-specific personal
data protection but would instead be governed by PIPEDA or, in British Columbia,
Alberta, and Quebec, by the private sector statutes of those provinces. PIPEDA and the
private sector statutes from British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec all expressly state that
“personal” information constitutes that which is about an identifiable individual.592 These
definitions of personal information and the potential for clinical trial sponsors to identify
all participants in accordance with the record-keeping requirements under the Food and
Drug Regulations593 are consistent with the proposition that personal data in clinical trials
remains identifiable.

Information Act: “health information” means one or both of the following: (i) diagnostic, treatment and
care information; (ii) registration information. See AB HIA, supra note 542, s 1(1)(k).
590
Ibid, s 1(1)(r).
591
Ibid, s 1(1)(p).
592
See PIPEDA, supra note 101, s 2(1); BC PIPA, supra note 105, s 1; AB PIPA, supra note 104, s 1(1)(k);
QC Act, supra note 100, s 2, where “personal information” is that which relates to a natural person and
allows that person to be identified.
593
See Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 5, s C.05.012(3)(d).
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This thesis has thus found that all patient data in clinical trials in Canada is
subject to personal data protection. All three constructs to be explored in addressing the
research question of this thesis have now been analyzed: the legislative regulation of
clinical trials, the data exclusivity right of pharmaceutical companies, and the
individual’s right to personal data protection. Having established the personal data
protection applicable to health care settings in every province, and having explored the
requirements for data exclusivity across Canada, the issue is whether there are situations
in which personal information gathered during clinical trials ceases to be subject to
personal data protection legislation. The following section explores this issue.

3.4.3. De-Identified Health Information: Definitions and Consequences of this
Classification
Five of the ten personal health information protection statutes surveyed offer an
express definition of de-identification of information. These jurisdictions are
Saskatchewan,594 Ontario,595 New Brunswick,596 Nova Scotia,597 and Prince Edward
Island.598 The provisions that define “de-identified information” differ slightly in
language and degree of detail. New Brunswick’s Personal Health Information Privacy
and Access Act offers a broad definition of de-identification: when the term “de-

594

SK HIPA, supra note 544, s 2(d):
“de-identified personal health information” means personal health information from
which any information that may reasonably be expected to identify an individual has
been removed.
595
PHIPA, supra note 384, s 47(1):
“de-identify”, in relation to the personal health information of an individual, means to
remove any information that identifies the individual or for which it is reasonably
foreseeable in the circumstances that it could be utilized, either alone or with other
information, to identify the individual, and “de-identification” has a corresponding
meaning.
596
NB PHIPAA, supra note 546, s 1.
597
NS PHIA, supra note 548, s 3(g).
598
PEI HIA, supra note 549, s 1(g).
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identified” is used to refer to personal health information, it means “personal health
information from which all identifying information has been removed.”599
Saskatchewan’s statute also defines de-identified information in a broad manner but also
contemplates the likelihood of identification of the individual, since “de-identified
personal health information” means “personal health information from which any
information that may reasonably be expected to identify an individual has been
removed.”600 The de-identification definitions from Ontario and Nova Scotia contemplate
the likelihood of identification and also consider the possibility that information can be
used with other information in identifying the individual. According to Ontario’s PHIPA,
to “de-identify” information means “to remove any information that identifies the
individual or for which it is reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances that it could be
utilized, either alone or with other information, to identify the individual.”601 Similarly,
Nova Scotia’s legislation defines “de-identified information,” as “information that has
had all identifiers removed that identify the individual, or where it is reasonably
foreseeable in the circumstances, could be utilized, either alone or with other information,
to identify the individual.”602 Finally, Prince Edward Island’s Health Information Act is
the only legislation to refer to specific anonymization techniques in its definition of “deidentified information” as “personal health information that has been stripped, encoded or
otherwise transformed so as to ensure that the identity of the individual who was the
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NB PHIPAA, supra note 546, s 1.
SK HIPA, supra note 544, s 2(d).
601
PHIPA, supra note 384, s 47(1). PHIPA offers this definition of de-identification for the purposes of
section 47, entitled “Disclosure for analysis of health system.” However, the definition is nonetheless
informative and provides insight into what constitutes identifying information.
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600

160

subject of the personal health information cannot be readily ascertained from the deidentified information.”603
Perhaps the difference in the language of these provisions reflects the reality that
anonymization techniques are not standardized across jurisdictions. El Emam et al have
noted that the concept of anonymous or non-identifiable data is ambiguous, which in turn
contributes to heterogeneity and inconsistency in actual anonymization practices for
health data.604 However, the robustness of anonymization merits close consideration since
some legislators in the area of personal data protection seem to have depended upon deidentification techniques to deliver, as Paul Ohm expresses it, “the best of both worlds:
the benefits of information flow and strong assurances of privacy.”605
Most important, characterizing information as “de-identified” leads to serious
implications with respect to the breadth of activities that are authorized in relation to this
information. Personal health information protection statutes from five Canadian
jurisdictions expressly authorize the collection, use, and disclosure of de-identified
information for any purpose: Alberta,606 New Brunswick,607 Prince Edward Island,608 the
Yukon,609 and the Northwest Territories.610 On the other hand, the statutes from
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Saskatchewan,611 Manitoba,612 New Brunswick,613 Nova Scotia,614 and Prince Edward
Island615 do not authorize collection, use, and disclosure for “any” purpose but instead
expressly exclude de-identified information from the scope of their application. Although
it may seem illogical for certain of these statutes, namely those from New Brunswick and
Prince Edward Island, to exclude de-identified information from the scope of their
application while simultaneously authorizing the collection, use, and disclosure of this deidentified information for any purpose, this situation merely means that de-identified
information is not protected by the statutory rules limiting collection, use, and disclosure.
The legal authorization to collect, use, and disclose de-identified or anonymized
health information for any purpose reflects the legislators’ apparent confidence in the
factual robustness of anonymization as an adequate safeguard for individual privacy
interests. In other words, for confidentiality to be upheld by de-identification, deidentified data must be truly anonymous. If this data is not truly anonymous and is being
collected, use, and shared in a widespread manner, this situation would run contrary to
611

SK HIPA, supra note 544, s 3(2)(a):
This Act does not apply to: (a) statistical information or de-identified personal health
information that cannot reasonably be expected, either by itself or when combined with
other information available to the person who receives it, to enable the subject individuals
to be identified.
612
MB PHIA, supra note 545, s 3:
This Act does not apply to statistical health information, or to health information that
does not, either by itself or when combined with other information available to the
holder, allow an individual to be readily identified.
613
NB PHIPAA, supra note 546, s 3(2)(a):
Unless otherwise specifically provided in this Act, this Act does not apply to
(a) anonymous or statistical information that does not, either by itself or when combined
with other information available to the holder of the information, permit individuals to be
identified.
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NS PHIA, supra note 548, s 5(2)(a):
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PEI HIA, supra note 549, s 4(1)(a):
Unless otherwise specifically provided in this Act, this Act does not apply to
(a) anonymous or statistical information that does not, either by itself or when combined
with other information available to the holder of the information, permit individuals to be
identified.
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the individual’s fundamental right to control his or her personal health information.616
However, recall from the discussion of data exclusivity at section 3.3.1, above, that
clinical trial data in Canada can never be de-identified because the federal government
does not allow it.
Research has shown that individuals can be re-identified from information that
was presumed to be anonymous.617 In their re-identification study, Latanya Sweeney et al
used 1,130 public profiles of individuals who shared their genetic data for the Personal
Genome Project (PGP), which was launched in 2006 in order to sequence the information
and make it publicly available in order for researchers to gain further insight into genetic
disease mechanisms and for individuals to learn about their own genetic profiles for
disease risk.618 Roughly half of the PGP profiles consisted of an individual’s date of birth,
gender, and 5-digit postal code, and Sweeney et al used a voter registration list and a
public records website to re-identify the PGP data according to individual names. The
researchers ultimately produced a list of 241 unique names for 42% of profiles in the
entire PGP dataset, and PGP staff confirmed that 84% of the matches were correct.619 In
addition to DNA information, many participants revealed sensitive conditions including
abortions, sexual abuse, illegal drug use, and clinical depression.620
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Recall, from Chapter Two, the words of LaForest J. in McInerney, supra note 375 at para 22 with
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Importantly, the PGP dataset consisted of data from individuals who had
expressly consented to the public sharing of their DNA information and who also had
control over the extent of the information that they wished to disclose. However, as will
be discussed in section 3.4.4 of this thesis, some personal health information protection
statutes authorize the creation of individually identifying information through data
matching, which can occur without the consent of the individual,621 albeit with the
approval of the requisite research ethics boards.
The ability to create identifying information from the availability of multiple data
sets raises the possibility of negative consequences for individuals, especially with
respect to genetic discrimination. For example, insurers routinely rely on an individual’s
family history and health status when determining risk classifications for health or life
insurance policies that are sensitive to mortality risks.622 Although predictive genetic
information may be necessary for an accurate assessment of risk and the subsequent
determination of the terms of insurance coverage,623 genetic information is nonetheless,
at best, “no more than probabilistic regarding the materialization of the risk in question,”
particularly with respect to conditions with multiple causal factors, and the individual can
remain asymptomatic.624 In this way, re-identification of publicly available information
by certain parties, such as insurers, can contribute to the denial or limitation of an
individual’s access to private insurance, thereby affecting his or her ability to respond to
unfortunate life events.
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Ultimately, it is the correlation between the individual’s name and another piece
of information, such as being afflicted by a certain condition or disease that can create the
risk of harm to the individual upon disclosure.625 The volume of available data
accordingly plays an important role in increasing the likelihood for re-identification
because it increases the potential for correlation between variables.626 The more detailed
the information in a data set, the easier it is to re-identify an individual in that data set.627
Nevertheless, commentators such as Ann Cavoukian and Daniel Castro have asserted
that, although re-identification of data sets is possible, the chance of re-identification is
relatively difficult in actual practice, such that the use of proper de-identification tools
render re-identification extremely unlikely.628 However, Cavoukian and Castro also
acknowledge that removing only direct identifiers – i.e. variables that provide an explicit
link to a data subject and that can directly identify an individual – is often insufficient to
ensure the de-identification of information.629 The problem of de-identification involves
“quasi-identifiers,” which are variables that may not directly identify individuals but are
highly correlated with unique identities and may thus be used for indirect reidentification, either alone or in combination with other available information.630
Cavoukian and Castro accordingly recommend that, in creating de-identified datasets,
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organizations should perform initial risk assessments and should consider the current
techniques regarding de-identification and re-identification.631
It is thus a question of achieving a balance between utility and anonymity of
information, since “data can be either useful or perfectly anonymous, but never both.”632
The ability to access multiple records and the absence of precise limitations on data
collection can accordingly render it easier for analysts to match and re-identify
information.633 Gratton thus proposes that the notion of identifiability should be
interpreted in light of the information’s overall sensitivity.634 In addition to the “intimate”
nature of the information and the extent of its availability to third parties or the public
upon disclosure, Gratton asserts that an analysis of the definition of personal information
should also consider whether the information collected may create a risk of harm upon
use or disclosure, since the risk of harm to an individual is minimal if an organization
merely collects personal information without using it and also protects the information
against disclosure.635

3.4.4. Contemplating Technological Realities: Personal Health Information Statutes,
Data Matching, and Re-Identification of the Individual
Protecting individual privacy is particularly challenging in 2017, where the
variety of data, size of data sets, and scope of data analyses are “unprecedented.”636 Even
if Canadian law did not require that clinical trial participants remain capable of being
identified, de-identifying data does not eliminate all risk of re-identification of data
631
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subjects, since reducing this risk to zero would destroy or at least significantly impair the
utility of the data for subsequent research.637 There is always some level of risk that
individual participant data, even de-identified, could be used to re-identify a research
participant, especially if “auxiliary information were linked with the clinical trial data
set.”638 Using such auxiliary information, it may be possible to infer or learn information
about individuals in a research data set, including the presence of sensitive conditions
such as alcoholism or mental illness.639
Research Ethics Committees are aware of the need to protect individual privacy
interests. For example, the TCPS 2 notes that where data is linked to different sources of
publicly available information, such linkages could give rise to new forms of identifiable
information, thereby raising issues of privacy and confidentiality.640 Accordingly, the
TCPS 2 requires that researchers who propose to engage in data linkage must obtain
approval from the appropriate Research Ethics Board before carrying out the linkage,
unless the research relies exclusively on publicly available information.641 In addition to
requirements to describe the data that will be linked and the likelihood that identifiable
information will be created through data linkage, researchers must also prove to the
applicable Research Ethics Board that the linkage is essential to the research and that
security measures will be implemented to protect the information.642 The TCPS 2
requirements reflect the reality that a growing number of databases and the advanced
technological capacity to link databases together create new risks to confidentiality of
637
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information, in which the linkage of de-identified or anonymized data may permit reidentification of individuals.643 Thus, data linkage is directly relevant to the risk of reidentification.
Most important to this thesis, personal data protection legislation has
acknowledged modern technological realities. Certain Canadian personal health
information protection statutes have expressly addressed “data matching,” and
consequently have, indirectly, addressed the issue of re-identification in doing so. For
example, Alberta’s Health Information Act defines data matching as meaning:
…the creation of individually identifying health information by combining
individually identifying or non-identifying health information or other
information from 2 or more electronic databases, without the consent of the
individuals who are the subjects of the information.644

With respect to health information custodians, Alberta’s Health Information Act
states that the custodian may perform data matching using information that “is in its
custody or under its control”645 and may also perform this technique by “combining
information that is in its custody or under its control with information that is in the
custody or under the control of another custodian.”646 Importantly, since data matching
occurs without the consent of the individual subject of the information, custodians who
engage in data matching under Alberta’s Health Information Act are required to conduct
a privacy impact assessment before data matching can be performed.647 These privacy
643
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impact assessments must describe how the information for use in the data matching will
be collected and must also delineate the use and disclosure for the information that will
be created by the data matching.648 The other Canadian jurisdictions that authorize data
matching by health information custodians are New Brunswick,649 Nova Scotia,650 the
Northwest Territories,651 and Prince Edward Island.652 In enacting rules to address the
technique of data matching, these jurisdictions have acknowledged that the availability of
multiple data sets can create identifying information that might have otherwise been
unavailable.
Identifying information that is created from data matching will be protected under
personal health information protection statutes and other personal data protection
legislation across Canada in accordance with statutory definitions of personal health
information therein. However, the ability to engage in data matching in the first place
emphasizes the importance of clarifying the definition of identifiability with respect to
information that has been rendered anonymous.
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3.4.5. De-Identification and Re-Identification: Is Data Ever Truly Anonymous?
Anonymization plays a central role in modern data handling, one in which data
handlers try to safeguard the confidentiality of personal information by de-identifying
data, including the suppression of patient names.653 However, according to Ohm,
legislators must abandon the following notions: 1) the idea that one can single out fields
of information that are more “linkable” to individual identity than others; and 2) the idea
that individual privacy can be protected when “we do nothing more than identify and
remove [personally identifiable information].”654 In light of the results of re-identification
research, and particularly the fact that personal health information protection statutes
expressly acknowledge the ability to combine data together, there is merit in Ohm’s
observation that “maybe everything is personally identifiable information to one who has
access to the right outside information.”655
Some academics note that most measures of the risk of re-identification assume
that someone will only attempt to identify a single record in the disclosed database.656
Identity disclosure and attribute disclosure are two types of disclosure that are of concern
in making raw data on individuals publicly available for secondary research purposes.657
Identity disclosure can occur where someone uses indirectly identifying information or
“quasi-identifiers”658 to assign an identity to a record in a particular data set, whereas
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attribute disclosure can occur when someone discovers a new, sensitive characteristic
about a patient in a database without necessarily knowing which specific record belongs
to the patient.659 Disclosing information that is not associated with an individual’s name
may create the mistaken belief that the individual is truly anonymous, thereby promoting
a false sense of security and increasing the willingness of the individual to share the
information publicly.660
The willingness to freely disclose de-identified information is also relevant to
organizations that are health information custodians. Personal health information
protection laws do not apply to de-identified information: for such information, no
limitations regarding collection, use, and disclosure of information apply.661 Rather than
focusing on the utility or merits of de-identification, this thesis focuses instead on the
question of clarifying what it means to be identifiable in 2017, given the power of current
information technology and the assumption still reflected in some personal health
information protection statutes that data can still actually be rendered truly anonymous
and thus does not merit personal data protection. The evidence is that the assumption of
de-identifiability is not valid. Therefore, personal data protection legislation needs to
preserve personal data protection for all data regardless of purported status in terms of
identifiability or anonymization.
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3.4.6. Withdrawal of Consent to Use and Disclosure of Personal Information: A
Potential Conflict with Data Exclusivity?
Although it appears to be uncommon for patients who withdraw consent to
participation in a clinical trial to also request the removal of their previously collected
data, such requests do occur.662 However, in addition to the fact that the withdrawal of
patient data from a clinical trial dataset can reduce the integrity of the sample and
compromise the scientific validity and generalizability of the research,663 the Food and
Drug Regulations oblige clinical trial sponsors to retain, for 25 years, all records involved
in a clinical trial,664 including those that would enable the individual to be identified.665
This mandated requirement to retain all records involved in a clinical trial is
directly relevant to the data exclusivity right of pharmaceutical companies with respect to
clinical trial data. The requirement, however, appears to conflict with an individual’s
right to control his or her personal data in terms of the right to withdrawal of the data
from a clinical trial dataset. According to the OECD Privacy Guidelines, individuals
should have the right to have data “erased” upon successfully challenging data related to
them.666 To explore this potential conflict between personal data protection and data
exclusivity, this thesis analyzed the private sector statutes that govern clinical trial
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sponsors in Canada.667 Specifically, this thesis examined PIPEDA and the private sector
statutes from British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec, in order to determine whether these
statutes authorize a right of absolute withdrawal of personal information that has already
been collected.
Of the four statutes analyzed, Quebec’s An Act respecting the Protection of
Personal Information in the Private Sector (“Quebec’s Act”) is the only statute that has
expressly implemented the right to “erase” personal information in the same manner
contemplated by the OECD Privacy Guidelines. Quebec’s Act grants the individual a
right of access to personal information held by an “enterprise”: upon the individual’s
request, the enterprise must confirm the existence of the file and communicate any
personal information to the individual.668 Most important for the purposes of the present
discussion, the individual “is entitled to obtain that any personal information collected
otherwise than according to law be deleted.”669 Accordingly, in Quebec, clinical trial
participants have express rights of withdrawal of personal data with respect to personal
data held by a clinical trial sponsor.
PIPEDA and the private sector statutes from British Columbia and Alberta do not
expressly give individuals the right to insist that personal data be erased or deleted by
organizations once it has already been collected. Nevertheless, all three of these statutes
667
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require individual consent to the collection, use, and disclosure of personal
information.670 Furthermore, all of these statutes expressly authorize the withdrawal of
individual consent at any time. For example, PIPEDA states that “an individual may
withdraw consent at any time, subject to legal or contractual restrictions and reasonable
notice.”671 British Columbia’s Personal Information Protection Act (“British Columbia’s
PIPA”)672 and Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act (“Alberta’s PIPA”)673 also
authorize individuals to withdraw consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of personal
information by organizations, such that the organization must cease these activities.674
The right to withdraw consent to use and disclosure of personal information has
implications in the data exclusivity context. Figure 6 illustrates the reality that clinical
trials involve multiple stages with respect to the flow of information, in which the
information is ultimately disclosed to Health Canada at the final stage in the course of the
regulatory market approval process for new drugs. As discussed earlier, personal health
information is first collected by qualified investigators, and this information is
subsequently disclosed to the clinical trial sponsor. The information then becomes part of
the clinical trial data set which is submitted by the clinical trial sponsor to Health Canada.
At each stage, the information is held by a separate organization – and each organization
is governed by specific personal data protection legislation – and no single piece of
personal data protection legislation governs all of these organizations.

670

See PIPEDA, supra note 101, Sch 1, s 4.3; BC PIPA, supra note 105, s 6; AB PIPA, supra note 104, s 7.
PIPEDA, supra note 101, Sch 1, s 4.3.8.
672
BC PIPA, supra note 105, s 9. The right to withdraw consent is subject to subsections 9(5) and (6), in
which, respectively, an individual may not withdraw consent if it would frustrate the performance of a
“legal obligation” or if consent had been given to a credit reporting agency.
673
AB PIPA, supra note 104, s 9. The right to withdraw consent is subject to subsection 9(5), in which the
withdrawal of consent does not operate to the extent that it would frustrate the performance of a “legal
obligation.”
674
See BC PIPA, supra note 105, s 9(4); AB PIPA, ibid, s 9(4).
671

174

Figure 6 - Flow of Information in a Clinical Trial from a Personal Data Protection
Perspective
As demonstrated in Figure 6, the withdrawal of consent to use or disclose
personal information at an early stage in the clinical trial (i.e. before the data makes its
way from the clinical trial sponsor to Health Canada) will prevent information from
moving to the next stage in the chain of information. Thus, although PIPEDA, British
Columbia’s PIPA, and Alberta’s PIPA do not grant patients express rights to “erase” data
that has already been collected from them in a clinical trial, these statutes nonetheless
authorize patients to withdraw consent to the use and disclosure of this information
before a clinical trial sponsor can submit it to Health Canada.675 Such a withdrawal of
consent will essentially “remove” the data from the dataset because the organization that
is the custodian will not be able to include the data in the dataset for further study.676
675
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Therefore, if patients withdraw consent to use and disclosure of personal information
before it is submitted to Health Canada, the clinical trial dataset submitted to the federal
government (Health Canada) will not be complete.

3.5. Conclusion
In the past, personal data protection appears not to have even been contemplated
as applying to clinical trial data, probably because of the assumption by authors that the
data from clinical trials had been anonymized. As such, patients were simply assumed to
lack rights of control over their data. Current information literature indicates that true
anonymization of data is no longer factually possible. As the analyses in this chapter have
shown, legislative definitions of personal health information and the record-keeping
requirements under the Food and Drug Regulations taken together indicate that personal
data protection applies to clinical trial data right up to and including the period of data
exclusivity protection. This finding represents the first time that a link has been made
between the previously diverse legal areas of data exclusivity and personal data
protection.
Through an analysis of Canadian data exclusivity and personal data protection
legislation, this chapter has demonstrated that data exclusivity does not abrogate the
personal data protection rights of the individual clinical trial participant. Instead, personal
data protection and data exclusivity regulate different parties’ rights of control to the
same information. This situation does not necessarily indicate a conflict between the two
legislative regimes, although a conflict may arise in the event that a clinical trial
complied with the conditions that would allow them to disclose information for research purposes without
individual consent; and b) what this effect would have, from a personal data protection perspective, on the
flow of information with respect to the market approval process for new drugs.
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participant exercises the right to withdraw consent to the use and disclosure by clinical
trial sponsors of personal information under the applicable private sector statutes.
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Chapter 4 – Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research
4.1. Conclusions
Modern intellectual property law seeks to maintain a balance between the rights
of individual innovators, the private interests of corporations that dominate intellectual
property ownership in many contexts, and the public good in accessing knowledge that
will further human progress.677 The need for balance among multiple stakeholders
involved with intellectual property law is particularly evident in the course of
pharmaceutical innovation. As part of this contestation, there is a struggle for control
over the confidential information generated in clinical trials.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the protection of commercially-related confidential
information, since the mid-nineties, has been classified as intellectual property under
international trade agreements including both TRIPS and NAFTA. As described in
Chapter Two, Canadian law provides protection both at common law and in civil law
consistent with this international trade obligation that such confidential information be
protected. In Chapter Two, this thesis noted that the secrecy of confidential information
has the potential to endure forever. 678 The 2012 Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Merck Frosst reinforces this legal reality: information submitted to the government in
innovative drug submissions is exempt from disclosure under the federal Access Act
(because Parliament accepted the inviolability of commercial confidential information
and exempted confidential “third party” information from being accessed by requesters).
The decision reinforced the protection of confidential information held by governments
from businesses, even when it has been transmitted from the business to the government,
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despite the fact that the Access Act gives the public a general right to access information
in government records. 679
Both TRIPS and NAFTA also require that nation states confer temporary,
exclusive rights, known as “data exclusivity,” upon pharmaceutical companies: rights to
the test data that is submitted to regulatory agencies in the course of the market approval
process for new drugs. The review of the academic literature on data exclusivity in
Chapter Two of this thesis demonstrated disagreements among scholars about the nature
and purpose of data exclusivity. This thesis, in Chapter Two, has established that,
contrary to the situation of potential permanency established by the law surrounding the
secrecy of commercial confidential information in Canada, Canada’s legislated data
exclusivity protection actually places a limitation on the period of secrecy in exchange
for giving the innovator pharmaceutical company a temporary monopoly on the
information. By placing a temporal limit on this secrecy, data exclusivity functions in a
manner analogous to classic intellectual property devices such as patent and copyright,
which confer limited term monopolies in exchange for public disclosure of information
with respect to an invention or work. Accordingly, data exclusivity is consistent with the
“bargain” in intellectual property law which seeks a balance between public and private
interests. Thus, this thesis demonstrates that a proper understanding of the role of data
exclusivity (that it is consistent with, and thus a new species of, intellectual property)
runs counter to much of the current literature on data exclusivity which represents data
exclusivity as purely a benefit to private interests.680
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The need for balance among multiple, potentially divergent interests also raises
important questions with respect to an individual’s right to control personal information
in clinical trials. Since it is individual participants whose personal health information
comprises clinical trial data, those individuals have the right to control their personal
information in accordance with Canadian personal data legislation681 and in light of
Canada’s commitment to the OECD Privacy Guidelines.682
This thesis examined three constructs: 1) the legislative regulation of clinical
trials; 2) the data exclusivity right of pharmaceutical companies; and 3) the individual’s
right to personal data protection. Examination of these three constructs was necessary in
order to answer the research question guiding this thesis: does the data exclusivity right
of pharmaceutical companies either operate consistently with or abrogate an
individual’s right to personal data protection in the clinical trial context?
To answer the question of whether data exclusivity operates consistently with
personal data protection, this thesis analyzed the data exclusivity provisions under
Canadian legislation and the definitions of personal health information according to both
Canadian health-specific personal data protection legislation and other non-specific
Canadian personal data protection legislation relevant to the regulation of personal health
information.683 In respect of every province and territory in Canada, this research
identified the relevant personal data protection legislation that would apply to qualified
investigators and clinical trial sponsors (those who are mandated by the federal Food and
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Drug Regulations to keep records that would enable the identification of clinical trial
participants).684 Based on this methodology, this thesis found the following:
1) Clinical trials involve the collection, use, and dissemination of personal health
information;685
2) According to definitions of personal health information in Canadian personal
health information protection statutes,686 information must be about an
identifiable individual in order to constitute personal health information;
3) The existence of applicable health-specific personal data protection does not
necessarily mean that all clinical trial sponsors will be covered by this legislation,
although all qualified investigators will be. Clinical trial sponsors such as
pharmaceutical companies were found to not constitute health information
custodians under health-specific personal data protection statutes and were found
to be governed instead by private sector personal data protection legislation
applicable in each respective jurisdiction.687
4) For jurisdictions that have not enacted health-specific personal data protection,
the public sector and private sector legislation of those particular jurisdictions
governed qualified investigators and clinical trial sponsors, respectively.688
5) Personal health information that initially comprises part of a data set from a
clinical trial can technically be “de-identified” using various “anonymization”
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techniques. De-identified data is not subject to personal data protection legislation
and can thus be freely used and disclosed by its custodian. At first glance, this
would seem to include “de-identified health information” from clinical trials, but
for two important findings from this study:
a) Despite having been subjected to anonymization techniques, data can
never be truly anonymous in light of the ability of modern information
technology to re-identify individuals. This factual finding that data is
never truly anonymous has implications for patient health information
that has undergone de-identification and might otherwise be assumed
to be excluded from the application of personal data protection laws;
b) Although clinical trial data might be thought to be capable of deidentification through anonymization techniques during the course of a
clinical trial, clinical trial participants must always be capable of being
individually identified with their data because of the record-keeping
requirements made under the federal Food and Drug Regulations.
Based on current statutory definitions under the Food and Drug Regulations in
Canada, clinical trial data must retain the characteristics of identifiability that
bring the data within the Canadian statutory definitions of personal information
protected by relevant personal data protection legislation.689
6) The importance of legislated privacy controls in situation where there is an
imbalance of power between those gathering information (here, the qualified
investigators and clinical trial sponsors) and clinical trial participants (patients)
689

As established above in Chapter Three, the Food and Drug Regulations mandate clinical trial sponsors
to retain records for a period of 25 years, including the records that would enable the identification of
individuals.
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has recently been highlighted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Douez (2017).
In Douez, the Court established that contract cannot necessarily oust legislated
privacy protections, particularly when there is an imbalance of bargaining power
between parties.690 In light of Douez, and despite whatever past understandings of
the role and effect of informed consent to participation in a clinical trial might
have been, this thesis indicated in Chapter One that henceforth the “price” for
treatment of an individual’s medical condition should not be considered to
necessarily include the relinquishing of that individual’s statutory rights to control
his or her personal information when it becomes part of the clinical trial data sets
going forward through the processes mandated by Health Canada.
As this thesis establishes in Chapter Three, a patient in a clinical trial who applies
under the relevant personal data protection legislation to get access to his or her data
collected as part of the clinical trial data to be submitted by a pharmaceutical company to
the government in an innovative drug submission will be entitled to that access. On the
other hand, also discussed in Chapter Three, this thesis establishes that private sector
statutes, with the exception of Quebec,691 do not authorize patients to “erase” personal
data from a clinical trial dataset. However, the right to withdraw consent to collection,
use, and dissemination of personal information, which is authorized by private sector
statutes,692 essentially “removes” the data from a clinical trial dataset in practice.
Therefore, this thesis has found that, while data exclusivity and personal data protection
operate consistently with each other in Canadian law and that data exclusivity does not
abrogate the personal data protection rights of the individual, there is a potential for
690

See Douez, supra note 25.
See QC Act, supra note 100.
692
See PIPEDA, supra note 101; BC PIPA, supra note 105; AB PIPA, supra note 104.
691
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conflict between the two legislative regimes if individuals withdraw consent to disclosure
of data. As established in Chapter Three, since clinical trials involve multiple stages with
respect to the flow of information,693 the withdrawal of individual consent to disclosure
of personal data at an early stage of a trial effectively prevents the data from making its
way to Health Canada. This “removal” of data can diminish the strength of the evidence
that supports the safety and efficacy of a new drug.
These findings are new to the literature about Canada’s data exclusivity provisions.
Scholars have argued that data exclusivity hinders access to affordable medicines by
delaying the market entry of cheaper generic drugs, thereby negatively affecting public
health.694 Although one Canadian judge has demonstrated agreement with the perspective
that data exclusivity postpones the market entry of lower-cost medicines,695 this thesis
has demonstrated that other Canadian judges and legal commentators have asserted that
data exclusivity actually promotes public health by providing incentives to develop new
medicines.696 Nonetheless, this earlier debate over the effect of data exclusivity on access
to affordable medicines appears to have contributed to an absence of scholarly or judicial
attention to the interests of the individual clinical trial participants in the data exclusivity
discourse. Despite the fact that clinical trial data comprises personal health information
protectable under personal data protection legislation across Canada, the need to consider
the potential application of personal data protection laws in the context of data

693

See Figure 6, above, in Chapter Three.
For example, see Lemmens & Telfer, supra note 338.
695
See Canadian Generic FC, supra note 430 at para 76: Mandamin J. states that Canada’s data exclusivity
framework does not directly contribute to public safety, since it postpones the introduction of lower cost
generic drugs.
696
See Canadian Generic FCA, supra note 451 at para 114; Lietzan, “Myths,” supra note 285.
694
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exclusivity appears to have been previously neglected by legislators, judges, and
academics.

4.2. Future Research
There is currently very little evidence that patients do withdraw consent to their
data being used and disclosed in clinical trials (or that withdrawal of consent with respect
to these activities is a sufficiently common occurrence that it affects the integrity of
datasets submitted to Health Canada). However, this does not mean that such a situation
will never occur in the future. Since there is an evident imbalance of power between
individual clinical trial participants and clinical trial sponsors, and in light of the fact that
the Douez decision prioritizes statutory protections over contractual restrictions in the
event of an imbalance of power between parties, there is an urgent need for a solution to
the potential conflict between the rights of individuals to control their personal data and
the data exclusivity rights of clinical trial sponsors.697
Moreover, reconciling this potential conflict depends on legally binding solutions.
This thesis focused solely on legally binding instruments with respect to the regulation of
clinical trials. This methodological decision revealed potential interpretive issues with the
law regarding data exclusivity and personal data protection. While ethical guidelines, as
described in Chapter One, that are contained within policies such as the TCPS 2 are
informative regarding acceptable practices in clinical research, it is the law, not ethics,

697

For example, the private sector statutes of British Columbia and Alberta both state that individuals may
not withdraw consent to the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information if this withdrawal would
frustrate the performance of a “legal obligation”: see BC PIPA, supra note 105, s 9(5); AB PIPA, supra
note 104, s 9(5). Since the term “legal obligation” is not defined under these statutes, future research could
explore the circumstances that would constitute a “legal obligation” within the meaning of each statute,
which would thus clarify the circumstances under which an individual could not stop the flow of data in the
context of clinical trials.
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that ultimately governs personal data protection and data exclusivity in Canada. Thus, the
challenges of the role of personal data protection, in light of data exclusivity, must be
considered and addressed by the respective levels of government.
Legally binding solutions would also avoid conflicts with Canada’s trade
obligations. Article 39(3) of TRIPS does not expressly allow any exceptions for member
states to meet the personal data protection rights of individuals.698 Similarly, there is no
exception under NAFTA to allow for domestic personal data protection obligations.
Canada’s refusal to enforce its domestic data exclusivity laws on the basis of a conflict
with personal data protection could be interpreted as a contravention of Canada’s data
exclusivity obligations under TRIPS and NAFTA. Member states that fail to enforce
intellectual property rights under TRIPS and NAFTA are subject to potential economic
sanctions under each agreement. As mentioned previously in Chapter One, TRIPS
facilitates a dispute mechanism that authorizes the suspension of “concessions” or “other
obligations” in various economic sectors.699 NAFTA provides for sanctions in a similar
manner, in which Article 2019 of NAFTA directly authorizes the “suspension of
benefits” for “measures” that do not conform to NAFTA.700 As in TRIPS, complainant

698

Wilkinson, “Confidential Information”, supra note 49 at 288: Wilkinson notes that the language of
Article 39(3) of TRIPS mandates the protection of “undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which
involves a considerable effort (i.e. clinical trials).” She also observes that there are permitted exceptions to
the obligation to protect test data (such as “where necessary to protect the public” or “where steps are taken
to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use”). However, Wilkinson ultimately
concludes that “there is no permitted exception under TRIPS for meeting the personal data control rights of
individual patients in such trials.”
699
Please refer to section 1.2 of this thesis, which described this sanctions mechanism. See also GATT
1994, supra note 56 and DSU, supra note 57.
700
NAFTA, supra note 51, art 2019(1):
If in its final report a panel has determined that a measure is inconsistent with the
obligations of this Agreement or causes nullification or impairment in the sense of Annex
2004 and the Party complained against has not reached agreement with any complaining
Party on a mutually satisfactory resolution pursuant to Article 2018(1) within 30 days of
receiving the final report, such complaining Party may suspend the application to the
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parties under NAFTA are also authorized to apply sanctions in different economic
sectors.701 In light of these far-reaching economic reprisals under TRIPS and NAFTA,
Canada’s failure to implement data exclusivity in accordance with its obligations would
have significant effects on Canada’s participation in global trade and would thereby result
in negative consequences to Canada’s national economic interests.
If personal data protection provisions diminish the value of data exclusivity rights
to the point where Canada is found not to have met its trade obligations in this regard,
there will be pressure on governments to reconcile these interests to preserve the integrity
of data exclusivity. On the other hand, the protection of privacy rights, including those
embedded in personal data protection statutes, though not an express part of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,702 is part of Quebec’s Charter of Human
Rights and Freedoms703 and may engender constitutional protection. These topics are
worthy subjects for future research.

Party complained against of benefits of equivalent effect until such time as they have
reached agreement on a resolution of the dispute.
701
Ibid, art 2019(2):
In considering what benefits to suspend pursuant to paragraph 1: (a) a complaining Party
should first seek to suspend benefits in the same sector or sectors as that affected by the
measure or other matter that the panel has found to be inconsistent with the obligations of
this Agreement or to have caused nullification or impairment in the sense of Annex 2004;
and (b) a complaining Party that considers it is not practicable or effective to suspend
benefits in the same sector or sectors may suspend benefits in other sectors.
702
Charter, supra, note 357.
703
CQLR c C-12, s 5.
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Appendix 1: Summary of Major Findings with Respect to Personal Health Information
Protection Legislation
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Appendix 2: Information Constructs Summary

Definition

Confidential
Information
Information that
is intended to be
kept secret and is
thus
communicated
only to select
parties, if at all.

Data Exclusivity
Allows innovative drug
manufacturers to maintain
temporary, exclusive rights
to information generated in
clinical trials.

Duration of
Protection
(Canada)

Potentially
perpetual

8 years

Status in
Canadian
Law

Common law
(duty of
confidence)

Food and Drug Regulations
(federal)

Personal Data Protection
Provides rules governing
processing and handling –
i.e. collection, use, and
disclosure – of
information about an
identifiable individual,
where this information has
made its way into
organizations.
For the life of the
individual; protection after
death can vary, ranging
from 10 to 30 years.704
Regulated by federal and
provincial statutes
Application of a particular
statute to personal
information depends on
whether the organization
is a public or private
sector organization.

TRIPS, Article
Status in
International 39 (covered as
“undisclosed
Law
information”)

NAFTA, Article
1711

TRIPS: no minimum term of
data exclusivity protection;
leaves member states free to
address term according to
their own preferences.
NAFTA: requires member
states to grant a minimum 5year protection.
Both TRIPS and NAFTA
authorize their member
states to enact more
extensive protection than
that required.

704

See Wilkinson, “Control Conflicts,” supra note 355 at 255, fn 141.

Most jurisdictions have
also enacted healthspecific personal data
protection.
OECD Privacy Guidelines
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Appendix 3: List of Acronyms

ANDS

Acronym

Description
Abbreviated New Drug Submission

CSR

Clinical Study Report

DPR

Data Protection Regulation

DSU

Dispute Settlement Understanding

FDA

Food and Drug Administration

ICH

International Council on Harmonization of
Technical Requirements for the
Registration of Pharmaceuticals for
Human Use

ICH-CSR

ICH’s Structure and Content of Clinical
Study Reports

ICH-GCP

ICH’s Guideline for Good Clinical
Practice

NAFTA

North American Free Trade Agreement

NDS

New Drug Submission

NOC

Notice of Compliance

PGP

Personal Genome Project

SNDS

Supplemental New Drug Submission

TCPS 2

Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical
Conduct for Research Involving Humans

TRIPS

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property

WIPO

World Intellectual Property Organization

WTO

World Trade Organization
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